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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to explore how family farms shift their traditional financing models 
towards off-farm equity financing. To achieve this aim, semi-structured (in-depth) 
interviews were conducted with four family farms engaged in the off-farm equity process, 
and with fourteen farm advisors who are actively engaged in advising farms and off-farm 
investors in establishing off-farm equity alliances. Following the aim of the study, this 
thesis follows the publication1 style of Ph.D. thesis presentation. The first-person style of 
academic writing is used, as preferred in qualitative inquiry, in reporting the research 
process, evidence, and interpretation, across the whole thesis. Three different but 
interconnected papers reflect interpretive findings from the empirical evidence on off-
farm equity capital in the Australian family farm industry. The reflexive interaction 
between extant literature about off-farm equity capital in family farms and interpretive 
findings led to the following research questions to achieve the above overarching aim: 
i. Why do family farms and off-farm equity investors differ in their views and how 
can these competing views be managed (Paper 1)? 
ii. Why and how do family farms divert their traditional financing path into off-farm 
equity path (Paper 2)?  
iii. How can family farms institutionalise their governance and reporting structures 
for accessing to off-farm equity (Paper 3)?   
Paper one, based on advisors’ experiences, addresses the competing views of farms 
and off-farm investors in the off-farm equity alliance and the mechanism through which 
these competing views could be minimised. Based on the interpretative thematic analysis, 
findings show eight pairs of opposing arguments between family farms and off-farm 
investors that might inhibit the flow of equity to family farms from off-farm equity 
investors. These competing views are: emotional vs. commercial, cost vs. profit, 
instinctive vs. reasoning, continuous vs. cessation, financial vs. non-financial literacy, 
                                       
1 These “papers will have been published, accepted, submitted or prepared for 
publication during the period of candidature” 
(http://policy.usq.edu.au/documents/151774PL) 
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lower vs. higher scale, traditional vs. professional, and operational vs. capital efficiency. 
In each pair, the first element relates to farms’ position and the second element indicates 
the investors’ position. Paper one also identifies two different strategic responses: 
investment readiness and equity structuring, which are used by family farms to minimise 
the competing interest. Institutional logic theory and strategic response model were 
inductively selected to interpret these findings.  
Paper two accounts the practical experiences of family farms for off-farm equity 
journey. An interpretative narrative analytical framework identifies five narratives about 
the off-farm equity process from the stories farms shared. These narratives towards new 
financing mix include motivation for change, soul reflecting, right capital and right 
partners, professionalization, and letting go and taking on narratives. Interpreting the 
narratives emerged in the second paper, through path dependent, path creation process and 
new path creation theory, the study outlines four- steps off-farm equity accessing process 
for family farms. This process covers:  responding triggers, searching alternatives, 
spotting obstacles, and getting ready. Learnings from this path creation also helped family 
farms to be investment ready.  
Paper three, grounded in both farms’ and advisors’ views, explores the governance 
process of family farms to access off-farm equity. An interpretative thematic analysis 
explores three elements of the governance process including governance culture, 
alignment and structure in the equity structuration process that lead family farms towards 
institutionalization. Following the institutional theory, this paper suggests a three-stage 
model of the governance process for family farms wishing to access off-farm equity. 
These three stages include transformation, formation, and intensification. Findings also 
suggest that a case by case governance and reporting practices, rather than a unique style 
of governance and reporting, seems to be more suitable for family farms wishing to access 
off-farm equity. In this paper, the researchers interpret off-farm investors and farm 
advisors together as a background institution in the off-farm equity setting, which inserts 
normative pressure on family farms to adopt a governance structure and reporting 
practices while accessing off-farm equity. 
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The philosophical position taken in this research was interpretive epistemology, which 
guided me to adapt qualitative interpretive methodology. I used the purposive and 
snowball sampling to select family farms and farm advisors engaged in off-farm equity 
accessing process, to conduct the in-depth interview. During the analytical phase, this 
study relied on both manual techniques and text analysis software. Analysis, findings, and 
interpretations of each paper were data driven.  
One of the main original contributions of my thesis is to explore how family farms can 
shift their traditional financing models towards an innovative financing model, off-farm 
equity capital. Under this broader topic area, my specific contributions are three: first, this 
study gives empirical evidence regarding the barriers to off-farm equity alliance from the 
farm and investors perspectives, and how to build and sustain this off-farm equity alliance 
in the context of family farms. Second, my thesis demonstrates a path to off-farm equity, 
and how to overcome the hurdles in that new financing path for family farms. Third, my 
study shows how family farms can demonstrate their governance and reporting practices 
to off-farm investors to convince the investors that they can rely on family farms. In 
actualising these contributions, my research also contributed to the conceptual, theoretical, 
and methodological literature about farm and agricultural finance, equity alliance, family 
farms’ institutional path dependence, path creation and institutional process of family 
farms. Policy implications are also discussed and are indicated for further research while 
acknowledging the limitations of this project.     
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1.Introduction 
Family farms cry out for access to sufficient finance, irrespective of economic 
settings. The year 2014 was celebrated as the year of family farming to consider this 
industry as the centrepiece of economic and business development right across the 
globe (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2014; Glover, 
2015; Glover & Reay, 2015; Van Vliet et al., 2015). However, most family farms have 
been struggling under constant pressure to survive, grow, and expand owing to lags in 
financial capital (van der Ploeg, 2013; Snyder, 2012; Schnaiberg, 1980; Havelock et 
al., 1971; Cochrane, 1958). The Australian family farming sector, the empirical setting 
of this study, is no exception. The scenario of the 100 years old Australian farm and 
agricultural finance model, based on internal equity and bank debt, has also become 
less feasible in meeting its growth capital and working capital needs, at least for those 
farms that want to achieve scale and like to expand their business (Heath & Tomlinson, 
2016; Sanyal, 2014; Australian Farm Institute (AFI), 2014; The Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group (ANZ), 2014; ANZ & Port Jackson Partners, 2012). 
Traditionally, these two financing sources advanced the Australian farming industry 
by increasing farms’ sizes, innovativeness, and successions, however, continuous 
structural changes (Mann, Freyens, & Dinh, 2017), have raised concerns about the 
sustainability of this traditional debt-dominated model (Heath & Tomlinson, 2016). 
The excessive dependence on debt capital could be viable if farm producers had 
sufficient internal equity to support their farms and to service their debt obligations, 
which is unlikely to happen (Dwyer, Lim, & Murphy, 2004). Alternatively, access to 
sufficient long-term off-farm equity capital is believed, by agricultural finance 
scholars, to be one of the critical solutions to defeating family farms’ financing 
pressures. Thus, this research is an attempt towards exploring alternative long-term 
finance, equity finance from off-farm sources in particular, in the context of the 
Australian farming industry. More specifically, this thesis explores how family farms 
shift their traditional bank-based financing models to off-farm equity models.   
Financial capital is regarded as one of the enablers to farm, and agricultural 
development (Christy, Mabaya, Wilson, Mutambatsere, & Mhlang, 2009) as finance 
facilitates firms’ growth, ensures survival, and enhances the likelihood of 
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implementing potential investment plans (Koropp, Kellermanns, Grichnik, & Stanley, 
2014). Financing decisions are, therefore, considered to be a key component of family 
firms’ strategic decision making because of their linkage with firms’ sales, succession, 
and internationalization (Michiels & Molly, 2017). Financing strategies associated 
with traditional businesses may not work effectively in farming and agricultural 
businesses as farming is fundamentally different from other businesses. Over the last 
decade, this has been the most vulnerable sector due to climatic disasters, mainly 
affected by floods, droughts, storms, and others (FAO, 2015). Expected production 
shocks from nature, combined with the effects of unexpected shocks on production 
cycles, stages, and outcomes, make the farm and agriculture business unique as 
controlling risk goes beyond farmers’ control (Gephart, Deutsch, Pace, Troell, & 
Seekell, 2017; Kahan, 2013; Errington & Gasson, 1994; Gasson et al., 1988). 
Historically, family farms all over the world use dichotomous sources of financing: 
internal equity and debt capital (Scofield, 1972). Many of the growing concerns have 
challenged the dichotomised funding model, such as- urgency to fight with natural 
shocks; emerging capital needs for farms business’ capital intensity; declining profit 
pattern in farm businesses; farmers’ expectation for better life; and farms’ increased 
financial and liquidity risks stemming from excessive usage of debt ( Featherstone, 
Ibendahl, Winter, & Spaulding, 2005; Errington & Gasson, 1994; Lowenberg-DeBoer, 
Featherstone, Collins, & Leatham, 1988; Scofield, 1972). 
Motivated by the issues above, this research contributes to exploring an alternative 
financing model that includes off-farm equity capital in the context of Australian 
family farms. Methodologically and theoretically, this research responds to the call for 
using a qualitative methodology and institutional theoretical framework to gain a better 
understanding of family business financing decisions (Michiels & Molly, 2017; 
Soleimanof, Rutherford, & Webb, 2017) with a focus on off-farm equity in this study. 
This thesis contributes in three broader ways to the extant literature: First, this thesis 
explores the competing views of two main parties to an off-farm equity deal, namely 
the demanders (family farms) and suppliers (off-farm equity investors) (Michiels & 
Molly, 2017), and how these competing views could be managed (paper 1) .  Secondly, 
this study sheds light on how family farms break their financial lock-in to traditional 
financing models and learn investment readiness through new path creation processes 
(paper 2). Finally, this research contributes to an understanding of governance 
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structure and reporting practices in off-farm equity deals, which in turn facilitates the 
relationship between family farms and off-farm investors (paper 3). The paper -
specific contribution is indicated in each chapter in alignment with the broader aims 
of the thesis.  
1.2.Core terminologies and use of the first-person style of academic writing 
A clear understanding of off-farm equity financing strategy in family farms 
involves a combination of a different branch of knowledge. Thus, this thesis utilizes 
multidisciplinary terminologies including family business, family farms, traditional 
strategic alliance, institutional logics, strategic responses to institutional pressure in an 
organization, path dependency, organizational path creation, institutionalization, 
firms’ governance, and reporting literature. Family farms as being a branch of family 
businesses are not beyond the theoretical and practical relevance of the financing 
decision aspects of family businesses and other non-family businesses, and some 
cross-disciplinary conceptual and theoretical ideas are therefore adopted throughout 
the thesis. Table 1 shows five common terminologies used in the papers and other 
chapters. Some other objectives and paper-specific terminologies have also been 
defined as necessary in specific chapters.  
The first-person style of academic writing is used, as it is preferred in qualitative 
inquiry (Chenail, 2009; Webb, 1992), in reporting the research process, evidence and 
interpretation. This writing style is applied to the whole thesis. Use of “we” and “our” 
acknowledges the researcher's integrity (Chenail, 2009) and the contribution of 
principal investigator and supervisors, as detailed in the statement of contribution prior 
to each paper. However, this thesis is primarily the work of the candidate, who 
conducted most of the work. 
1.3.Contextualization and historical background   
To set the context of off-farm equity financing in family farms and agriculture, this 
study relied on the literature about US farm financing, as literature on other economic 
setting was relatively underdeveloped. Two reasons support the choice for selecting 
the case of US farming to create the case for Off-farm equity in this study. First, 
empirical works for understanding farm financing issues were less developed beyond 
the US, in comparable economies, like Australia, until recently. Thus, the Australian 
academic community may learn conceptual understanding from the US literature. 
Second, possibly more important than the first reason is that it was observed in the 
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review stage of the thesis that there are many structural similarities in agricultural 
changes and their influences on the trajectory of farm financing between Australia and 
the US. To limit the space in this chapter, some US-centric farm financing literature 
has been shown in appendix 1. Section 1.1 of appendix 1, summarises the contexts in 
which when and how: the US farm credit system emerges; the US farm sector 
immersed itself into credit crisis; policy directions developed into actions to cut the 
US farm credit crunch; limitations of farms’ debt and internal financing models; and 
the emergence of a market-based farm financing model. More specifically, in this 
section of the appendix, reviews also demonstrate that off-farm equity has been 
suggested, for the first time in global farm financing history, as one of the policy 
weapons to defeat the US farm crisis. This reference point of off-farm equity usage by 
farm businesses has drawn the attention of academics, policymakers, and 
commentators concerned with farms and agricultural finance. From a broader 
perspective, this thesis is related to the conceptual ideas of US off-farm equity, which 
has been narrowed down to the Australian context. 
Table 1: Core terminologies used in the study  
Off-farm 
equity  
Equity capital accessed by farms from private equity investors not related to 
family ownership and any other equity sources than internal equity or retained 
earnings. In this study, external equity is used as a synonym for off-farm 
equity (Thiele, 2017; Wang, Leatham, & Chaisantikulawat, 2002).  
Off-farm 
equity 
alliance 
An institutional setting of two autonomous stakeholders –family farms and 
off-farm investors who engage in an active process using shared roles, norms 
and structure to act (Gray & Wood, 1991). The following synonyms are also 
used throughout the research: off-farm equity collaboration, external equity 
partnership, off-farm equity alliance/joint venture 
Family 
farms 
Farms in which family members hold the ownership of land and other assets, 
enjoy decision making freedom on operational aspects (Van Vliet et al., 2015) 
and employ a small proportion of hired labor (Djurfeldt, 1996; Errington & 
Gasson, 1994). 
Traditional 
farm 
financing 
sources 
Refers to generational finance- internal equity, retained earnings-, short-term 
bank loan and credit services, medium-term bank loan, leasing capital and a 
long-term bank loan (Mishra &Moss, 2017; Heath & Tomlinson, 2016; 
Casson, 1999; Scofield, 1972).   
Off-farm 
investors 
Private investors who want to invest capital in family farms in expectation of 
future income or asset appreciation (Miller, Stucker, Smith, Krause, & 
Harrington, 1985). Different classes of investors are a wealthy individual, 
family offices, asset managers, merchant banks, pension’s funds, private 
equity investors, and wealth management and hedge funds (Sippel, Larder, & 
Lawrence, 2017; Isakson, 2014; Miller et al.,1985).  
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To describe the context of off-farm equity in the Australian farm financing 
industry, we refer to subsections 2.1.to 2.5 under section 2 of Appendix 1. In these 
sections, this thesis outlines the historical evolution and contributions of Australian 
farms and agriculture; the fallen competitiveness picture of Australian farm 
businesses; the structural changes in Australian farms and agriculture, especially 
regarding farm financing structure. More importantly, reviews of these sections 
portray a picture of how, once established, the Australian public finance-based farm 
credit system was gradually replaced by a market-based credit system and why the 
traditional bank based Australian farm financing model cannot adequately address the 
financing needs of farm industry. Table 1 in appendix 1 shows the timeline of the farm 
financing credit system in Australia. These reviews lay the foundation of this thesis 
which explores why off-farm equity is another alternative form of farm financing that 
might satisfy long-term capital needs for the farms and industry. 
Against a backdrop of these contexts of a changed farm credit system and 
challenges with the limitations of internal equity and debt finance mentioned above 
and in Appendix 1, Australian farm policy makers, academic and industry research, 
media commentators, industry stakeholders and professional farm advisors have 
focused renewed attention to exploring more suitable alternative capital funding 
models to ensure sufficient access to finance. To give a sense of the gravity of capital 
constraints in Australian agriculture, ANZ and Port Jackson Partners (2012, p.3) noted:  
“Farmers face significant challenges in raising sufficient capital to fund 
growth and support farm turnover.” New structures for owning and 
operating farms need to be encouraged to attract investment from domestic 
and foreign sources and capital markets. These structures might include a 
rapidly evolving equity partnership, modern variants of share farming, and 
the use of off-take agreements”.  
 
ANZ and Port Jackson Partners (2012) has estimated a one trillion dollar of the 
capital gap ($600 billion for capital investment and $400 billion for operating 
investment) to capture an additional $1.7 trillion in agricultural exports by 2050. It is 
unlikely that the Australian banking system can finance such a volume of capital needs 
of Australian farming and agriculture. Hence, alternative financing is necessary. 
To explore alternative financing models and other important issues, the Australian 
government has drafted the Australian Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper, 
2015 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015) reflecting government priorities on the basis 
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of 1000 submission from Australian farm stakeholders. Access to farm finance was 
one of the nine leading themes that government raised in the issue paper. Under the 
access to finance theme, five key issues were targeted for discussions: (1) how to 
attract private capital in farms better; (2) what are the best examples of innovative 
financing models for farms; (3) what drives farms to undertake new financing modes; 
(4) what business structure preserves farms’ ownership; and (5) how foreign 
investment enhance farms’ finance and productivity. While developing research 
questions for this thesis, I also reviewed the issue and white paper submissions that 
also reflected the needs for alternative financing model for Australian farm businesses. 
1.4. Off-farm equity in Australian farms and agriculture 
The need for sufficient equity capital in Australian agriculture was acknowledged 
in the early 2000s. A conference titled Efficient Equity Credit Financing for the Rural 
Sector was organised by the Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation 
(RIRDC) and revealed that external equity remained a neglected issue in the Australian 
rural capital market (for full conference proceedings see Dwye & Lim, 2001). During 
that conference, it became clear that there is potential for an off-farm equity market in 
Australia, but this source of finance is rarely used (Dwye & Lim, 2001). Conference 
commentaries expose the existence of barriers that do not motivate off-farm equity 
providers to supply equity capital in the Australian setting:  
i. lower scalability of farms (generally less than $5million); 
ii. lower profitability of farms (most of the farms earn below the benchmark rate 
of return 20%); 
iii. high information cost of equity providers (in selecting the right farms); 
iv. farms’ fear of losing control in equity alliance;  
v. rural-urban knowledge divide among partners, and negative media image of 
farms; 
vi. farms’ poor technological set up; 
vii. farms’ relatively long-term orientation; and 
viii. no clear exit strategies.  
 
From that period to the present, little is known about the modus operandi of off-
farm equity in Australian agriculture, at least in the academic literature. However, 
anecdotal, and grey literature regarding off-farm equity alliance is growing.     
Contemporary empirical work, anecdotal findings, and media coverage also 
show the rise of Australian family farms and agribusiness as an attractive choice for 
off-farm equity capital providers. In the academic domain, some studies (Sippel et al., 
2017; Larder, Sippel, & Lawrence, 2015; Magnan, 2015; Sippel, 2015) has analysed 
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the injection of private capital, mainly from foreign sources, in family farm businesses. 
These scholarly works account for the recent development of private capital flows and 
models in Australian agriculture under the discourse of Agri-financialization, land 
grabbing, and food security. Much less is known about how family dominant farms 
access this private capital, off-farm equity in particular. Magnan (2015) discussed 
private capital injection under different business models- own operate, own lease out, 
joint venture, crop, and sheep production. Extant literature, however,  has not clearly 
explained in detail how two partners- farms and investors- come together to make the 
off-farm equity deals. This insight is significant in farm businesses’ private financial 
deal, foreign farmland investment deal,  in particular, as this deal is risky to all 
including farms, investors, governments, and others (Li, 2015). Few academic works 
concentrate on off-farm equity capital and that focus in detail on all its aspects, barriers 
and suitable institutional mechanism.  
1.5.Benefits of off-farm equity 
Off-farm equity capital in family farms is not a novel idea; rather evidence 
suggests that off-farm equity is attractive to both farms and equity investors. Section 
1 and 2 in Appendix 2 shows both the demand and supply side of off-farm equity. In 
traditional family businesses, off-farm-equity has been used as external equity. 
Michiels and Molly (2017) recorded some benefits accessing the external equity in 
traditional businesses. For instance, external equity supplies long-term capital to firms 
with capital intensity, cyclicality, and growth potential (King & Peng, 2013). As noted 
in Michiels and Molly (2017), external equity also strengthens firms’ long-term 
performance (Viviani, Giorgino, & Steri, 2008), provides management know-how 
(Martí, Menéndez-Requejo, & Rottke, 2013) and improves firms’ governance 
structure (Achleitner, Herman, Lerner, & Lutz, 2010), and strategy (Scholes, Wright, 
Westhead, Bruining, & Kloeckner, 2009). 
In the family farms context, off-farm equity also benefits farms in different 
ways. Shifting from debt to off-farm equity, family farms could inject additional 
capital, at no incremental financial risk, to grow, to overcome cash flow shortages, and 
to meet working capital needs (Miller et al., 1985). Some other benefits also include 
that it helps: expanding a farm’s scale, financing projects during financial distress, 
attaining production efficiency and increasing maximum business opportunities 
without additional financial risks (Wang et al., 2002; Barry, Bierlen, & Sotomayor, 
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2000; Lowenberg-DeBoer, Featherstone,& Leatham, 1989; Collins, 1988; Fiske, 
Batte, & Lee, 1986; Raup, 1986). Investors are also motivated to see the long-term 
return and the fundamentals of the agricultural asset class to diversify their portfolio. 
Family farms’ resilient business model, which is based on generational capital also 
attracts investors to invest. 
1.6. Market requirements, models, and barriers 
The flow of equity capital in farm businesses from off-farm investors mainly 
depends on the availability of market requirements in any economic setting. Many 
authors (Dodson,1994; Lowenberg-DeBoer et al. 1989; Collins & Bourn, 1986; Miller 
et al. 1985) have addressed the issue of off-farm equity market requirements as a 
condition for the economic viability of off-farm equity. According to these authors, 
the components of the off-farm equity market include a set of farm business with 
required size and rate of return, sufficient numbers of investment, farms’ willingness 
to participate in off-farm equity, and the institutional arrangements to bind the farms 
and off-farm investors together. In the space of both academic and anecdotal literature 
in global and Australian farms and agricultural finance, appendix 2 of this study, shows 
a review of market requirements for off-farm equity. Appendix 2 overviews the 
sources of demand for off-farm equity covering varied sizes, and nature. This section 
also outlines the sources of off-farm investors, types of investors and agricultural asset 
class that investors are looking to invest. A diverse group of investors is also indicated 
including institutional investors, private equity, pension funds and high net worth 
individuals and sizes of their investment.  
From institutional arrangement points of view, extant literature has also 
recorded different arrangements including direct ownership, limited, unlimited and 
corporate ownership, and equity partnerships. Furthermore, different investment 
models, including own-operate model, own-lease model, lease-operate model, OPCO–
PROPCO, share farming, joint venture, asset management, management investment 
schemes, leasing and public ownership, that are currently practiced in the off-farm 
equity market, is also discussed in detail appendix 2.  
In a context of less matured academic literature, like Australian setting, anecdotal 
research addressing off-farm equity financing is on the rise. The following works 
provide more details about off-farm equity partnerships: Cotter, Rochecouste, & 
Mohsin, (2016); Alexander, (2015); Agrifood Skills Australia, (2015); KPMG,( 2015); 
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Tomilson, (2014); ANZ, (2014); Commonwealth of Australia, (2014); PPB, (2014); 
and Clark et al., (2014). We also refer to appendix 2 where we describe the different 
off-farm equity models in the Australian context. In addition to the emerging picture 
of off-farm equity models in Australian farms and agriculture, these studies also find 
similar barriers to the off-farm equity market that was in existence in the early 2000s 
in the Australian market as mentioned earlier. Summing up all these studies, we can 
conclude  that  off-farm equity usage in Australian farming is gradually moving 
forward but is not attractive to off-farm investors due to farms’ poor 
investability,vogue management style, poor information infrastructure, immature 
financial governance and concentrated ownership structure, poor level of farms’ 
reporting, cultural disparity, goal ambiguity, lack of off-farm equity market liquidity, 
lack of asset managers and lack of suitable products (Cotter et al., 2016; Alexander, 
2015; Agrifood Skills Australia, 2015; KPMG, 2015; Tomilson, 2014; ANZ, 2014; 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2014; PPB, 2014, & Clark et al.,2014). 
As a consequence of the above development, off-farm equity investors including 
individual and institutional investors entered the axis of finance-agriculture relations 
in contemporary Australian farm financing (Larder, Sippel, & Argent, 2017).  Media 
reports and commentators (Clark,2014; Schlesinger,2014; Lynch, 2014; Bryant, 2013; 
Knight, 2010) in Australian family farm businesses suggests off-farm equity, as a new 
farming investment model, is on the rise, and there is enormous potential for the off-
farm equity market. Like the grey literature, media reports also find some barriers to 
off-farm equity in Australian agriculture mainly from farms’ point of view: lack of a 
solid plan, track records of farms’ performance and risks (Marshall, 2015). Some other 
commentators have identified farm consultant and advisors as one of the big barriers 
as only a handful of advisors understand farm business dynamics very well and can 
manage investors’ funds efficiently (Marshall, 2013). Yet, there is a little 
understanding of how family farms can shift their traditional financing model to off-
farm equity model. Therefore, this thesis explores: why family farms and off-farm 
investors contradict each other; how these contradictions can be minimised; how farms 
can transform for this new form of relationship, and how family farms can 
institutionalise their norms and practices. This study thus contributes to these 
unexplored areas.  
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1.7.Points of tension 
The linkages between finance (off-farm equity providers in this case)  and 
farming sector are termed as “unnatural coupling” (Ghosh, 2010), as off-farm investors 
are not farmers (Valoral Advisors, 2015) and vice versa. Both of them have different 
learning backgrounds and perspectives (“Investing in Agriculture,”2014). This 
relationship is neither “abstract nor one-sided” rather it is “multidimensional” (Sippel 
et al., 2017). Neither family farms nor off-farm investors are knowledgeable regarding 
one another and experience asymmetric information (Wulandari, Meuwissen, 
Karmana, & Lansink, 2017). Hence, it is not surprising that farms and investors would 
show contradictions in their logic. 
 Some aggregated reasons for the tension between farms and off-farm equity 
investors, as cited in the current literature are: high transaction cost, inflexible 
financing arrangement, moral hazard problems between farms and investors, and the 
peculiar organizational structure of farm businesses (Wang et al., 2002; Barry & 
Robison,2001; Lowenberg DeBoer et.al.,1989). Tensions may arise from both farms’ 
and investors’ perspective. The previous research has attempted to explore point of 
tensions without clearly identifying the perspective of farms and investors separately. 
To fill this gap in the literature, one of the main goals of this research is to classify 
arguments of farms and investors’ points of view.  
Family farms want to have full family control within the family farms, and they 
also want to successfully pass it on to the next generation (Anderson & Jack, 2000; 
Gasson & Errington, 1993) as a symbol of prestige (Anderson & Jack, 2000). They 
also want to pass the operations (Kimhi, 1994), expectations (Laband & Lentz, 1983), 
and strategic decision-making authority (Kimhi & Lopez, 1999) to the next generation 
of the family.  
Off-farm investors may also be concerned about the legitimacy of family farm 
businesses from different standpoints.  For instance, family farms are prone to peculiar 
business and organizational model, information asymmetry and the expropriation 
tendency of outsiders’ capital and other benefits. Farm businesses vary regarding their 
complex business arrangement (Johnson, Morehart, Culver, Poppe, & Salvioni, 2009), 
legal structure (Weller, Smith, & Pritchard, 2013), ownership, decision making and 
controlling aspects (Calus & Van Huylenbroeck, 2005, 2008). The idiosyncratic 
business and operating environment of farms and the agriculture industry create 
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information asymmetry for the key stakeholders of this industry (Ahlers, Broll, & 
Eckwert, 2013). Off-farm equity investors also express their concerns about farmers’ 
unprofessional business models. Family farms’ business models are criticised for 
emotional attachment, the non-economic goal at the cost of negative profit-growth, 
and desire to sustain full control by passing the business on to the next generation 
(Austin, Deary, Gibson, McGregor, & Dent, 1996; Gasson & Errington, 1993). Off-
farm equity investors also do not see any guarantee of their investment in family 
businesses as insiders may use investors’ resources for their benefit (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Outsider investors think that insiders expropriate outside investors’ 
interests in many ways (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000): 
stealing profit, selling out the assets, positioning unqualified family members in 
managerial position and overpaying executives. 
These naïve business models of family farms can be compared with the peculiar 
financial logics of family businesses (Gallo, Tàpies, & Cappuyns, 2004). Manager-
owner family businesses show the following attributes (Gallo et al. 2004): “do not 
want to be controlled,” “do not account to anybody” and “cannot show the firms’ real 
picture” to others. These attributes negatively affect family firms’ growth potential, 
impedes the collecting of fund required for investment and weakens long-term 
competence (Gallo et al., 2004). Structural changes including demographic, social 
environment and economic dimensions in the spectrum of family farming may also 
compound tension in the minds of investors (Downey, Threlkeld, & Warburton, 2017).  
The above research findings, however, have not addressed competing views of 
both farms and investors and how these competing logics could be minimised. 
Empirical research is also silent on how family farms break their traditional model 
while navigating the logics. However, theorising the experiences of family farms’ off-
farm equity shifting process can contribute to understanding the off-farm equity 
accessing process. In addition, there does not appear to develop any governance 
structure at family farms that might assure off-farm investors that their investment in 
family farms would be safe and rewarded. While these issues are very significant in 
accessing the off-farm equity in family farms, family farms scholars have given less 
empirical attention to these issues. This research, hence, is mainly concerned with 
identifying the main competing views from family farms and off-farm investors 
perspective. This study also focused on how these competing logics could be managed 
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by developing some norms, strategies and structural issues at family farms. Finally, 
this study explores how family farms can institutionalise their governance process. 
Following the above theoretical problems defined, this thesis expects to contribute to 
unraveling the shifting of farms financing model and to the development off-farm 
equity financing alliance in family farming industry. 
1.8.Theoretical perspectives 
1.8.1. Theoretical shifts in family business financing decision 
Theories and empirical evidence in corporate finance literature is thought to 
have little bearing in fixing the capital structure issues in farm businesses (Lowenberg-
DeBoer et al., 1989) owing to fundamental differences between agricultural farms and 
other firms (Wu, Guan, & Myers, 2014; Zhengfei & Oude Lansink, 2006). From a 
theoretical perspective, there has been a persistent call to develop an institutional 
framework, both in agricultural farms (Dodson, 1994) and in traditional firms 
(Michiels & Molly, 2017; Soleimanof et al., 2017). Institutions, either formal or 
informal, prescribe some “rules of the game” as being acceptable to all and sets the 
platform to comply with those rules ( Scott, 2013; North, 1993; Dimaggio & Powell, 
1983). The institutional platform enhances the productivity of economic activity, 
minimises transaction cost, and most importantly it creates governance mechanism 
(Soleimanof et al., 2017; Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009). Family businesses in 
general – be it agricultural farms (McElwee & Rudmann, 2008; Lowenberg-DeBoer 
et al., 1989; Gasson et al., 1988) or traditional firms- (Soleimanof et al., 2017)- have 
not had any formal institutional framework because family businesses traditionally 
access resources (capital, labour, networks) from generational sources (Soleimanof et 
al., 2017; Glover & Reay, 2015).  
 Researchers in traditional family businesses have already explored the various 
limitations of family business’ financing decisions which have been discussed mainly 
with traditional theories: agency, pecking order, socio-emotional wealth, planned 
behaviour. For example, in a comprehensive review of 131 scholarly articles, Michiels 
and Molly (2017) found two types of theoretical approaches in family firms’ capital 
structure decisions: traditional approaches and non-traditional approaches. In the 
traditional approach, family firms want to finance their capital needs mainly by 
internal equity and retained earnings, and then firms attempt to access external finance 
(debt and external equity). Traditional financing decisions are characterised by 
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economic logics: conflict of interest (principal–agent; principal-principal), potential 
transaction costs, and information asymmetry of bringing external capital suppliers 
into the capital structure (Michiels & Molly, 2017). These views are theorised by 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), trade-off theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) 
and the pecking order model (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Equity investors feel 
discouraged to supply off-farm equity due to the likelihood of conflicts and interest 
that are manifested through agency theory. Fernando, Schneible, and Suh (2014) 
mentioned two types of agency problems: type 1 and type 2 agency problem because 
of which private investors do not like to invest in family businesses. Type 1 emerges 
in owner-manager family firms due to the conflict of interest between owners and 
managers, while the conflict of interest between large family shareholder and 
nonfamily shareholders create type 2 agency problem.  
The other approach to taking financing decision can be called self-interest or the 
owner-manager preference approach in firms’ behavioural models (Neckebrouck, 
Schulze, & Zellweger, 2017; Newbert & Craig, 2017; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-
Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). These approaches have been theorised 
by socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), stewardship 
theory (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997), and planned behaviour theory 
(Koropp et al., 2014). According to these theories, investors may also point at family 
firms’ preferences to non-economic and non-professional motives. Non-economic 
motives of family farms indicate placing “dynastic motive’ well ahead of business 
motives (Casson,1999) while non-professional motives refer to poor governance 
structure, dominance of self-interest over business interest, appropriation of firm 
resources for personal benefit, firms behavioural approach ( Michiels & Molly, 2017; 
Neckebrouck, Manigart, & Meuleman, 2017; Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & 
Craig, 2008). Investors tend to consider firms’ professionalization, human resources, 
and opportunity to reduce agency costs before selecting firms to invest in. Family 
firms, on the other end, blame investors’ intention to control the firms’ ownership 
rather than facilitate growth and development (Wu, Chua, & Chrisman, 2007). Other 
research (Zata-Poutziouris, 2011; Seet & Graves, 2010) found three kinds of the gap 
between farms and investors: the finance gap, the knowledge gap, and the empathy 
gap. Also, the financial assets in agriculture are complex in nature, and the investors 
diverge (Clapp, 2017). 
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The traditional theories have advanced the scholarly discussions about family 
business financing decisions, but they are also criticised for many reasons. One of the 
main limitations of agency theory, pecking order, and trade-off theory is that they 
consider financial arguments in selecting capital mixes for family businesses (Michiels 
& Molly, 2017). Socioemotional wealth theory is criticised for increasing sole agency 
of family firms in taking decisions (Newbert & Craig, 2017). Another limitation of 
these theories is that they are silent about how to address the demands side concerns 
and supply side concerns of family financing decisions (Michiels & Molly, 2017).  
Given the importance of the demand and supply side of financing decision (Michiels 
& Molly, 2017), we believe it is necessary to develop an institutional framework for 
family farms that would consider both demand and supply side perspectives in family 
farm financing decisions.  
1.8.2. Institutional theoretical linkage 
In line with the research question and the evidence explored from the data set, this 
research can be better explained through different theories under the central domain of 
institutional theory: institutional logics (paper one, institutional lock-in/ institutional 
path dependence and path-breaking (paper two), and institutionalisation process theory 
(paper three).One of the basic tenets of institutional theory is that it emphasises on a 
set of norms of rules for individuals, group of individuals, and organisation to 
legitimise their actions and to ensure their survival in the broader institutional 
environment (Scott,2013; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010). Institutional theorists define, 
as reviewed in Bruton et al. (2010), the term institution as a: formal set of rules; flexible 
and shared rules and norms, set of granted assumption, and set of ex-ante agreements, 
which are expected from individuals and institutions to follow.    
Institutional theorists are divided into a different school of thoughts that contribute 
in formulating different theoretical essence of institutional theory. Before discussing 
relevant institutional theories and terminologies, it is better to mention, at this stage of 
this research, that it is probably impossible to make an exhaustive list of terminologies, 
clear conceptualization, and constructs of institutional theories (Scott, 1987) even 
though application of institutional theories have been gradually increasing in multiple 
organization fields (Lok, 2017). Scott (1987) pointed at two reasons for this difficulty 
in producing an exhaustive list of the concept under institutional theories: (1) some of 
the constructs are explicit while others are entirely implicit, and (2) institutionalist 
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rarely come to an agreement regarding the specific meaning of the concepts. Yet we 
summarised five schools of thoughts of institutionalism and their main features in 
appendix 3.  
At least five significant schools of institutionalism are found in the literature 
(Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence & Mayer, 2017; Amenta & Ramsey, 2010) that 
contributes in developing multifaceted in institutional theory. These five school of 
thoughts include realist institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, political institutionalism, and organisational institutionalism. Realist 
institutionalism is the oldest form of institutional thoughts where actors ensure ‘some 
institutional principal’ in their operating environment before starting their actions. In 
this world of institutionalism, actors maintain networks among themselves where trust 
and agreements are created to govern their actions (Myer, 2008). Political and 
historical institutionalism regard institutions as ‘formal or informal procedure, 
routines, norms, and conventions’ (Amenta & Ramsy, 2010). Sociological 
institutionalism perceives the institution as ‘cognitive scripts, moral temples and 
symbol system’ (Amenta & Rasmy, 2010). The cognitive logics or heuristics of 
individual help actors take the decision in sociological institutionalism that makes the 
institution highly self-centered (Bruton et al., 2010; Amenta & Ramsey, 2010). This 
phenomenon of actors/institution is believed to better explain through institutional 
logic theory (Friedland & Alford, 1991).  
In historical institutionalism, which is also another close version of sociological 
institutionalism, actors tend to establish a certain path of actions based on their cultural 
and contextual events within a society over a specified period (Myer,2008). This 
historicity may better be theorised through institutional path dependency or lock-in 
(Mahoney & Schensul, 2006; Pierson & Skocpol, 2002). Rules, system, and processes 
constructed by actors govern the actions of the institution in the political /economic 
branch of institutionalism (Bruton, 2010; North, 1990). While these four schools of 
thoughts are rooted in the study of politics, concepts of these thoughts have been 
migrated to develop another form of intuitionalism known as ‘organisational 
intuitionalism’ (Greenwood et al., 2017). Following previous research (Campbell, 
2004, Djelic & Quack 2004; Hall & Taylor, 1996), Greenwood et al. (2017) skeptically 
defined organisational institutionalism as the combination of several variants of all 
four other school of thoughts discussed. An extensive review, over three-time frames 
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( 1983-91, 1987-91, and 1991-2007), made by Greenwood et al. (2017) informs us that 
organisational intuitionalism attempts to explore institution, institutional process, and 
perspectives of an organisation.  
  This thesis takes the position of organisational institutionalism covering at least 
three other variants of institutionalism: sociobiological, historical, and economic/ 
political. Sociological institutionalism fits in a sense that family farms are a unit of 
organization and farms’ actions are impacted by social, cultural, and heuristics logics 
of farms (producers). Farms actions are also embodied in their historical events over a 
generation which is relevant to historical institutionalism. These two views call for 
using the institutional logics (in paper one), and institutional path depended/ 
institutional lock-in theory (in paper two). Finally, economic/ political thoughts of 
organisational institutionalism fit in paper three as we attempted to explore the 
governance process and practices of family farms to legitimise their business to off-
farm equity investors. 
 Institutional perspectives of family businesses have been widely examined by 
family business scholars (Soleimanof et al., 2017; Parada, Nordqvist, & Gimeno, 
2010; Melin & Nordqvist, 2007; Leaptrott, 2005). A recent review (Soleimanof et al., 
2017) of 131 articles on institutional theory perspective of family firms recorded 
institutional (formal/informal) influence on family firms’ behaviour. Soleimanof et al., 
(2017), informed us of some four key areas of influences of formal and informal 
institutional norms on family firms’ performance and behaviours, and vice versa.  
First, formal institutional development affects family firms’ performance at the 
macro level. For example, formal institutional development affects family firms’ 
performance through governance mediating role, minimising agency problems, and 
professionalizing attempts (Fernando et al., 2014; Liu, Yang, & Zhang, 2012; Jiang & 
Peng, 2011; Carney, 2005). Secondly, formal institutional development, such as 
entrepreneurship and economic development, and regional and national public policy, 
are also impacted by family firms’ behaviour (Carney, Duran, van Essen, & Shapiro, 
2017; Soleimanof, 2016; Steier, 2009). Thirdly, informal institutional norms and 
practices play a large role in influencing family firms’ behaviour as a family firm, as 
an institution, is co-created by two separate institutions and their mutual interactions: 
family and business (Zachary, 2011; Litz, 2008). Informal institutional practices 
originate from family firms’ socioemotional wealth (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 
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2012), idiosyncratic histories (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003), social and cultural contexts 
(Khayesi, George, & Antonakis, 2014; Gupta & Levenburg, 2012), influences firms’ 
family and businesses logics (Soleimanof et al., 2017). Finally, family firms also play 
an active role in designing the essence of informal institutional practices, such as the 
nature and process of institutional practices, norms quality, and heterogeneity 
networks and processes (Basco, 2015). The main reasons for this influence of family 
firms on institutional norms and practices generate from firms’ localism and 
regionalism perspectives and their historical embeddedness within that region and 
within community norms and values (Soleimanof et al., 2017; Soleimanof, 2016; 
Seaman, 2015). Despite this interconnectedness between institutional practices and 
family firms’ performance and behaviour, there is ample space to extend institutional 
theories about family businesses in general, and to family farms in particular. We 
contribute to the auspicious of advancing institutional theory in the auspicious of 
family farms. 
1.8.3.  Problematizing institutional theory 
The reasons why family business research experienced a theoretical shift from the 
agency, social-emotional wealth, pecking order and planned behaviour theories to 
institutional theory, have been discussed. Then, some evidential and theoretical 
discussions of institutional theory in prior family business research were outlines that 
provide us a durable base of conceptualisation for this research. Researchers from 
different perspectives have enriched such theoretical shifts in family business research.  
The extant literature of institutional theory in family businesses is inconclusive 
(Soleimanof et al., 2017; Wright, Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2014).  Current literature 
sidesteps the bidirectional aspect of family firms’ relationship with other institution 
(Soleimanof et al., 2017). Less attention has also been paid to discrepancies between 
farms and equity investors, and how to manage those logics, even though institutional 
theory can be used to unveil family firms’ pluralistic position’ in a broader context of 
multiple institutional logics (Michiels & Molly, 2017; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). 
Michiels and Molly (2017) also argue that qualitative methodology is missing in the 
literature of family businesses’ capital structure decision (Langley & Abdallah, 2011). 
Whereas, qualitative methodology is seen as an ideal way to advance the gaps in 
current theoretical frameworks (Siggelkow, 2007).  
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 Motivated by the growing necessity for long-term farm financing for family 
farms, off-farm equity in particular, and the calls for   more attention be paid to 
institutional frameworks (Soleimanof et al., 2017; Mondelli, 2011; Dodson, 1994; 
Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989) to clearly  address the farms’ logics and investors’ 
logics, this dissertation explores how family farms can access off-farm equity capital 
from private investors including institutional, corporate, family office, net worth 
individuals. Thus, this study, first, explores the competing logics of family farms and 
equity investors and how this competing interest of two partners can be minimised. 
Then, the process for breaking family farms’ traditional financing path has been 
explored with the learning of farms’ investment readiness. Next, the institutional 
process through which family farms adopt governance and reporting strategies to 
minimise the information asymmetries between family farms and off-farm investors 
are proposed. 
A significant volume of mostly US-centric literature has been concentrated on the 
necessity of, and barriers to, external equity financing, while less attention has been 
paid to institutional frameworks that remove potential conflicts among farms and off-
farm investors. Replicating US findings in Australian contexts may yield dubious 
result as factors affecting farms’ growth and profitability vary in different jurisdictions 
(Jarrett, 1968). Off-farm equity in Australian farm businesses is not a new 
phenomenon. However, the large scale of equity partnership in Australian setting has 
not grown enough in its comparable economies, NZ for example (Agrifood Skills 
Australia, 2015). Anecdotal findings call for ensuring an institutional framework that 
aligns the interests of both farms and investors to facilitate this off-farm equity market 
to a larger extent (Agrifood Skills Australia, 2015; ANZ, 2014; PPB, 2014). This gap 
in the farm financing literature and the slow growth of off-farm equity financing in an 
Australian setting justifies selecting Australia as the empirical setting.  
1.9.Research questions  
Based on the gaps found in the extant literature and on the problem definition, 
as discussed in the sections above, we reflexively (Agee, 2009) formulated the 
following research objective for this thesis: exploring the shifts of family farms’ 
traditional financing models to off-farm equity alliances. We attempted to address 
the following research questions corresponding with three empirical studies, to 
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understand how this move of family farms towards off-farm equity alliances 
happens: 
1. Why do family farms and off-farm equity investors differ in their logics in 
equity alliances and how can these differences be solved? (paper 1, chapter 2) 
2. Why and how could family farms break their traditional financing paths to 
access off-farm equity, and how this path creation process contributes to 
farms’ investment readiness learning? (paper 2, chapter 3) 
3. How can family farms institutionalise their governance structures to access 
off-farm equity? (paper 3, chapter 4) 
In the three empirical qualitative papers (see table 2 for an overview), my co-
authors, who are also my supervisors in this thesis, and I contributed to each paper 
proportionately from different perspectives. In this regard, please see the attached 
statement of authorship provided before each paper. In the following sections, the 
methodologies, theoretical underpinning, an overview of the papers, based on three 
research questions, are summarised. 
1.10. Methodologies 
From epistemological standpoints (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), the position this thesis 
adopts is an interpretive approach to epistemology (Schwandt, 2000), meaning that the 
foundation of new knowledge in this thesis is based on empirical evidence, in the form 
of subjective experience, of its participants (Gephart, 2004; Hudson & Ozanne, 1988), 
namely farms and advisors. Consistent with the interpretative epistemology, 
investigators followed an interpretive research approach throughout the research 
journey. An interpretive research approach is appropriate in a context when the 
researcher attempts to address a relatively less explored branch of an empirical setting 
and research questions keep evolving and emerging in line with the data (Hudson & 
Ozanne, 1988). This view of interpretive research has worked in this thesis in two 
ways. First, research in exploring the off-farm equity partnership is an emerging stage, 
at least in the empirical setting of this thesis, the Australian farming industry. Second, 
researchers experienced a continuous change in developing research questions, 
analyses, interpretations, and theorisations of the data. Data analysis and interpretation 
of the data, with extant theory, has been through an inductive process (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). Figure 1 portrays the combined methodological of the thesis while each 
paper contains specific issues applied.  
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Figure 1: Combined methodological map of the thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Philosophical Position of the Thesis 
B. Interpretive Epistemological Stance 
C. Interpretive Qualitative Methodology 
4. Data Analysis: 
Analytical Tools: 
1. Interpretive content and Thematic (paper 1) 
2. Interpretive Narrative (paper 2) 
3. Interpretive Thematic (paper 3) 
 
1. Data Collection: Semi-Structured (In-depth) Interview Data 
2. Sampling Methods: Purposive, Snowball, and Theoretical 
Sampling 
D. Interpretive Qualitative Research Methods 
3. Data Management: 
1. Manual Handling 
2. Text Analysis software: N-vivo Pro 11 and Leximancer 
version 4. 
  
5. Data Reporting 
1. Detective approach 
2. Natural story telling approach  
 
6. Data Theorising: Making sense of Data 
Inductive approach (for all papers) 
21 
 
The empirical setting for this study is the Australian family farming industry, with 
a focus on Queensland. I collected semi-structured interview data between 2015 and 
2016 while one of my co-author, my principal supervisor, helped me in accessing the 
participants through her professional network. A total of 18 interviews were 
conducted: 4 with family farm owners and 14 with farm advisors.  
The representative of sample size in a qualitative study is unlikely to be unique in 
every research setting. Sample size varies based on the nature of the study undertaken. 
Literature suggests that different ranges of sample size, such as 30-50 for ethnographic 
research; 5-25 for phenomenological research; 20-30 for grounded theory; and 100-
200 in the ethological study, as summarised in (Mason, 2010; Sandelowski, 1995) is 
possible. These numbers, however, rarely have any “empirical arguments” to believe 
as to “why these numbers and not others” (Mason, 2010,p.3). Sample selection strategy 
of this research has been “flexible and pragmatic” (Marshall,1996,p.524) as there are 
no hard and fast rules, in qualitative research, to fix a specific number of a sample 
before the study commences (Sandelowski, 1995).  
This thesis did not prefix any sample criterion but wanted to explore in depth 
experiences of off-farm equity processes and phenomena from farms and advisors, 
who could deliver rich information in this regard. This view of sample selection is 
inconsistent with the Sandelowski’s (1995) view of using “informationally 
representative sample” Patton’s (1990) view of using “information-rich cases” in 
qualitative research. Each of our samples was rich enough regarding information as 
sample family farms were engaged in a farming occupation for generations and sample 
advisors were also involved in advising around 10-20 years. This thesis has, in fact, 
the components of three sample selection strategies: purposive sampling (Patton, 
1990), snowball sampling (Patton, 2002), and theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 
2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The first stage of data collection of this study started 
with interviewing two farm advisors, who were familiar to my principal supervisor 
and who had almost 20 years of experiences to elicit some details about Australian 
farm financing and off-farm equity injections. 
We examined all the information, experiences, and events in the interview to get 
relevant data (Cleary, Horsfall, & Hayter, 2014). Since we utilized some “exemplary” 
(Sandelowski, 1995) and “typical information” (Patton, 1990) about off-farm equity 
in Australian farms and agriculture, this was necessarily purposive sampling. 
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Secondly, we requested every participant to provide some names of other 
farms/advisors who could provide us with some valuable information for our thesis. In 
this way, we acquired other participants. This strategy is akin to sampling. Thirdly, we 
analysed every interview soon after it was conducted in order “to decide what data to 
collect next” (Coyne, 1997) using “constant comparative analysis” (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998)” of the initial codes and categories. This process guided us regarding which 
question should be dropped or added from the interview and which questions were 
very significant or less significant (Glaser & Strauss, 2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) 
in the case of our study.  
We stopped our interviews with two the different participant groups for three 
distinct reasons. Interviews with advisors were stopped when we observed that taking 
more participants beyond 14 were not disclosing anything new, which is known as the 
“theoretical saturation” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) or the “information redundancy” 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985) stage in qualitative research. This feature of this stage is 
aligned with data saturation (Guest, Bunch, & Johnson, 2006). On the contrary, we 
ceased interviews with farm participants for two reasons: First, we observed that we 
got rich, diversified, and representative information (O’Reilly & Parker, 2013; Guest 
et al., 2006) from four family farms regarding off-farm equity issues. Second, we faced 
unforeseen complexities, and time as well as resources constraints to trace family farm 
participants accessing or using off-farm equity within our empirical setting of this 
study (Green & Throrogood, 2004; Tuckett, 2004), which stopped our interview with 
more farms. We frame two possible explanation from these two experiences with farm 
participant’ data. On the one hand, data saturation might have partly been achieved 
with the diversified and rich information gathered from four farms (Guest et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, data saturation might have been underachieved due to 
heterogeneous nature of farms interviewed. This underachievement of data saturation 
calls for further exploration of family farms’ views rather than that the “findings are 
invalid” (Morse, 1995). 
We conducted nine face-face interviews (6 with farm advisors and 3 with farms) 
and nine telephonic interviews (8 with farm advisors and 1 with a farm). Total 
interview time was 1070 minutes (793 minutes of interview with farm advisors and 
277 minutes with farms), which varied from 107 minutes to 25 minutes, and averaged 
60 minutes. 
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1.10.1. Sample size and theoretical (Data) saturation  
In a qualitative study, researchers are yet to have any unique “published guidelines 
or test of adequacy” for achieving theoretical saturation (data saturation in this study) 
– the point when researchers get no incremental information from adding new 
participants to the interview- (Mason, 2010; Bowen, 2008; Morse et al, 2002). Thus, 
conceptual variation in reaching to the point of theoretical saturation is ample in the 
literature (Fusch & Ness, 2015; O’reilly & Parker, 2013; Mason, 2010). In some cases, 
saturation is possible within a small sample size, six interviews, for instance, while in 
other cases, based on the nature of qualitative research, 15 to 30, and 20 to 30 and up 
to 60 interviews are recommended (Guest et al. 2006; Morse, 1994). OtherS suggest 
that researchers are less likely observed to link the sample size with theoretical 
saturation (Morse, Lowey, & Steury, 2014). 
Bigger sample sizes for qualitative interviews are not necessarily essential to 
achieve theoretical saturation (Fusch & Ness, 2015; O’Reilly & Parker, 2013, 
Burmiester & Aitken, 2012). The more critical issues in claiming theoretical saturation 
are to access rich data with a thick description that ensures a wide range of opinion 
and diverse representation of the issue being explored (O’reilly & Parker, 2013; Guest 
et al. 2006). In addition, transparently disclosing all of the steps taken by an 
investigator from data collection to analysis can ensure theoretical saturation. 
Attaining this saturation, however, is often believed to be dictated by the following 
factors: research context and scope, inductive philosophy, data complexity, population 
heterogeneity, participants of special interest, researchers’ budget as well as resource 
availability, longitudinal or panel character of data (O’reilly & Parker, 2013; Mason, 
2010; Bowen, 2008). Following these views, it can be said that if any qualitative 
investigation is inductive in approach; is context specific; and is intended to 
inductively explore the in-depth experiences of a specific group of participants (with 
relatively homogenous character), theoretical saturation (data saturation) can most 
likely be achieved with small sample sizes and vice versa.     
Following the above concepts of theoretical saturation, overall, this research 
acknowledges the limitation of pure theoretical saturation (data saturation) for we 
observed many diverse opinions in the participant’s opinion. Moreover, this study was 
conducted in a specific region of Australia with a small group of farms and advisors 
who are familiar with the idea of off-farm equity. This limitation demands the further 
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exploration of data from a bigger sample, possibly around Australia, which was not 
possible for this present study owing to resources and time constraints. Having 
acknowledged this limitation, this study provided rich and representative information 
for both farms and advisors participants for the following reasons:  
 First, the two core interests’ participants of this study were very specific: farms 
either accessed off-farm equity or were in the process of accessing off-farm equity, 
and advisors engaged in off-farm equity in the context of family farms. Second, semi-
structured interviews were conducted to get the in-depth experiences of both farms and 
advisors. That is, in an interview, the main focus was to understand in which context 
farms and investors want to come to off-farm equity partnership, what the various 
aspects of off-farm equity partnership mean to both farms and investors, and how the 
partners develop the off-farm equity partnership. Third, sample farms and advisors 
interviewed in this study were homogeneous by many features, even though they were 
also heterogeneous by many other features and in their opinions.  
Farms, even though were heterogeneous in terms of financing needs and 
governance structures, were homogeneous in many features:  all farms were located in 
the same region, sample farms were looking to access off-farm equity capital, they 
were in either third or fourth generational stage, and each of the farms was in favor of 
bringing required changes in farm business management. Likewise, farm advisors 
were homogenous in many features: First, all the advisors had advising experiences in 
the same geography - different states around Australia. Second, they had long 
experiences in dealing with Australian family farms that gave them a clear edge in 
understanding farming families’ dynamics and complexities. Third, the advisor 
participants had experiences about the current and potential domestic and foreign 
investors in Australian farms and agribusiness industry. Fourth, personal farming 
orientation in their early carrier of our participants ensured the relevancy of their 
experiences and observation regarding family farm businesses. This homogeneousness 
in both groups of participants may conceptually be related to the combination of 
homogeneities in the qualitative research proposed by Robinson (2014): demographic, 
geographical, psychological, and historic life homogeneity.  
Our small sampling strategy can also be justified by the logics of and positive case 
for small sample size developed by Crouch and McKenzie (2006). These authors 
argued that a small number, say less than 20, of in-depth interviews, has little impact 
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on research validity and research logics if research is undertaken through in-depth 
discussion and the data are continually interpreted theoretically to understand the 
problem. In this research, we have found that farms in our interviews have a great 
emotional attachment to their farms. Farms struggle with capital shortages, and they 
cannot expand their scale. Farms wanted to access capital from off-farm sources in one 
hand while, on the other hand, they wanted to keep the rein of the farms in their hand. 
Finally, they revealed that they were ready to have some negotiation with off-farm 
investors. Similarly, we got an in-depth picture of off-farm equity investors’ 
imagination while they invest capital with family farms. Investors prefer different 
models of investment and show different expectation towards farms for sustaining 
their capital and return on capital. More areas of investors’ concerns were revealed 
form farm advisors: farm governance, reporting, management, control, decision 
making, and farms professional status. Our findings from both groups had 
continuously linked with the relevant theories to make sense of the data, and we 
reached to the fruitful interpretation of the data through the lenses of the theories 
summarised in figure 2. 
In preparing three papers, we used both manual and text analysis software (N-Vivo 
Pro 11 and Leximancer-4) for analytical triangulation. For methodological 
triangulation, we used content and thematic analysis for paper one, interpretive 
narrative technique for paper two and interpretive thematic analysis for paper three. 
For an analytical summary, see table 2, and for the interview protocol, see appendices 
3 and 4. In addition, each paper inserted in this thesis contains a paper-specific detailed 
methodological section.  
1.11. Theoretical underpinning 
The findings of this thesis have been theorised inductively, which means our data 
analysis has been data grounded, rather than theory dictated. In every paper, we 
interpreted our findings under the suitable theoretical framework after which we have 
finished our analysis. The paper- specific theories that we linked with our findings are 
shown in figure 1. All the theories shown in figure 1 are related to the institutional 
theory perspective. The four inductively generated theories and one model used are 
institutional logic theory and strategic response model (paper 1), path creation theory 
(paper 2), and institutionalization theory (paper3), and they are shown in figure 2. 
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Concepts inserted in the boxes of figure 2 are based on the empirical findings of my 
research. 
This theorising stage was not straightforward, but rather a reflexive process and 
the selected theory was chosen based on compelling arguments of the researchers. The 
finding of the first paper led us to relate intuitional logic theory and strategic response 
model to theorise two major findings: (1) competing arguments of off-farm alliance 
partners, and (2) the right strategies and structure of off-farm equity partnership that 
may convert the equity partners’ contradictions to into mutual benefits. We have 
theorised the experiences of creating a new financing part of family farms through path 
creation theory in the 2nd paper. While the 3rd paper is about structuration of equity 
partnerships in particular. See figure 1 for the connection between findings and 
theories in paper one, two, and three.   
Figure: 2: Integrated conceptual map connecting all three papers 
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1.12. Paper overview 
 Paper 1 – “Family farm alliance with off-farm equity investors: Managing 
competing logics”- presents the professional advisors’ view regarding family farms’ 
and equity investors’ competing demands and the mechanism to manage these logics. 
The paper focuses on the research question: Why do farms and off-farm equity 
investors differ in their logics in equity collaboration and how can these differences be 
solved? We inductively analysed the in-depth interview data, with 14 farm advisors, 
developed the overall papers, and interpreted the findings. Using inductive content and 
thematic analysis, we firstly explored eight competing interests that family farms and 
investors expect from each other. We interpreted the first part of the evidence of Paper 
1 about institutional logics theory. We found that family farms use two strategic 
practices- investment readiness, and equity structuring- to manage the competing 
arguments of equity capital providers. We found the strategic response model as one 
of the most suitable frameworks to interpret these practices. 
In paper 1, based on advisors’ experiences, we found eight competing logics 
that both farms and investors may draw on while entering off-farm equity partnerships: 
emotional vs. commercial, cost vs. profit, instinctive vs. reasoning, continuation vs. 
cessation, financial vs. non-financial, lower vs. higher scale, traditional vs. 
professional, and operating vs. capital efficiency. In each pair, the first element relates 
to farms’ positions and the second element indicates investors’ positions. These 
findings fit with the institutional logics theory, which is a metatheory of institutional 
theories (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Institutional logics define the contradictory 
contents, practices, and beliefs of different institutions under different contexts 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  Institutional logic is one of the key strands of institutional 
theory that produces these rules and practices based on the behaviours of stakeholders 
in a particular institution, and they develop the institutional dynamics over a period 
(Zilber, 2013; Friedland & Alford, 1991). Scholars (Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; 
Gerlach, 1992) have argued that an alliance of multiple actors can be studied from 
within institutional settings. Following this view, this study also considers off-farm 
equity alliance is a strategic institutional platform where two separate institutional 
actors, namely family farms and off-farm equity investors, attempt to interact with 
each other according to their respective formal and informal rules and behaviours. 
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Table 2: Overview of three papers 
Structure Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3 
T
it
le
 Family farms alliances 
with off-farm equity 
investors: Managing 
competing logics 
Breaking financial lock-in in 
family farms through off-
farm equity financing.  
Governance structure of 
family farms in the context 
of off-farm equity 
financing.  
R
es
ea
rc
h
  
q
u
es
ti
o
n
s 
Why do farms and off-
farm equity investors 
differ in their logics in 
equity alliance and how 
can these be resolved? 
How can the family farms 
break their traditional 
financing path to access off-
farm equity and how this path 
creation process contributes to 
farms’ investment readiness 
learning? 
How can family farms 
institutionalise their 
governance structure to 
access off-farm equity? 
M
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
 
Research Design: 
interpretive    
Data collection 
Semi-structured interview  
(see appendix 4)  
Analytical Technique 
Content and interpretative 
thematic 
Coding techniques 
Software (Leximancer 
and N-Vivo) and Manual  
Research Design: 
interpretive    
Data collection 
Semi-structured interview 
(see appendix 3) 
Analytical Technique  
Interpretative narrative 
Analysis 
Coding techniques 
Software (Leximancer and N-
Vivo) and manual 
Research Design: 
interpretive    
Data collection 
Semi-structured Interview 
(see appendix 3 and 4) 
Analytical Technique 
Interpretative thematic 
analysis 
Coding techniques 
Software (Leximancer and 
N-Vivo) and manual 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
/ 
S
am
p
le
  
. 
an
d
 s
am
p
li
n
g
  
Context: Australian 
family farm industry 
Sample: 14 professional 
advisors 
Sampling technique: 
Purposive and Snowball 
technique 
Interview period: 2015-
16 
Context: Australian family 
farm industry   
Sample: 3 family farms (1 
farms using equity and the 
two waiting to access equity) 
Sampling technique: 
Purposive and Snowball 
technique 
Interview period: 2015-16 
Context: Australian 
family farm industry 
Sample: 14 professional 
advisors and four family 
farms 
Sampling technique: 
Purposive and Snowball 
technique 
Interview period: 2015-
16 
M
ai
n
 f
in
d
in
g
s 
Evidence explored eight 
competing logics between 
farms and investors. Two 
strategic responses – 
investment readiness and 
equity structuring-   are 
used to resolve those 
logics  
Both internal and external 
factors contribute to moving 
towards equity process. 
Equity accessing process 
includes four stages:  
responding to emerging 
triggers, searching for 
alternatives, spotting 
challenges: self-auditing, and 
getting professionally ready  
Family farms may require 
three elements – 
governance culture, 
alignment and governance 
elements in the structures. 
Farm and reporting 
structure vary on the farm’ 
and investors’ 
heterogeneity. 
T
h
eo
re
ti
ca
l 
fr
am
ew
o
rk
 
Institutional logics and 
Strategic responses 
models to competing 
demands  
Institutional lock-in and path 
creation theory  
Institutional theory  
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Using the concept of institutional logics, we named these two institutions as 
family farm logic and off-farm equity investor logic. Earlier conceptualization has 
shown different ideal types of institutional logics in the society: market, corporation, 
democracy, professions, family, religion, and state (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; 
Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005; Friedland & Alford, 1991). These studies used logics 
in the sense of the ideal type of logics. Ideal types of logics, however, do not reflect a 
true description of the insights of logic in an institutional setting; instead, they allow 
for a comparison of the set of previously defined logics with the data being observed 
(Currie & Spyridonidis, 2016; Reay & Jones, 2016). Rather than using any ideal types 
of logics (Thornton et al., 2005), this study empirically explored logics of family farms 
and equity investors. As our paper is about interpretively identifying logics in off-farm 
equity alliances, we followed the same qualitative logic capturing process as Reay and 
Jones (2016), which encourages pattern inducing approach of logic exploration for 
qualitative interpretive research. 
Contradictions in any form of alliance/ partnership at multiple levels are 
manifold and unavoidable, as explored in other alliance research (De Rond & 
Bouchikhi, 2004; Das & Teng, 2000; Gray & Wood, 1991). After detecting a 
contradiction between two logics in off-farm equity partnerships in our research, we 
attempted to explore the ways by which these contradictions of the two actors could 
be minimised. Our analysis reveals that articulating two different strategic responses-
investment readiness and equity structuring- at family farms may address potential 
contradiction with equity providers logics. To theorise, this finding, we relied on the 
theoretical framework of the Oliver (1991) and Pache and Santos (2010), who 
extended Oliver’s version:  a strategic response framework to competing demands. 
Precisely, our findings were matched with the acquiring strategy and the 
compromising strategy of these frameworks. In line with acquiring strategy (Pache & 
Santos, 2010; Oliver, 1991), our findings also suggest that it would be better for family 
farms to adopt some institutional norms and practices. We also found the element of 
the compromising strategy (Pache & Santos, 2010; Oliver, 1991) in our findings as 
analysis shows that balanced negotiation mechanisms are necessary for 
accommodating partners’ interest in off-farm equity alliances. Our view for 
developing a strategic response is also very close to the strategic commitment view of 
institutional logics (Ocasio & Radoynovska, 2016), which shows how logics’ 
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incompatibilities can transform institutions towards multiple business models and a 
heterogeneous governance structure.  
 The 2nd paper of the thesis- “Breaking financial Lock-in in family farms through 
off-farm equity financing” explores how family farms create a new financing path 
towards off-farm equity. The research question we set in this paper was: how can 
family farms break their traditional financing path to access to off-farm equity, and 
how does this path creation contribute to farms’ investment readiness learning? Based 
on three farms’ experiences of the off-farm equity journey, we observed five narratives 
about their off-farm equity path creation processes. Interpreting this narrative under 
the lens of path dependence and path creation, we propose a four-step off-farm equity 
path creation process that breaks the family farms’ old financial model. Finally, in this 
paper, we also argued that learning, which stemmed from this path creation also help 
farm to be investment ready. However, once family farms have started their process of 
accessing off-farm equity, the question remains: what governance practices do family 
farms may choose to articulate to institutionalise their legitimacy? The third paper 
attempts to answer this question. 
We interpreted the findings of the second paper with path dependence theory 
(Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009; Arthur, 1994), path creation process (Garud & 
Karnøe, 2001) and new path creation theory (Simmie, 2012). We see the elements of 
path dependence theory to the point where family farms remain affixed to old 
financing model. Path dependence theory argues that an institution becomes locked-in 
to a once established solution to a problem, provided that institution benefits from that 
option increasingly or no external shocks threaten that option (Simmie, 2012; 
Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011;  Beyer, 2010; Vergne & Durand, 2010; Arthur, 1994; 
1990; 1989;  David, 1985). As shown in detail in paper two, we argue that family farms 
become financially path dependent owing to their use of the same sources of financing 
over generations.  
However, our findings also show family farms break this tradition on arrival of 
external shocks and overcome the challenge of scale and growth. This observation is 
precisely an indication what path creation theory implores (Simmie, 2012; Garud, 
Kumaraswamy, & Karnøe, 2010). Thus, our findings in paper 2 focus on the 
component of path creation from the moment when the family farm sets out to explore 
new sources of finance. Our result is mainly aligned with the hybrid socio-economic 
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path creation theory (Simmie, 2012) which suggests a reflexive process of path 
creation, rather than a canonical process of path creation (Garud et al., 2010). 
Following the reflexive view of path creation, we also see in our findings that 
exploring a new financing model for family farms is a collective effort of farms, 
investors, and farm advisors. Following the path creation process and new path 
creation theory, family farms adopted strategies. We called these strategies (steps) 
investment readiness strategies. Investment readiness makes a firm ready for external 
equity in three ways (Mason & Kwok, 2010; Mason & Rogers, 1997): making firm’s 
knowledgeable about external equity, pitching firms for external investors’ 
requirement, and improving firms’ reporting capability about the true business picture. 
The strategies identify the boundary of direction, long-term commitment, and 
resource requirements of an institution, in a critical environment, to satisfy all other 
actors’ needs and expectations in that institution (Johnson, Scholes, & Whittington, 
2008). Actors of the collaborative institution might have their unique strategy, and they 
either change their old identity or stick to the old form of identity for the smooth 
functioning of collaboration (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Family farms, as a ‘resource 
dependence’ (Pache & Santos, 2010) partner, at least for financial capital, in our 
research, to change their traditional identity to convince the equity providers that they 
are capable and trustworthy of housing investors’ capital. Paper 2, based on farms’ 
experiences, explores the process of building off-farm equity collaboration where we 
see family farms change their traditional financing model. In doing that, findings show 
us that farms followed some steps: responding to emerging triggers, searching 
alternatives, spotting challenges: self-auditing, and getting professionally ready.  
 The 3rd paper of this research - “Institutionalizing Family Farms for Off-farm 
Equity financing” is an empirical paper based on the experiences of both four farms 
and 14 advisors, who gave their different views regarding elements of equity structure- 
governance and reporting practices. The overall question we explore in the 3rd paper 
is: how can family farms institutionalise their governance structure to access off-farm 
equity? We focus on exploring governance processes and practices for family farms 
wishing to access equity capital from off-farm sources. We inductively found that 
family farms follow three sequential stages to articulate governance and reporting 
practices. Stage one is creating a governance friendly culture, stage two is aligning 
governance elements with farms’ and investors’ choices, and the final stage is to adopt 
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suitable practices. Evidence from the third paper also suggests case-specific 
governance styles in off-farm equity financing. That is, larger farms are more suited 
to reach to equity deals with institutional and corporate investors because of scale 
issues. In this case, advisors suggested a set of formal governance structure and 
sophisticated reporting practices for family farms with large scale who intends to 
develop bigger equity capital deal. In contrast, small and retail-based private investors 
can be the preferred equity capital partners for small and medium family farms. In this 
case, informal governance and less sophisticated reporting may help them access off-
farm equity. Finally, we interpreted the findings of our third paper within the 
framework of the institutional theory.   
Contradictions in partners’ logics, as discussed in paper one, in the strategic 
alliance (off-farm equity partnerships in this case) may produce strategic mismatch 
(Nielsen, 2002).  The absence of right governance, to control partners’ opportunistic 
behaviours, in an alliance is a common phenomenon (Parkhe, 1993). Self-governance 
while producing a better individualistic outcome in an alliance, does not produce 
efficient outcomes that satisfy all partners’ expectations (Parkhe, 1993; Williamson, 
1985; Telser, 1980). Thus, the governance structure is regarded as a moderating factor 
to firm performance and strategic mismatch (Nielsen, 2002). Prior alliance research 
(Das & Teng, 1998), interpreting from others (Das & Teng, 1996; Yan & Gray, 1994; 
Sohn, 1994; Neale & Bazerman, 1992; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Williamson, 1983;) 
indicates two types of structural specification in alliance structural process: ex-ante 
and ex-post.  
In this thesis, paper 3, grounded in both farms’ and advisors’ views, explores three 
elements of governance structuration process for family farms intending to start off-
farm equity collaborations.  This process includes, in figure 1: governance culture, 
alignment, and structure in equity structuration process. We theorise these stages of 
governance under the sequential process of institutionalization following the 
institutional framework is given by renown institutionalists, Tolbert and Zucker 
(1999). Institutional theory is a framework that explains how and why an organisation 
adopts some distinct processes, strategies, schemas, and outlooks, derived from the 
social interaction and environment where the organization operates (Selznick, 1996). 
The institutionalisation process is the combination of creating a formal structure,  
informal norms and administrative rituals and ideologies based on the goals and 
33 
 
problems of the organization to infuse specific values (Selznick, 1996). We relate 
family farms’ governance structuration processes to Tolberts’ institutionalization 
process as follows: Tolberts’ habitualization stage with our transformational stage, 
Tolberts’objectification stage with ours’ foundational stage and Tolberts’ 
sedimentation stage with our intensification stage; for the detailed explanation, please 
see paper 3.  
Our theorisation for this paper is justified in the sense that we view family farms, 
a branch of family businesses,  as a separate field of the institution (Sharma, Melin, & 
Nordqvist, 2014; Melin & Nordqvist, 2007). Family businesses always face legitimacy 
demands from macro-level actors, such as state, laws, and regulation (Scott, 2013); 
from major resource suppliers; and from family business professional bodies who 
advises good practices to them (Parada et al., 2010; DiMaggio, 1988). Following 
institutional theory (Selznick, 1996), we treated off-farm investors and farm 
investment advisors as new sources of normative institutional isomorphism (Dimaggio 
& Powell, 1983) who exert indirect normative pressures on family farms, insisting that 
farms adopt governance practices to ensure the farms’ legitimacy (Larson, 2017; 
Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Collins, 1979). We also see the elements of DiMaggio’s 
(1982) “structuration” process as our findings also suggested to incorporate the 
following elements as part of governance structure: increasing interaction with 
stakeholders; creating some sets of defined structures, increasing information 
availability and establishing a shared understanding.   
1.13. Ethical consideration 
Ethics in a qualitative research project legitimises the researchers’ actions and 
ensures they are not doing anything harmful to any of the research’s stakeholders 
including participants, peers, and sponsors (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Three 
empirical papers of this thesis fully draw on the firsthand experiences shared by the 
two group of participants: family owners and the professional farm advisors. We 
follow ethical research practices from before collecting data to reporting that data. We 
have received ethical approval from the University of Southern Queensland (USQ) 
Australia, Human Participants Ethics Committee. Appendix 5 shows the ethics 
approval letter of this thesis. Secondly, before commencing interviews, I sent a 
research information sheet (see appendix 6), and a participant consent form (see 
appendix 7) to each of the participants to sign. Through the consent form, we agreed 
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to keep the names and comments of participant anonymous and confidential. These 
steps align with the requirements of “procedural ethics” (Tracy, 2010). 
 Moreover, our information sheet ensured that the participants were informed 
about the purpose of research, had an idea of the types information they might share, 
the approximate time of interview session, and the use of data being collected. Thirdly, 
permission was taken to audio record the interviews before each actual interview was 
started. Finally, we agreed to remove or alter the potentially identified opinions as per 
participants’ request, and participants were assigned pseudonyms in actual reporting. 
With all of these actions, we ensured the “relational ethics” (Tracy, 2010) of this study. 
We also ensured “situational ethics” in this project as the objectives of this thesis have 
not been achieved using unfair methods or practices. Finally, as we did not report 
anything that created any harms or danger to our participants, we also protected the 
“existing ethics” (Tracy, 2010) of the study. 
1.14. Thesis outline  
This thesis is composed of three interconnected empirical papers that explore the 
overarching aim of the thesis: how family farms access equity capital beyond their 
traditional sources, off-farm equity capital from off-farm investors. Three papers that 
are presented in three consecutive chapters are preceded by the introductory chapter 
and followed by the concluding chapter. See figure 3 for the connection of all chapters. 
Three important things are clear about the thesis structure from the arrow sign in figure 
3: First, all the chapters are interconnected, meaning that the whole document 
describes one story where each chapter addresses distinctive objectives. Second, the 
contents of all chapters, including literature, theories, findings, discussions, and 
interpretation, have continuously been changing due to the flow-on- the effect of 
inductive iteration in the qualitative analysis and findings of each empirical paper. 
Thirdly, the researchers have theorised the empirical evidence of each paper at the end 
of that paper. This thesis advances family farms and agricultural financing literature 
by linking the empirical findings with different cross-disciplinary conceptual and 
theoretical issues: strategic alliance, institutional logics, and strategic responses in the 
institutionalisation process (in Paper 1); institutional lock-in, organizational path 
dependency and organizational new path creation (in Paper 2); and governance and 
reporting practice and institutionalization process (in paper 3). 
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Figure 3: Thesis outline 
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The 1st chapter, the introduction of the thesis, sets the scene of the study, 
describing the contexts of off-farm equity capital, providing background information 
about Australian farms and agricultural industry, and identifying the theoretical and 
empirical gaps of the study. As an extended part of the introduction, Appendix 1 and 
two also cover more contextual and historical information relating to farm financing, 
off-farm equity, and farming industry. Following the introductory chapter, the 2nd 
chapter, first empirical paper, of the thesis explores the contrasting views of two 
partners, family farms, and off-farm equity investors, in off-farm equity alliance. This 
paper also prescribes two practices, emerged from the data, in managing the competing 
views of off-farm equity alliance partners. This paper is in the process of being 
submitted to a suitable journal. Chapter 3 is the 2nd empirical paper. Paper 2 accounts 
three family farms’ practical experiences of accessing off-farm equity capital from off-
farm investors. This paper addressed two issues: (1) Why family farms attempt to shift 
their traditional (old) approach towards a new financing path, and (2) how family farms 
shift their old financing paths into a new one (off-farm equity in this case). This paper 
has been thoroughly reviewed by my supervisors, but it is yet to be submitted to any 
journal.  
Then final empirical paper, paper three is presented in chapter 4. This paper 
reports on the governance and reporting aspects that are deemed necessary for family 
farms to adopt for the accessing off-farm equity. We empirically propose a three-
stage institutionalisation process of family farms to adopt governance and reporting 
structure for family farms. This paper has already been submitted to the Family 
Business Review. As an independent paper- each corresponding to a specific chapter- 
every paper has a standalone introduction, conceptual grounding, conceptual and 
theoretical underpinnings, methodological issues, findings, and discussions. Each 
paper finishes with interpretations, implications, limitations and further research 
spaces, and a conclusion. The final chapter, chapter five, draws the conclusions of 
my thesis and articulates its contributions, methodological legitimization is 
addressed, and limitations are acknowledged.  
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Chapter TWO: Paper One 
 
Family Farms Alliances with Off-farm Equity Investors: Managing Competing 
Logics 
Abstract  
Family farms are increasingly subject to long-term equity capital constraints imposed 
by their traditional capital preferences, and institutional norms and practices. Off-farm 
equity alliance with private investors is believed to be one of the best alternatives to 
overcome this challenge. This paper builds on prior work on strategic equity capital 
alliances in traditional businesses by considering off-farm equity alliance in family 
farms. Our main objectives are: to empirically show the competing views of family 
farms and off-farm equity investors in an off-farm equity alliance and to identify the 
practices to overcome these competing views. Based on semi-structured interviews 
with professional farm advisors, and using the interpretive thematic analytical 
technique, we found eight pairs of competing logics can emerge from off-farm equity 
alliance. Two strategic responses- equity investment readiness and equity structuring- 
were suggested to manage contradictory demands. Interpreting the findings with 
institutional logics theory and strategic response models, our key contribution is to 
provide a clear conceptualization of why off-farm equity alliance struggle to initiate 
and what institutional responses are required to actualise this alliance.  
Keywords: Family farms, Off-farm equity capital, off-farm equity alliance, 
institutional logic, farm logic, investors logic, and competing logics. 
1. Introduction  
Individuals or units of firms are intrinsically self-centered (Williamson, 1985). 
They like to be self-governed (Telser, 1980). Self-orientation is, however, challenged 
by the environmental complexity and resource limitations (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Gomes-Casseres, 1996). The desire to overcome these challenges 
motivates individuals or firms to voluntarily form an alliance2/a collaboration with 
others (Parkhe, 1993). Before and soon after allying, self-opportunistic behaviours 
lead firms to experience confrontations due to the absence of compliances in leading 
alliance agreement (Parkhe, 1993). As a corollary, trust among parties to an alliance 
                                       
2 The terms off-farm equity partnership, collaboration, deal, alliance and joint venture 
strategic off-farm equity alliance would be interchangeably used in this study. 
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may tear and destabilise, which, may then cause the alliance to collapse due to poor 
performance (Geringer, 1991). For that reason, it is good for alliance participants to 
know the logics of others and design the alliance structure to remove the potential 
conflicts and thereby to ensure the success of the alliances. In particular, tensions may 
be expected to escalate in an unregulated market setting, for example, financing 
arrangements between family farms and private off-farm investors, as each party does 
not rely on a commitment towards the other due to the absence of any defined formal 
guidelines. 
  Thus, this study explores how family farms and off-farm investors act and 
come to an agreement amongst themselves. Traditional strategic alliances literature 
contains ample theoretical and empirical contributions on multifaceted dimensions and 
levels of traditional businesses. Less scholarly works have also been conducted in 
family business alliance literature, especially in the family farm financing domain. 
Exploring the Australian farming industry, we examined the conflicting views of two 
partners- family farms and off-farm investors- in off-farm equity alliances, and we 
suggest some strategic mechanisms to curtail the logics. Conflicting arguments may 
arise between farms and investors as both parties come from different origins with 
different expectations about forming the alliance. To this end, we relied on the 
advisors’ opinion who have been engaged in advising both family farms and off-farm 
investors for a long time, approximately 10-20 years (see Table 2).  
Advisors are treated as one of the key elements for farms’ decision-making system 
at least for three reasons (Rose et al., 2018, Nettele, Crawford & Brightling, 2018): 
First, advisors know farms “mental history” from field level. In other words, by 
providing expert suggestion to farms over a period of time, advisors develop learning 
about their farm clients.  Second, advisors also preserve farms’ “place-based memory.” 
That is, advisors can provide ‘specialist support’ and ‘management intervention’ to 
farms based on farm clients’ needs. Third, advisors can articulate the differences 
among sets of farms from their knowledge developed from the “trusted relationship” 
with farms over a period.  Investors are also observed in relying on advisor’s view for 
their distinct roles in capital raising process. Advisors produce information regarding 
firms and industry, analyse firms’ and industry performance, and audit the 
performance to signal the firms’ reputation (Corwin & Schultz, 2005). We believe, for 
these reasons, that advisors’ experiences are a suitable source of data as they are in a 
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unique position to understand both farms and investors and their competing arguments. 
Besides, owing to the challenges of accessing investors as a participant, the intention 
of this paper to understand farms and investors’ logics from a common institutional 
ground. Advisors are believed to be qualified to have this common institutional 
background. 
Following the vacuum created by neoliberalism policy in family farms and 
agricultural finance (Lawrence, Richards,& Lyons, 2013; Wolf & Bonanno, 2013; 
Kotz, 2010), market-based financiers have started to replace government supported 
schemes almost in all industrialised nations (Ouma, 2016). Off-farm investors 
including wealthy individuals, high net worth individuals (HNWISs), family offices, 
asset managers, merchant banks, pension funds, investment companies, private equity 
investors, private wealth management firms, hedge funds and others, emerged as 
alternative finance partners using single or multiple investment models (Sippel, 
Larder, & Lawrence, 2017; Isakson, 2014; Fairbairn, 2014, 2013). Investors’ 
concentration has been on the entire supply chain, including inputs (Ross, 2008), 
manufacturing, processing, retailing (Burch & Lawrence, 2013, 2009), trading 
(Murphy, Burch, & Clapp, 2012), risk sharing, price and distribution mechanism 
(Clapp, 2014;Bush, 2012; Ghosh, Heintz, & Pollin, 2012) and farmland (Sippel et al., 
2017; Fairbairn, 2013; Cotula, 2012).  
Entrepreneurial family farms (Sippel et al., 2017; Barbarino, 2017) and young 
family farmers (Cotter, Rochecouste, & Mohsin, 2016) have been experiencing this 
off-farm financing relationship under different alternative business structure and 
financing methods (Heath & Tomlinson 2016;Alexander, 2015; Agrifood Skills 
Australia, 2015). This non-traditional financing alliance is especially advantageous to 
those family farms that do not have access to sufficient resources and are not capable 
of or interested in increasing their use of bank financing to grow their businesses 
(Sippel et al., 2017; Larder, 2015). While outright purchase models of the off-farm 
financial partnership are hyped in the media (Isakson, 2014), studies found four 
dominant off-farm investment strategies: own-operate, lease-operate, own-lease out 
and joint venture in the US, the EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Magnan, 
2015; Fairbairn, 2014). Although the win-win frame of the financial partnership is 
proposed to facilitate this partnership, the perspectives of farms and investors specific 
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logics in the contexts of farm-off-farm equity alliance partnership3are still missing in 
the farm and agricultural financing literature. Whereas, a clear understanding of both 
partners competing logics is necessary to facilitate this off-farm strategic alliance for 
equity capital. These logics are neither “abstract nor one-sided” but rather 
“multidimensional” (Sippel et al., 2017). 
Strategic alliances have historically been used in the social and political space 
(Ohmae, 1989), and are now extensively being used as a strategic business tool 
(Schifrin, 2001; Schifrin, 2001; Day, 1995; Fedor & Werther, 1996; Harbison & Pekar, 
1993). It is now commonly used as a firm strategy across business arenas around the 
globe with more than 10,000 new partnership each year (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001). 
This model facilitates the partners access to competitive advantages including all 
necessary resources (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002), financial resources and other 
skills (Pisano & Teece, 2008; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989).  It also enhances firms’ 
legitimacy and market power (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), risks sharing ability 
(Baum & Oliver, 1991), new competencies (Hagedoorn, 1993; Hamel et al., 1989; 
Hennart, 1988) new markets and technologies, and future investment options (Kogut, 
1991).  
With all the benefits of alliances, unsurprisingly, academic publications that 
focus on alliances have received serious attention in relation to addressing a number 
of issues. One group of scholars has emphasised identifying alliance partners’ 
characteristics and partners’ selection criteria (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Hitt, Dacin, 
Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Harrigan, 1986a, 1986b; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976). 
Other researchers have investigated alliance conceptualizations, models, design, 
regulation, and performance (Todeva & Knoke, 2005; Day,1995; Varadarajan & 
Cunningham, 1995). Additional inquiries have found interactive firm cooperation in 
alliances (Gulati, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Cook, 1977; Heide &Miner, 1992), 
alliance management (Ireland et al., 2002) including formation (Kogut,1988), 
governance (Gulati, 1995), success factors (Hoffmann & Schlosser, 2001; Rai, Borah, 
& Ramaprasad, 1996) and alliance failure (Park & Ungson, 2001). For more themes 
                                       
3  For the purpose of this study, modifying G. P. Pisano (1989), we define off-farm equity 
alliance as an institutional arrangement, either a shared equity or classic joint venture, 
between unquoted family farms and unquoted equity investors that create ownership 
structure to protect investment and return and design incentive structure to minimize 
opportunistic behaviour.  
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uncovered in the strategic alliance literature, we refer to a recent review of Gomes, 
Barnes, and Mahmood (2016) of last 22 years of strategic alliance research in 22 
leading management journals globally. However, alliance research has mainly focused 
on traditional strategic alliance rather than the context of family businesses alliance 
and family farm alliance in particular. 
Another stream of literature in which we position our research consists 
institutional logics and institutional complexity. Institutional theory advocates, as 
mentioned by Reay and Hinings (2009) and others (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; 
Gray, 2000; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000) assert that collaboration is one of the 
key components of institutionalization. In this research, we treat off-farm equity 
collaboration in family farming industry as an organization field which is governed by 
competing logics of both family farms and investors in terms of their “belief system”, 
“related practices” (Scott, 2013), assumptions and values (Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012) to “create a sense of common purpose and unity” (Reay & Hinings, 
2009). The common goal of unity in equity collaboration is to make money both for 
investor and farms. Two autonomous stakeholders- family farms and off-farm investors- 
of farming industry domain “engage in an interactive process using shared roles, norms 
and structure to act” (Wood & Gray, 1991). These shared patterns and beliefs develop 
institutional logics, which is referred to as partners’ cognitive ideas, practices, structure, 
objects, and cultural materiality (Jones, Boxenbaum, & Anthony, 2013; Thornton et al., 
2012; Friedland & Alford, 1991). These logics create complexity in the organization 
due to the degree of mutual agreement or disagreement with the partners (Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). If this statement is true in another 
organizational setting, we believe that the family farms equity collaboration context 
would also be affected. 
The point of departure of our study is to explore the logics of farms and investors 
in the context of off-farm equity partnerships. While prior studies in strategic alliance and 
institutional logics make a useful contribution, there is sufficient opportunity to extend 
current alliance and institutional logics research by focusing on family farms’ external 
equity investors’ partnership alliances. Current farm financing research, to the best of our 
knowledge, has not fully addressed, theoretically and empirically, the financial and non-
financial logics of partners in the context of financial partnership logics. Specifically, we 
contribute to the literature in three ways: Firstly, our study explores the competing views 
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of the demand side of off-farm equity alliance (family farms in this case) and the supply 
side of equity alliances (off-farm equity investors in this case) as few studies in the extant 
literature uncovered actors’ choices and behaviours, from different perspectives of equity 
deals. These views, unlike other research, are based on the experiences of farm advisors 
who are engaged in intermediating and advising both farms and investors as part of the 
dynamics of equity structure. Secondly, we also did not find much empirical evidence 
that shows how these competing logics can be combined and blended to reach a successful 
equity deal in a family farm setting. Thirdly, we believe our research will produce 
necessary food for thoughts for developing equity alliance at different empirical setting. 
Developing alliance across the economic settings around the globe is not straightforward 
as farms are not unique across the region due to diverse agro-ecological and socio-
economic context (van Vliet et al., 2015). 
We suggest that it is necessary to have a pluralistic institutional arrangement, like 
other (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), in off-farm equity alliance through some appropriate 
reactions. However, how? Current literature shows three ways, intra-organizational 
(Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke, & Spee, 2015), inter-organizational (Purdy & Gray, 2009) 
and organizational peers (Venkataraman, Vermeulen, Raaijmakers, & Mair, 2016), of 
managing competing logics.  
We have divided this article into five parts. First, we discuss our theoretical 
frameworks and outline the concept of institutional complexity and institutional logics 
and their relevance to off-farm equity collaboration in family farms. Second, we describe 
our methodological choices. Third, we present the findings of our semi-structured 
interview with farm advisors. In the fourth section, we discuss our findings linking them 
with the theory constructed inductively and the extant literature. Finally, the paper 
concludes by stating the limitations and opportunities for further research.   
2. Empirical setting  
The off-farm equity collaboration we studied was in the context of Australian 
farming during the period 2014-2017. In this period, the family farming industry has 
received rejuvenated global policy attention as the United Nations designated the year 
2014 as the “International Year of Family Farming (IYFF)” (van Vliet et al., 2015; Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2014). As an empirical 
policy response to this global development, we intend to contribute to the long-term 
external equity financing policy space of family farms. During the same period, we have 
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also observed the emergence of significant public and private policy concentration in 
the Australian family farming and agricultural domain, in particular, the necessity to 
explore alternative financing alternatives, among other issues, for Australian family 
farming and agribusinesses. To draw public attention regarding the importune of this 
policy, the Australian government drafted the Agricultural Competitiveness White 
Paper 2015 through the process of developing an Agricultural Competitiveness Issue 
Paper (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015, 2014). Various stakeholders including 
farmers, industry associations, researchers, finance sector, representatives, supply chain 
representatives, and state and territory governments, were involved in the consultation 
process with almost 1000 submissions. In the private domain, we observed high 
numbers of anecdotal and idiosyncratic inquiries and commentaries on adopting 
alternative finance and long-term equity in particular. Two special issues of Australian 
Farm Policy Journal by Australian Farm Institute (AFI), for example: “Financing the 
Future Farming” (AFI, 2013) and “A Review Farm Funding Models and Business 
Structure in Australia” (Heath & Tomlinson, 2016) on Australian farm financing 
authenticate the relevance of our research setting and time.  
3. Conceptual grounding  
We have reviewed three fundamental areas of the literature: family farms financing, 
strategic alliances, and institutional logics and institutional complexity. These key issues 
are the focus of the conceptual and theoretical lenses of our study.  We are convinced 
that off-farm equity is a much-needed equity capital model for family farms, but there 
is yet to be a clear understanding of how these off-farm equity alliances in the family 
farming sector can happen. The extant literature has not segregated the demand side 
logics and supply side logics of off-farm equity. In addition, managing the conflicts of 
fund users and fund providers has not been discussed in family farms contexts.  Most of 
the equity alliance literature has focused on the context of traditional businesses. 
Likewise, in institutional logics, most of the literature has addressed logics in traditional 
businesses apart from few in family businesses contexts.  
3.1.Family farm financing and off-farm equity alliances  
The literature regarding family business capital structures shows that internal 
equity and bank debt are the two-dominant sources of capital (Thiele, 2017). Family 
farms, as a subset of family businesses, are not different. Since the advent of the first 
agricultural commodity exchange for farm financing in mid-1800s for farm financing 
65 
 
(Bryan & Rafferty, 2005; Clapp, 2014), farm and agricultural sector has traditionally 
been expanded until the end of the 20th century, through the dichotomy of capital: 
internal equity and bank-based financing (Williams, 2014; Lowenberg-DeBoer, 
Featherstone, & Leatham, 1989). Internal equity does not help family farms to grow 
and increase their scale. Researchers (Lowenberg-DeBoer, 1989; Collins & Bourn, 
1986; Melichar, 1984; Gabriel & Baker, 1980) have noted the limitations of debt 
financing after the U.S. farm crisis in 1980 and beyond. For example, bank debt creates 
financial, production, commodity, and price risks for farms. Stricter banking 
regulations after many banking crises across the world (Spitzeck & Hansen, 2010), 
and global financial crisis in 2008 (Thiele, 2017), made the bank loan a less attractive 
choice for family businesses. This pushed the family-owned firms to use external 
equity, which was once treated as the least preferred financing option for family firms 
(Gottardo & Moisello, 2014; Koropp, Kellermanns, Grichnik, & Stanley, 2014). 
Equity financing, the most effective financing option for projects with long-term 
returns such as product development, expansion, innovation, research or opening new 
markets (Isaksson & Çelik, 2013). As these project features are also available in 
capital-intensive farming, equity capital can also be a suitable financing option for 
farm businesses. Thus, non-farm equity, in the form of public equity, particularly in 
agricultural projects such as tobacco and ranching (Atherton, 1972), emerged in the 
US farms and agriculture finance. However, scholarly debates about capital structure 
decisions of publicly traded corporate firms cannot inform the equity financing 
problems of farm businesses because most farm businesses’ structures are in either of 
two forms: closely controlled by families, sole trader ship or partnership (Lowenberg-
DeBoer et al., 1989). Moreover, family farms are afraid of losing control, regulatory 
compliance, and costs if external capital is injected (Weild & Kim, 2010).  
Since the 1990s, agricultural assets have merged as an attractive investment class 
to the varied private investor's groups including large institutional investors, 
investment banks, hedge funds, commodity index funds and other third-party investors 
(Williams, 2014; Burch & Lawrence, 2009). The main reasons for this attraction is 
that these investors think that this investment category provides reasonable return, both 
operational and capital gain, and it is safe, secured, compared to traditional asset class, 
as it offers inflation hedged return and growth potential (Williams, 2014; Clapp, 2014, 
2012; Magnan, 2012; McMichael, 2012; Burch & Lawrence, 2009). 
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3.2.Equity alliance typology 
Expanding on structural choices of the strategic alliance, Das and Teng (2000); 
Gulati, (1995); and Tallman & Shenkar (1990) have identified a dichotomy of the 
alliance: equity and non-equity. Collaborative arrangements among firms, for 
integrating different resources, such as cash, technology, patent, rights, have been in 
practice either through pure contractual (non-equity) or equity collaboration, even 
though it has received little empirical analysis (Pisano, 1989). These non-equity 
arrangements are also known as contractual agreements such as licensing, distribution, 
supply agreement, technical assistance and management assistance (Hennart, 1988). 
Equity arrangements refer to a mechanism where one partner partially acquires 
ownership of other partner’s firm, or two or more partners agree to pool different 
resources under the watchdog of a legal entity which distributes profits or any other 
surpluses to partners (Hennart, 1991; Pisano, 1989; Hennart, 1988). This collaborative 
arrangement may take different shapes: equity joint venture, direct equity investment, 
and consortia. Table 1 summarises common forms of equity collaboration in traditional 
business. 
However, what motivates firms to use equity collaboration?  We examined the use 
of equity joint venture from different perspectives, especially in the contexts of 
multinational enterprises in different modes: forward and backward integration, 
horizontal expansion, or diversification mainly in the technology sector to increase 
minimum efficient scales (MES) for firms’ economic activities (Pablo, Subramaniam, 
& Krishnaswami, 2002; Hennart, 1988). Equity joint ventures were the topic of 
attention for the industrial economists ( Hennart, 1988) and their primitive stage; joint 
ventures were limited to the same industry in a bid to reduce competition (Pate, 1969). 
Later, Berg and Friedman (1980) suggested four reasons for equity joint ventures: 
achieving economies scale to diversify risks; defeating the entry barriers in the global 
market, developing, or exchanging knowledge, and combatting the xenophobic 
reaction of host country partner.  
These motives behind joint venture, however, were not sufficiently convincing in 
the eyes of critics; thus, these conditions of equity joint ventures were considered 
necessary but not sufficient conditions (Hennart, 1988). To extend this issue further 
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Hennart (1988) clarified why partners prefer equity joint ventures, even at the cost of 
ownership. Paraphrasing the views of Hennart (Hennart, 1988), we define scale equity  
Table 1. Forms of equity / non-equity collaboration in traditional business. 
A. Equity joint venture: contributing equity by joint partners say 51%; 49%, or 50%-
50-%, 80%-20% or any other combination, partner holding majority equity portion 
enjoys a dominant position in the collaboration (Hennart, 1991; Hennart, 1988;  
Pisano, 1989; Sampson, 2004). 
1. Non-operating equity joint ventures: do not perform the operations of any 
partner’s, rather they ensure the legal and administrative procedures of partners as 
per agreed conditions (Sampson, 2004; Hennart, 1991; Pisano, 1989; Hennart, 
1988). 
2. Operating equity joint ventures: create a separate entity with its own facilities, and 
they perform on behalf of each partner (Sampson, 2004; Hennart, 1991; Pisano, 
1989; Hennart,1988). 
3. Hybrid joint equity ventures: partly non–operating and partly operating (Sampson, 
2004; Hennart, 1991; Pisano, 1989; Hennart, 1988). 
B. Direct equity: no separate entity is created, one partner (firm) purchases some 
portion, less than 50%, of another partner’s equity, or any other combination, partner 
holding majority equity portion enjoys a dominant position in the collaboration 
C. Minority equity: it is direct, incoming partners’ equity would be restricted to 20% 
of the target partner’s (firm’s) equity. 
D. Equity joint ventures: partners either purchase partial ownership in other firms or, 
establish a separate independent legal entity to pool their resources. Types: Scale 
equity joint venture and link equity joint venture (Pablo et al., 2002; Hennart, 1988). 
1. Scale equity joint ventures: it is formed when all parent firms are symmetrical at 
least in purpose and look for partners for expanding production, distribution, or 
entering a new market (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000). 
2. Link equity joint ventures: formed when all partners are different purposes 
(Dussauge et al., 2000). 
E. Non-equity Alliances: no equity and ownership are shared among partners, by 
default mode of alliance (Gulati, 1995); easy to negotiate, and requires limited 
investment but it engages opportunistic behaviour (Joskow, 1987).  
1. Unilateral non –equity alliances: involves transferring one asset to another among 
partners; they work independently, but the degree of collaboration among partners 
is minimal. Examples: licensing, distribution, research, and development (Mowery, 
Oxley, & Silverman, 1998). 
2. Bilateral Non-Equity Alliances: manifest partners are putting resources and 
working together, more open than unilateral. Example:  joint promotion/production, 
enhanced supplier partnerships ( Das & Teng, 2000). 
joint venture as a way to reconcile the inefficient market of intermediate inputs, such 
as raw materials, knowledge, distributional channel, tacit technology, nationality and 
financial capital, in two markets (partners). At the other end, the link equity joint 
venture is used to produce better alternative solutions for particular resources if 
partners perceive any simultaneous failure in their respective markets. Based on 
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transaction theorem analysis, Hennart (1988) argued that scaled equity alliance is 
suitable when two partners attempt to internalise any failing market of at least two 
intermediate input simultaneously, provided that they find a large difference in 
minimum efficient scales (MES) (see Hennart, 1988), for a detailed scale equity 
model).  
The two main logics underpinning the arguments for scale and link equity joint 
ventures are that assets are characterised by two features: (1) firm-specific assets, and 
(2) assets as public goods. By firms’ assets specificity, Hennart means an asset that 
cannot be isolated form firm. Public good assets mean assets that can be shared at low 
marginal costs, and it is better to acquire that asset than replicate them.  As per this 
argument, the bottom line for equity alliance to happen: equity joint ventures are an 
efficient option if the required resources are part and parcel of firm operations and if 
they incur more expenses to replicate them than to acquire them Linking with this 
justification, we argue that financial capital is such an intermediate input of farms’ 
production without which farms may not achieve their minimum efficient scales 
(MES), also known as minimum optimal scales (MOS) (Kaselimi, Notteboom, Pallis, 
& Farrell, 2011; Fuss & Gupta, 1981; Christensen & Greene, 1976), let alone preferred 
scales (Kaselimi et al., 2011; Pratten, 1971). 
The definition given by Wood and Gray (1991) has attracted our attention as 
they attempted to revise the definition of strategic collaboration (alliance), by Gray 
(1989), based on nine empirical and two theoretical papers published in the Journal of 
Applied Behavioural Science. Ray’s (1989) definition of collaboration is as under: 
“Collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problems 
domain engages in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms and practices, and 
structures, to act or decide on an issue related to that domain” (Gray,1989, p.11). Based 
on 11 papers, Wood and Gray (1991) identified a range of elements of collaborations. 
According to Wood and Gray (1991), a collaborative contract will have the following 
elements: voluntary membership; common interest and shared goals; medium to long-
term capacity; various aspects and opinions; constructive acts; shared 
institutions/rules/norms; interactive and flexible norms and practices; and solutions 
beyond their limited visions to fix the shared domain future. 
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3.3.Institutional logics, logics multiplicity, and strategic alliances 
Alliances and networks in firms can be studied within their institutional 
settings (Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997) as alliances are the mechanisms of strategic 
cooperation of inter-organization and entrepreneurs (Gerlach, 1992). To understand 
the main logics in off-farm equity alliances, particularly the stakeholder level of 
collaborations (Gray & Wood, 1991), in family farms, this research inductively uses 
institutional logic theory, which is a meta-theory of institutional theories. Institutional 
logics is one of the key strands of institutional theory, and the argument around is that 
rules and practices derive from the behaviours of stakeholders in that institutional 
context who develop the institutional dynamics over the period (Zilber, 2013; 
Friedland & Alford, 1991). Institutional logics produce “a sense of common purpose 
and unity” in the organization setting Reay and Hinings (2009). Based on the work of 
other institutional theorists (Scott, 2013; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), Reay and 
Hangings (2009) suggest that a dominant institutional logic dictates an organizational 
field despite the presence of two or more competing logics at a time. Others (Smets et 
al., 2015; Mair & Hehenberger, 2014) argue that competing logics may co-exist in an 
organization and organizational stakeholders get benefit from this coexistence if 
properly managed. 
Institutional logic creates organizational practices, also known as the actors’ 
roles (Thornton et al., 2012), in an organizational field (Scott & Lane, 2000). Actors 
in an organization develop their behaviour, provide a clear explanation of their right 
course of action and articulate ways of success through the principles guided by 
institutional logics (Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton, 2004). In the work of 
Thornton (2004), we find six types of institutional logics: market, corporation, 
profession, family, religion, and state. In this paper, we considered two types of 
institutional logics: family farm and equity investors’ logics. Previous literature has 
explored competing for multiple logics in various organization fields, “a community 
of actors held together by their joint values and beliefs” (Reay & Hinings, 
2009,p.631). Some notable areas are:  social and economic development 
(Venkataraman et al., 2016); public-private partnership (Saz-Carranza & Longo, 
2012); healthcare (Currie & Spyridonidis, 2016; Reay, Goodrick, Waldorff, & 
Casebeeer, 2016); cultural industries (Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005); life sciences 
(Murray, 2010);  manufacturing (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010),family 
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businesses (Jaskiewicz, Heinrichs, Rau, & Reay, 2016; Reay, Jaskiewicz, & Hinings, 
2015);  professional services (Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012); private firm 
financing (Hua, Chen, & Prashantham, 2016), and the  microfinance industry (Cobb, 
Wry, & Zhao, 2016).  
Institutional logics adopt the shape of multiplicity if organizations are to 
comply with the demand (logics) of multiple audiences. The higher the deviation among 
the institutional logics of multiple actors, the higher the possibility of tensions 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). The existence of multiple institutional logics among multiple 
institutional actors creates institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Institutional logics theorist acknowledges the presence of multiple logics in an 
organizational field but is yet to achieve consensus on a systematic conceptual and 
theoretical platform to respond to this multiplicity (Pache & Santos, 2010). Scholarly 
works describe different response strategies for managing competing logics among 
partners: strategic (Dorado, 2005; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010) hybrid (Pache 
& Santos, 2013b), compatible and central (Besharov & Smith, 2014) organizational 
(Greenwood et al., 2011), individual (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Smets et al., 2015), 
material (Jones et al., 2013) and co-existence (institutional pluralism) (Kraatz & Block, 
2008; McPherson & Sauder, 2013). 
In our research, we view family farms and investors as two separate institutions 
because these two separate units have their own formal: (written and codified legal 
and political) and informal (social and cultural norms and practices) rules which dictate 
their entrepreneurial behaviours and create payoff for them (Boettke & Coyne, 2009; 
North, 1990). We expect that differences and tensions between equity collaboration 
partners, farms, and investors, originate from two different potential sources in the 
problem domain of partnerships (Wood & Gray, 1991). These two problem domains 
create tensions in collaboration as indicated by Wood and Gray (1991): self-interest 
vs. collective interest, and self-control vs. collective control. Tensions in alliances are 
inherent but not desirable, in that alliance (Das & Teng, 2000). Such inherent tension 
of strategic alliances has motivated scholars to call a strategic alliance “a system of 
multiple tensions- namely, cooperation versus competition, rigidity versus flexibility, 
short term vs. long term” (Das & Teng, 2000,p.94). For this multiplicity, alliances are 
also heterogenetic- in the sense that multiple partners engage with a ‘plurality of 
interests, values, loyalties, histories, and preferences” (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004). 
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4. Theoretical underpinning    
Our theory selection process was inductive, meaning that we relied on the 
inductive interpretation of our data to link relevant theory with our findings (Thomas, 
2006; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In this paper, our main intention was to evaluate the 
raw data to navigate the separate views of family farms and off-farm investors to 
understand how these separate views can be managed. We were guided by this focus 
in our analysis (Thomas, 2006), and institutional logics theory (Thornton et al., 2012; 
Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) and strategic response models (Pache & Santos, 2010; 
Oliver, 1992) became stronger in our interpretations of the findings. 
We believe that exploring views of off-farm equity partners, was better reflected 
in the mirror of institutional logics. Institutional logics are broadly categorised as the 
collections of beliefs, practices, values, assumptions, and rules that influence 
individuals’ or organizations’ cognition, behaviour, and identity (Lok, 2010; Thornton 
& Ocasio, 1999). Logics are gradually manifested among individuals or organization 
through their inherent activities, work experiences, education, influential peers 
(individuals/organization), and major societal units of institutions such as family, 
community, state, market, religion, corporation, and professions (Thornton et al., 
2012;Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Friedland & Alford, 1991). Influenced with all of 
these logics, individuals /organization adopt the basic structure that governs their 
decision-making pattern (Pache & Santos, 2013a; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). 
Differences in logics amongst actors in an organization contradict each other and 
create logics multiplicity, which can be either be detrimental or beneficial to the 
organizations’ performance (Besharov & Smith, 2014). Incompatibilities in multiple 
logics create institutional complexity. Institutional logic theorists argue that multiple 
logics of separate actors can be blended through the logic of bureaucracy to develop a 
new type of organizational form (Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2005; Haveman & Rao, 
1997).  
Following these views, in our research, the institutional logic framework fits 
into three dimensions: first, two different actors in off-farm equity alliances, farms 
and equity investors, have different logics as they have different experiences, 
education, beliefs, and social and community orientations. Second, like in other 
institutional settings, off-farm equity alliance may face logic multiplicity arising 
from the incompatibility of farms and off-farm investors’ logics. Third, an 
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institutional framework between farms and investors can be created to balance the 
logic incompatibilities among farms and off-farm investors. 
Further, we also believe the art of managing competing logics among farms 
and off-farm investors, in this paper, could be explained through the framework for 
organizations’ strategic responses to competing demands (Oliver, 1992; Pache & 
Santos, 2010). This framework suggests five strategic responses, “Acquiescence,” 
“Compromise,” “Avoidance,” “Defiance,” and “Manipulation” to multiple 
conflicting institutional demands. Drawing on Pache and Santos (2010), we define 
these terminologies here in brief: acquiescence means accepting some norms and 
practices; compromise means partial acceptance of all competing demands; 
avoidance refers to escaping the acceptance of competing logics; defiance is about 
rejecting at least one the competing demands, and manipulation means altering the 
contents of competing demands. 
Like Oliver’s strategy, our findings also suggest family farms can acquire some 
form of institutional norms and practices and show some compromising responses to 
manage competing logics. We do not see any relevance here for our research of three 
of Oliver’s other strategies: avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. Also, using 
Oliver framework, other research (Dorado, 2005; Clemens & Cook, 1999; Sewell Jr, 
1992) has also explored how organization strategically fight with conflicting 
demands of actors.  
5. Methods  
5.1. Research design  
Philosophically, we adopted a constructivist (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997; 
Roulston, 2010) view in our research. Rather than following a stricter interview 
protocol, during our interviews, we tried to give a unique sense of our research to 
each of our informants. Our unstructured interview questions along with the various 
fine tunned theme of our research, which has gradually improved from preceding 
interview sessions (Spradley, 1979), were put on the table for discussion with our 
participants. In response to the call of Reay and Jones (2016) for using a “qualitative 
pattern inducing” method for navigating institutional logics, we inductively 
interviewed farm advisors to explore off-farm equity partners’ logics.   
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5.2. Data collection and sources 
As we set our main objective to explore and manage the competing logics 
among off-farm equity alliances, we explored the experiences of participants who 
have had the experience of dealing with the arguments of both farms and equity 
investors. To achieve this, we relied on the lens of professional advisors’ experience. 
This perspective is somewhat similar to the “practice lens” (Smets et al., 2015) within 
institutional logics and the complexity that uncovers a more “dynamic” picture of 
competing logics (Suddaby, Seidl, & Lê, 2013). Professional advisors’ perspectives 
about the farms’ and investors’ logics derive from “practical understanding” 
(Schatzki, 2006) of “everyday experience” (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009) with 
farms and investors. We relied on the opinions of Australian farm advisors who have 
actively been engaged in advising both equity investors and family farms using or 
looking for off-farm equity in Australia for the last 10 to 20 years.  
 
We selected the first two advisors purposively (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) 
considering these two informants would be easy to access and would provide 
information aligned with our main research question. The other 12 advisors were 
selected using snowball sample technique (Patton, 1990). We reached a point of 
theoretical saturation (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) at 14 informants at which point we 
stopped our interviews. Names of informants and locational identity have not been 
disclosed to ensure anonymity. The main method of data collection was semi-
structured interviews with specialist farm advisors to get real accounts about the field 
(Morgan, 1983). One of the authors helped in accessing interview participants while 
I conducted the interviews and recorded them verbatim with an audio recorder with 
participants’ prior permission. Interview time totaled 793 minutes with an average 
time of 61 minutes per interview. To allow for flexibility, six interviews were 
conducted face to face while the remaining interviews were done over the phone. 
Table 2 depicts the participants’ matrix of the study that shows different attributes of 
13 participants while one participant was removed from the final analysis. This was 
due to this respondent’s reluctance to be recorded verbatim and to be identified. We 
selected advisors with diversified backgrounds to ensure a quality sample.  
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5.3.Data analysis   
Our analytical strategies consisted of two stages: stage one is an automated thematic 
analysis, and stage two is an inductive theme. This technique is similar to the work of 
Young and Denize (2008).  
Table 2. Participants’ matrix of the study 
W = Whole Ag Industry, H = Horticulture Industry, C = Cattle Industry, F= Farms, 
I= Investors, G = Growers, AA= Around Australia. Q= Queensland, T= Telephonic, 
F to F = Face to face 
5.3.1. Stage 1: Automated thematic analysis   
We inductively coded (Thomas, 2006) each interview’s data in N-Vivo Pro11 and 
also used Leximancer 4, N-Vivo pro 11 and manual analytical tools together for this 
paper. Four reasons drove our decision to use Leximancer for this paper: (1) it is 
recommended for inductive research that does not rely on predetermined theoretical 
frames (McKenna & Waddell, 2007); 2) it ensures reliability of manually coded text 
analysis (Smith & Humphreys, 2006), (3) it minimises unreported subjectivity errors of 
Professional portfolio Industr
y focus 
Advising 
experience 
(years)  
 
Farming 
engagem
ent 
Geograp
hical 
Focus 
Interview 
protocol 
Interview 
duration 
(minutes) 
Global Agribusiness 
Consultant (GAC) 
W 20 Yes AA F to F 107 
International Investment 
Advisor (IIA) 
W 10 Yes AA F to F 43 
Investors Consultant (IC) H 10 Yes AA T 25 
Capital Consultant (CC) C 20 Yes Q T 93 
Management and 
Consultancy (MC) 
H 20 Yes AA T 35 
Accounting and Auditing 
Firm (AA) 
W 20 N/A AA F to F 68 
Private Equity Firm (PEF) W 20 N/A AA F to F 47 
Investment Advisor and 
Asset Manager (IAAM) 
W 15 Yes AA T 68 
Partnership Consultant 
(PC) 
H 10 Yes AA T 58 
Independent Management 
Consultancy (IMC) 
W 20 Yes AA T 25 
Fund Managers (FM) C & H 20 Yes Q F to F 95 
Property Valuators (PV) W 15 Yes AA T 80 
Agribusiness Banker (AB) W 10 Yes AA F to F 49 
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human interpretation (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and (4) it reduces the time involved in 
the analytical process (Weber, 1990). 
For our research, we created a single project in Leximancer 4.0 version for all 13 
interviews, and we analysed them collectively. Unlike using Leximancer for positivist 
ontological evidence (Carson, Gilmore, Perry, & Gronhaug, 2001; Hudson & Ozanne, 
1988), we used Leximancer with an interpretative epistemological frame (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985), similar to other prior research (Parsons, 2008; Young & Denize, 2008). 
Leximancer aided an interpretative constructivism stance that gave us the opportunity 
to broadly contextualize the auto-generated concepts and texts and to see how these texts 
function with our mental map (Widdowson, 2008; Smith & Humphreys, 2006). This is 
one of the significant steps towards interpretation from the analysis in qualitative 
research (Widdowson, 2008). To sum up, we used the software in a manner compatible 
with an interpretive stance.     
Leximancer generated a total of 7 themes and 45 relevant concepts under a theme 
size of 50%. The seven chronological themes, as per the Leximancer hit map, from 
interview data are farms, investors, business, doing, model, reporting, and able. 
Associated concepts and the thesaurus for each of the themes and the concept map have 
not been presented here due to space constraints, but they are available from the first 
author. Leximancer itself performs two stages of text extraction, namely relational and 
semantic extraction, to automatically analyse generated themes. 
5.3.2. Stage 2:  Interpretive thematic analysis 
Stronger and explicit themes in a Leximancer concept map do not always unfold 
important concepts as required to answer research questions, as less important 
concepts are not reflected in the Leximancer hit map. Hence, we moved from open to 
the axial coding of data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to concentrate on leading themes. 
During this stage, we revisited the corpus of interview data coded under each of 
the auto-generated themes. Using our interpretive hermeneutics, we reviewed all of 
the seven themes to reveal the meaning of interview texts. In this process, we also 
observed the implicit and weak concepts in addition to the generic and dominant 45 
concepts from Leximancer as the former is sometimes equally important to the latter, 
provided they satisfy the research focus (Dewey, 2013; McKenna & Waddell, 2007; 
Margaroni, 2005). This led us to consider all 45 concepts and the background words 
and texts, which made the concept map and shaped the themes. We interpreted the 
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background texts to make it differentiated, which is impossible without the 
researchers’ intervention (Young & Denize, 2008). Figure 1 summarizes the results of 
that interpretation. Arrows in Figure 1 are an indication of the association of concepts 
described by participants.  
Figure 1: An interpretative framework for exploring competing logics and 
responses 
 
 
The interpreted data of figure 1 incentivised us to divide relevant concepts under 
two broader interpretive themes, as shown in the box in Figure1. Theme one is about 
competing views in off-farm equity alliance and covers two distinct categories: farms’ 
logics (marked as logic A) and investors’ logics (marked as logic B). The other theme 
indicates principles of managing competing views and shows two different principles: 
investment readiness and equity structuration. We can theorise them as logics by 
linking them to institutional logic theory. The next section discusses these two themes 
about empirical evidence. 
6. Findings   
 Based on the automated and interpretative analysis shown in the previous 
section, in this section we present the empirical evidence answer two research 
questions: (a) why two parties do to off-farm equity- family farms and off-farm 
investors- confront each other, and (b) how these can competing for logics in off-farm 
equity alliances be managed. 
Equity 
Capital 
Business 
Case 
Strategy 
Govern-
ance 
Model 
specifi
city 
Scale 
Professional 
Focus  
Conservatis
m Investors’ 
types 
Efficienc
y  Family 
dominance  
Theme One: 
Competing Logics 
 Logic A: Farm logics 
 Logic B: Investor 
logics 
 
Theme Two:  
Managing Logics 
 Investment readiness 
 Equity structuring 
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6.1. Competing logics: Family farms logics and off-farm investors logics  
      As our automated Leximancer analysis indicated investors and farms are two leading 
themes, and inductively we consider these two themes as subthemes under an inductive 
theme: competing logics. The analysis in Leximancer indicates to us that these two sub-
themes are interrelated with other concepts. For instance, the farm sub-theme covers the 
13 concepts: family, capital, equity, asset, structure, private, level, land, year, strategy, 
farming, and debt. The sub-theme investor includes 15 concepts: investment, look, 
agriculture, people, different probably, institutional, time, Australia, return, Australian, 
invest, things, and market. We may draw an inference that every other concept in the 
interview is connected either with farms or with investors. Interpreting all the 
background texts under these 28 concepts, we named these two themes farm logic (logic 
A) and investors’ logic (logic B) as we observed some competing choices of family 
farms and equity investors within off-farm equity alliances.  
We presented these competing logics in a dichotomous pair to reflect the position 
of both farms and investor in Figure 1. We included the most relevant, rather than 
exhaustive lists, eight competing logics from our research are: emotional vs. 
commercial, tax vs. profit maximization, instinctive vs. evidencing, continuation vs. 
cessation, financial vs. farming literacy, lower vs. higher scale, traditional vs. 
professional, and operational vs. capital efficacy. Table 3 presents some representative 
statements from our informants specifying competing logics of farms and investors. 
Putting these pairs succinctly in an interpretive statement, we can say from our analysis: 
in off-farm equity alliances, family farms seem to be emotional, protectionists and 
traditionalists in taking a business decision and they look to protect the generational 
legacies. They struggle with lower scales and poor financial literacy with a focus on 
minimising cost, operational efficiency, and diversification. 
In contrast, off-farm equity investors appear to be commercial, positivistic, and 
professional in their business dealing and they like to ensure a return for a fixed period. 
They have an appetite for large-scale investments, and they lack in farming knowledge. 
The primary focus of investors lies in maximising the efficiency of output, capital and 
divesting. In summary, the representative data shown in table 3 indicates concerns for 
both for family farms and off-farm investors in off-farm equity alliance. Table 4 
summarises concerns under eight different pairs as per researchers own interpretation 
form data presented in table 3.   
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Table 3: Data structure showing competing logics in equity collaboration 
Dimensions Logic A: Family farm logics Logic B: Off-farm investors logics 
Emotional 
vs. 
commercial  
They [Farmers] live on farms, and they 
[Farms] are their family homes (FM). 
Family farms say we are not making any 
money (due to) troubles of cash flow and 
seasonality (PEF)  
[Investors] are bit bipolar, --- If anything does 
not work, they [investors] want to sell. If 
anything works, they want to buy (FM). They are 
also kids in a candy store or rednecks in a glitter 
boat shop. Investors want[a]sense of profitability 
from farms financials (IIA) and to make a return. 
(PEF)  
Tax vs. 
Return 
maximizati
on 
Farmers always try to minimize their tax, 
and that is their objective. They actually 
increase the debt which will increase their 
interest which will offset their tax 
payment. (GAC)  
Investors [want to] own some of the assets, to 
participate, and they want capital gain and 100 
% gain on the asset (CC) They want a mixture of 
cash return growth about 4-5% and capital 
growth (increase in land value (GAC) 
Instinctive 
vs. 
Evidence-
based  
Farmers do not need to know [data] 
particularly why they are doing what they 
are doing because they have been doing it 
for generations and it’s in his DNA. (CC) 
Data is particularly important to an investor, and 
this is actually one of the areas that make assets 
investable because the data is analysed (IC) 
Continuatio
n vs. 
cessations  
Family farms are multi-generational, so 
they might be thinking its again going to 
pass it on to the next generation and the 
next generation because that has been the 
history of that asset (PEF), different 
generation want to do it differently (PV),  
“Investors provide equity to grow farm’s 
business but want an exit to take those funds out 
of business to realise investment (PEP), 
Investors are here for long-term, (but) they are 
not forever, they could be here for five years or 
10 years or 50 years”. 
Financial 
vs. No-
financial 
literacy 
Farms merely have financial reporting 
that are not sophisticated enough that 
would attract the equity investors 
(GAC) 
Investors do not have any idea what they (farms 
businesses) actually mean---- Why to invest in 
Australian agriculture; what would be hurdles, 
how to mitigate that (GAC) 
Lower vs. 
higher 
scale 
The scale of enterprise within the family 
farm structure rarely match with the 
quantum of the capital of private equity 
investors (FV) 
investors want really quite big numbers to make 
the investment work, for example, $150 million 
for each transaction, so they would longer term 
would like exposure to $450 – 500 million of 
opportunity (FV) 
Traditiona
l vs. 
Profession
al 
Governan
ce   
The farm is as a lifestyle rather than a 
business, no segregation of duties, lack of 
enterprise vision and accountability 
(GAC) Fam’ reporting is always focused 
either on minimising the tax or to meeting 
the bank governance (Allen). Farms do 
financial and tax accounting (FM), farms 
feel comfort with mum and dad type of 
structure (PV); fundamentally dad makes 
the final decision (FV) 
Investors want a good operator with a level of 
governance (PV) their own representatives or 
their own independent advisors (CC). Majority 
institutional investors want corporate structure 
in management and governance and 
consolidated financial of 3-5 years with a sense 
of profitability (IIA) and audited accounts by 
professional (SC) Investors prefer 
management accounting (FM) and strategic 
accounting (GAC).  
Operating 
vs. 
Capital 
efficiency  
Farms need to be really good with current 
operation and have also got the potential 
capacity to run a big operation (CC) 
Investors need to understand the capital’s 
requirements and then identify and understand 
the operator’s requirements (CC) 
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Table 4: Underlying common concerns in off-farm equity alliance 
Contradictory 
pair  
Family farms concerns Off-farm investors’ 
concerns 
Emotional vs. 
Practical   
Concern regarding the family kingdom  Concern about farms’ 
profitability 
Tax vs. Profit 
Maximization 
Tax burden if profit demonstrated  Proportionate reward for 
investment: share of 
operating and capital gain  
Instinctive vs. 
Reasoning  
Experience is the key to take a decision Data is the base for making a 
decision 
Continuation vs. 
Cessations  
Controlling generational legacy  Realising capital invested 
with reward  
Financial vs. 
No-financial 
(farm) literacy   
Farms lack of financial knowledge Investors lack farming 
knowledge 
Lower vs. higher 
scale 
Scale limitation to attracting investors Equity Investors prefers to 
invest higher scale 
investment 
Traditional Vs. 
Professional 
Governance   
Feeling at ease with the family style of 
governance  
Safeguarding capital through 
the professional setup 
Operating vs. 
Capital 
efficiency 
Operating efficacy and space for the 
scale  
Understanding farm’s 
concern 
 
6.2.Managing competing logics 
      Our participants suggested some mechanisms through which the competing logics 
in off-farm equity collaboration can be coped with. We classify all the opinions of our 
participants in relation to mitigating competing logics under two major headings: being 
investment ready and fixing equity structure. Data also confirms that; professional 
advisors moderate the investment readiness and equity structuring process. This section 
describes the views of participants including data structure surrounding these two themes. 
6.2.1. Investment readiness 
   One of the main practices for managing competing for an equity interest, as 
outlined by informants, is to make family farms investment/investor ready. 
Leximancer informed maps demonstrate that investors and investment are two leading 
concepts with 44 related words but did not disclose any compound concept as investor/ 
investment ready. To make better sense of the data, we have performed text queries in 
N-Vivo on investors and investment separately.  
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Figure 2: Data structure showing investment readiness (IR) practices  
 
                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theme First order codes 
Understanding appetite, getting mind set right 
(cc) 
It is everything from mindset (FM) 
(1) Fixing 
Mindset 
It (IR) achieved through having advisors 
externally or training themselves on their own 
(GAC), and formalising decision process (IC), 
digging it to business structure (CC), and 
getting right strategy and structure (FM) 
 
Taking the emotion out of the businesses (IC) 
Mapping out operational issues, forecasting 
the business (e.g. hurdles and commodity 
changes) within next 10 years (GAC) 
(IR) includes three things: basic document 
preparation, communication process, and 
process administration (CC) 
(2) Setting 
Investment case 
based on past  
Information/data helps (investors) thinking of 
the equation of risk and return (PV) 
To do a comparative analysis, budgeting and 
planning based on 10 years actual (FM) 
(3) 
Documentation, 
communications, 
and procedure 
ready In
v
es
tm
en
t 
R
ea
d
in
es
s 
(5) Farm database 
(Information 
ready) Data room should reflect the quality 
information- water, infrastructure, crops-, 
rather than quantity   
 
Sample data excerpts 
Data room should cover historical 
information and all other farm details (AA), 
must be transparent, and real timed (IC) 
(4) Governance 
structure 
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We looked at the all word trees that makes sense for investment readiness themes 
such as, investor ready (6 informants), investment-ready (4 informants), documents 
ready (1 informant), deal ready (1 informant) and information ready (1 informant). Our 
inductive lens explored five leading elements of investment readiness from the data. 
These include mindset, investment case, documentation, communication and 
administrative process, governance readiness and data readiness.  Figure 2 shows some 
representative data around these five elements in for investment readiness. 
The background texts of 44 words in Leximancer and the associated texts in the 
N-Vivo word tree indicate that different participants have different views on 
investment readiness. One noted: “they [farms]need to be able investment ready, and 
to be investor ready is a long process; it is understanding, --- what the business can 
offer, -- to map out the operational issues-- -- to be able to forecast the business and 
the hurdles in agriculture –in next 10 years” (GAC). To our informants, investment 
readiness is very important “to bring the actual business to those guys [equity partners” 
(CC and GAC), and “information memorandum” is one the tools to communicate this 
readiness. Another participant (CC) commented on “pre-thoughts of investment 
readiness, such as initial investigatory stuff for due diligence and chatting about project 
target” should be the starting point for investment readiness but very few farms 
concentrate on this.   
 The need for benchmarking data both at the national and farm level was another 
way to demonstrate investment readiness as informed by our participants. 
Benchmarking information helps off-farm investors in investing greater scale of 
capital as one participant noted, “they [investors] are looking to invest not $1 million, 
not $5million, but $100/ $300 /$500million in an enterprise” (GAC). Another 
participant (PV) noted that benchmarking data “provides [investors] some verifiable 
data about farms’ return, risk, and cost structure as investors look at investment from 
the mathematics.”  Around 7 participants stressed on the necessity of benchmarking 
data. In this context, one advisor noted “Australian farm and agriculture [have] 
benchmarking information for some sectors of the industry, but [they are] not in the 
public domain” (CC). However, they noted that information, which was available, is 
“flawed, vexed, and grossly wrong at worst” (CC). Also, the data is biased as farms 
submit these for benchmarking “if they have a good year” (PV). Another participant 
(FM) blamed the regulator for this absence of benchmarking data. To address this, 
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advisors recommended to establish “benchmarking industry index or subindex in 
agriculture across [the] industry” (PEF), “sectors and regions” (PV), and 
“neighbouring farms” (GAC). Figure 2 portrays more data structure in support of other 
elements of investment readiness. 
6.2.2. Fixing equity structure 
Our analysis also informs us that developing an equity structure at family farms is 
another key practice to manage competing logics in off-farm equity alliance. According 
to our findings, equity structuring refers to family farms adopting suitable strategies and 
being strategic in their farm businesses by family farms. However, our primary themes 
list in Leximancer do not show any explicit themes such as structure, strategy, and 
strategic process, we inductively reached these themes from leading Leximancer 
generated concepts of “structure”, “strategy”, “process”, “needs”, “understands”, 
“financial” in the data, as well as their background texts. To get more insights into the 
concepts, we also checked the interconnectivity of these concepts with other concepts 
such as “equity”, “business”, “management, “reporting”, “able”, “doing”, “looks”, and 
their interconnection with other concepts including “structure”, “strategy”, “process”, 
“needs”, “understands” and “financial”. The reasons we investigated this 
interconnection were that we observed in the data that they were interrelated. We 
observed that almost all of the advisors talked about the proper structuration of equity 
deal, eight advisors stressed fixing the right strategy while 6 of them emphasised on 
strategy. We combined these categories into a single theme named equity structuration. 
Figure 3 depicts some supporting data in support of this theme. 
When the interviewees talked about structure, the word tree in N-Vivo showed us 
some connecting words, compound concepts, which participants shared in the interview. 
For example, participants, as a whole, mentioned: “investment structure”, “management 
structure”, “board structure”, “governance structure”, “ownership structure”, 
“corporatized structure”, “reporting structure”, “cost structure”, “operating structure”, 
“formal structure”, “legal structure”, “organizational structure”, and “right structure”. 
As we have detailed the right governance, reporting, and ownership structure for right 
partners in a separate paper, we intentionally excluded these details in this paper.  
Analysis of the concept strategic showed us some more related compound concepts 
like “strategic decisions” (CC and IC), “strategic day, strategic planning, strategic 
guidance, and strategic analysis, strategic financials, strategic accounting” (GAC), 
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“strategic assets” (TN), “strategic objectives”, and “strategic point of view”. A close 
look of the concept strategy through N-Vivo word tree unveiled some other related 
compound concept: “exit strategy,” “commodity strategy,” “growth strategy,” 
“expansion strategy,” “investment strategy,” and “overarching strategy.” Other words 
related to strategy, in the data, included:  stagey about; strategy around; strategy across; 
strategy between; strategy framework; strategy structure; and strategy for. All these 
compound concepts of strategy and their background texts indicate the needs of 
structuration of the equity deal and the necessary components of those structures.   
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Within the data, 9 out of 14 advisors, confirmed that putting the right structure 
at farms and adopting the right strategy around that structure is mainly moderated by 
professional advisors. For this aspect, one advisor (CC) noted that “[equity] structure 
might be tweaked, people like myself will create a strategy around the structure for 
both sides and helps create the solution to that structure.” Other participants (GAC) 
argued that “they [family farms] need people of our company or any company like 
ours--- if they want to double their operations injecting external capital. However, in 
doing so, the advisor also commented that this kind advisory help should not be 
CC: Strategic decisions should be set 
fairly early 
GAC:  Deals and whole transaction 
need to be structured in a way that 
benefits both investors and farms 
PC: Strategic decision about 
infrastructure need to be made 
collectively 
GAC: Strategic planning maps the 
business from zero to the next 10 years 
for investors, -it is fun, but it is 
complex, in such a volatile business 
PV: If [investment] proposal is put 
out to the right structure, capital will 
come will step forward into that 
FM:  Governance and reporting 
structures of 95% of agribusiness 
farms are not in existence whereas 
investors [pension funds] are really 
looking for governance, and goal 
orientation 
E
q
u
ity
 S
tru
ctu
rin
g
  
CC: Business structure involves 
succession  
FM: Have a whole strategic day (to 
inform investors) about how your farm 
is going, how farms are tracked 
GAC:  Farm management structure 
are ill equipped to do with external 
equity demand 
Figure 3:  Data structure indicating equity structuration theme 
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mandatory up to the point where farms are equipped themselves: “it is just letting 
them acknowledge where their capabilities stop and then to ask for help so that they 
can be attractive for investors” (GAC). However, in reality, “family farms 
historically have seen financial advisors as necessary evils” (GAC). Participants also 
opined that advisors should act for the better interest for both farms and investors: 
“[advisors] should always be acting in the best interest of both farms and investors -
-- so that they can solve operational issues in farms and communication between 
farms and investors” (CC). Other argued that advisors advocate filling the gap 
between farms and investors: “we actually bridge the gap, we are matchmaker Dot 
Com.” (FM)  
7. Discussion 
This research is one of the few first studies in family farm financing that has 
explored the multiple logics of family farm businesses and off-farm equity investors 
that potentially inhibit flows of funds between private family farms and off-farm 
private investors in the family farming setting. Firstly, we identified eight pairs of 
competing forces- emotional vs. commercial, tax vs. profit orientation, intuitive vs. 
evidencing, financial vs. nonfinancial literacy, lower vs. higher scale, traditional vs. 
professional governance, and operating vs. capital efficiency. These sources of 
competing logics may inhibit the formation and progression of off-farm equity 
alliances. Secondly, we identified two practices that family farms can develop to 
manage multiple competing logics that may maximise the chance of accessing off-farm 
equity. The policy implication of our research is that off-farm equity partners and 
stakeholders can get more information regarding the farms and investors’ arguments to 
facilitate the institutional arrangement in the off-farm equity market.  
In the following section, we theorise our findings in resemblance with current 
theories and literature and spot spaces for further research. We explored two practices: 
investment readiness and equity structuring, as likely mechanisms, moderated by 
professional advisors, to curb these competing logics. 
7.1. Logics multiplicity between family farms and off-farm equity investors     
One important contribution of our study is that it has identified logics of the demand side 
of off-farm equity capital as well as amongst suppliers of off-farm equity capital. Following 
the conceptualizations of institutional logics explained in section 3, our research extended 
the idea of institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) in the context 
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of family farm financing viewing farms and investors as separate logics. Both family farms 
and off-farm investors show diverse sources of logics in off-farm equity alliances as their 
behaviours are influenced by different normative, principles, and different social and cultural 
templates (Scott, 2013; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Friedland & Alford, 1991).  
 Although the term “family farm logics” is rarely used in the farming literature, we accept 
the main objectives of family farms as family farms’ logics from the previous family farming 
literature (Lobley,Errington, McGeorge, Millard, & Potter, 2002; Stokes & Blackburn, 2002; 
Anderson & Jack, 2000; Errington & Gasson, 1994; Gasson & Errington, 1993;Johnson & 
Booth, 1990; Gasson et al., 1988). These researchers confirm fundamental logics of family 
farms, such as keeping the control in the family, passing farms to the next generation to 
ensure emotional survival, protecting prestige, and keeping the family name on the land. 
Family farms may also find themselves under severe tension due to the economic recession, 
loss, or transfer of the farm business, and lose ownership. In our research, we found family 
farms demonstrate the logics of emotion, protectionisms, input orientation, generational 
attachment, poor financial literacy, traditional business style, operational focus, and business 
diversification.    
Our research can be connected to the previous works (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; 
Das & Teng, 2000) that focused on exploring dialectics of strategic alliances in a bid to 
understand reasons of alliances instability in the context of family farming, even though they 
were not undertaken in the farming and family business context. In their work, Das and Teng 
(2000) identify three pairs of internal tension in the strategic alliance: “cooperation vs. 
competition,” “rigidity vs. flexibility” and “short-term vs. long term.” Claiming these three 
tensions as being incomplete sets, De Rond and Bouchikhi (2004), based on the theory of 
human behaviour in organizational settings (Bouchikhi, 1998), treated strategic alliance as 
“heterogeneous phenomena that are continuously torn by multiple and contradictory forces.” 
According to De Rond and Bouchikhi (2004), multiple contradictory forces (competing 
logics in our view) for which alliance organizations are permanently torn may include but 
are not limited to: trust, autonomy, emergence, replication, contradiction, individualism, 
competition, conflict, vigilance, control, design, innovation, expansion, collectivism, 
cooperation, and compromise. These lists of logics, however, may also be extended to 
explore more tensions at multiple levels of a single strategic alliance (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 
2004). Our research may be treated as an empirical response to that extension.   
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Likewise, from off-farm investors’ (fund providers) point of view, our work also 
contributes to identifying how off-farm equity investors deal with conflicting logics from 
family farms. Our research reveals that, unlike family farms, investors show more 
commercial logics. Empirical research unveiling the financiers’ logics including (public, 
commercial, and private financiers) behind investing their money with different partners in 
different contexts are rarely known. Even though every commercial financier is different in 
their logics to invest their money (Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2015), they show two 
notable financial logics: strong financial returns and low risks (Katila, Rosenberger, & 
Eisenhardt, 2008). Money management practices, long-term investing spirit, community 
logics, and social return logics are other noted logics described by investors in previous 
studies (Almandoz, 2014; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Lounsbury, 2007).  
Larger size is one of the essential attributes of firms that investors’ logics consider as 
it indicates the gene of firms past and future financial performance and stability (Josefy, 
Kuban, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010; Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006; Berk, 1995). Better financial performance generates firms’ solvency and increases 
the capacity to pay the loan repayments (Fama & French, 2012). Of all investors, 
institutional investors are susceptible to selecting the right partners as their central 
investment committee ensures the due diligence at head office (Gonzalez, 2010). All these 
findings from previous research support the assertion that investors want more professional 
partners, which is in line with our study.   
One interpretation of our research is that the multiple competing logics in off-farm 
equity collaborations impede the off-farm equity flow from equity investors. This is 
consistent with the previous findings, which claimed that logic multiplicity could be 
threatening to firm performance and put organizations under stress. Other scholars (Smets 
et al., 2015; Jay, 2013; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011), however, 
have positive views on the consequences of logics multiplicity. These works confirm that 
actors consider multiple logics as resources and they can become innovated, sustainable, 
and improved even though actors face some institutional complexity due to logic 
multiplicity. Following these observations, we argue that gaining knowledge by partners 
about each other can also create positive outcomes in the alliance. Likewise, off-farm equity 
collaboration actors- farms and investors- may consider their respective logics as a way of 
transferring knowledge. Farms can learn financial literacy, and business skills from 
investors and investors can increase their farming literacy. In this context, it is a relevant 
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question to ask what kind of alliance facilitates learning. We suggest that the co-investment 
model is the best model that the farming industry can adopt as it protects the maximum 
interest of both farms and investors. Traditional alliance literature (Dussauge et al., 2000), 
however, informs us that link alliance, alliances with different capabilities, may provide 
more capability and learning, than that of scale alliance, alliances with same capabilities. 
Further research can also be done on the scale and link equity alliance in family farming 
industry. 
7.2.Managing logics 
As explained in our literature review section logics multiplicity in an organization 
field, is not a new phenomenon. What is new in our research is the extension of the concepts 
of logic multiplicity into the context of the family farms’ off-farm equity alliances domain. 
In essence, we want to contribute to how these logics multiplicity could successfully be 
managed in a context where family farms build equity alliance (as is our case) with off-
farm investors. We identified two possible ways- investment readiness and equity 
structuring- through which off-farm equity alliance can manage competing logics of farms 
and investors. We argue that these practices are strategic responses from family farms as 
the equity alliance is a strategic journey for both farms and investors. Our findings with the 
theoretical strategic framework of Oliver (1991) and Pache & Santos (2010), which was 
designed to respond to competing for institutional demands. We observe the links between 
two tactics under two strategies, as outlined by Oliver, in our research: firstly, compliance 
tactic as a part the strategy of acquiescing, and secondly, the relevance of a compromise 
strategy with balanced tactics.  
Following the Oliver (1991) and Pache & Santos (2010), we interpreted our 
investment readiness stage using “compliance” tactic under acquiesce strategy. Using our 
interpretation, in this study we identified two practices: investment readiness practice and 
equity structuration practice. Within investment readiness practice in our findings, family 
farms capture future phenomena upfront in congruence with off-farm equity investors. 
Our research indicates, that as a part of equity investment readiness practice, partners 
require the articulating of specific business goals that cover: a positive mindset towards 
off-farm equity; setting up investment case that covers operational and future direction of 
the business; developing document and constructing communication with investors; and 
taking care of right business structure and farm databases, (see Figure 2 for relevant 
quotes during the investment readiness stage). These investment readiness initiatives can 
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be related to compliance tactic of acquisition strategy within strategic response model of 
Oliver (1991) and (Pache & Santos, 2010). Acquisition strategy, with compliance tactic, 
fits in the sense that family farms would demonstrate through the investment readiness 
phase that they have the mindset to accept off-farm investors as partners and to adopt 
some norms and institutional requirements demanded by off-farm investors. Previous 
research has also talked about adopting formalised, rational, and standardised structures 
for family businesses, which eventually increase family business capability (Stewart & 
Hitt, 2011; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Chittoor & Das, 2007), and will lead them into the 
territory of professionalization. Professionalization subsequently increases the likelihood 
of firms’ accessibility to finance at a cheaper cost, and more competitive terms from 
different financing mix including public equity, private equity, and banks (Dawson, 2011; 
Bancel & Mittoo, 2009; Ravasi & Marchisio, 2003; Barden, Copeland, Hermanson, & 
Wat, 1984) 
This investment readiness, conceptually, is also comparable with the ex-ante 
mechanism of the alliance structuration process in line with (Das & Teng, 1998) prior 
alliance research which is based on other work (Das & Teng, 1996; Sohn, 1994; Yan & 
Gray, 1994; Neale & Bazerman, 1992; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Williamson, 1983). 
According to these works, the ex-ante mechanism includes identifying shared equity 
ownership and mutual commitment of non-recoverable investments at the beginning of 
the alliance process. Another stream of research labels this strategy of the alliance as 
“fixing shadow of alliance future through open and frequent contract and fixing front end 
matters” Parkhe (1993).  
One important aspect of our equity investment readiness process to maintain 
communication. Communication between partners is the way in which confidence can 
be developed in the alliance structure (Das & Teng, 1998) and it converts asymmetric 
information into symmetric information (Kramer, & Tyler, 1996). Our research also 
confirms that this role of communication in off-farm equity alliance is best settled by 
professional advisors as they understand both partners’ language. One participant (CC) 
noted: “external advisors should always be there – in the best interest of those primary 
goals to provide a communication bridge with the investors and farms.” Previous farm 
business research (McElwee & Annibal, 2010; McElwee & Bosworth, 2010) has also 
argued that appointing professional advisors gained business skills and training for farms 
that intron led farms to be profitable. Like previous alliance research ( Das & Teng, 
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1998; Doz, 1996), another important interpretation of this investment readiness strategy 
is that it will control partners’ opportunistic behaviours and increase cooperation spirit. 
Another practice to manage the competing logics between family farms and off-
farm equity investors are to structure the off-farm equity deal. Our findings suggest 
farms are required to adopt some structure including, business planning, strategic 
planning, management, board, governance, and reporting, as well as an operational and 
cost structure. It means that family farms are expected to adopt “structural compliance” 
(Meyer, Scott, and Strang, 1987) and strategic compliance (Smith & Tracey, 2016) to 
manage the competing view in off-farm equity alliance. This part of the findings is also 
aligned with the Oliver’s (1991) and Pache & Santos’, (2010) view of compliance tactics 
withing acquiesce strategy. This structural and strategic adaptation would enhance 
firms’ legitimacy, family farms in this study, and remove the negative perception in the 
public domain, off-farm investors’ domain in our case,(Oliver,1991). 
 Moreover, the above structural compliance at family farms also ensures 
“procedural fairness” (Luo, 2008) view in the off-farm strategic alliance. Procedural 
justice safeguards long-term attitudes, for example, commitment, trust, and harmony 
improve cooperation and increases operational and financial performance in a strategic 
alliance. Because off-farm equity alliance partners may be unknown to them each other, 
correct information and pay-off from equity alliance would possibly be difficult to 
envisage due to the given uncertain and asymmetric environment and relational risks 
among partners (Das & Teng, 1998; Johnson, Korsgaard, & Sapienza, 2002; Parkhe, 
1993; Reuer & Koza, 2000). In such uncertainty, maintaining procedural fairness in the 
equity structure works to ensure as equity preserver in the alliance (Johnson, 1997; 
Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995; Sheppard & Tuchinsky, 1996). 
 Another dimension of equity structuration is that the off-equity deals are 
deemed to consider the interests of farms, other active members in that farm business, 
and the off-farm investors. We observed that our participant advocated for this position. 
As one noted: “the external investor [needs to be] happy in the [equity] structure in a way 
that the farms are happy; there is no other point; otherwise you cannot have an [off-farm 
equity] transaction” (GAC).  Other pointed that:  “If they [farms] want to be part of [equity 
model] with no exit plan, and if the investors want just to help the farms for the first 5 
years and then they [investors and farms] are going to make another arrangement that is 
not going to work; so it depends on both parties; and it varies what they [farms and 
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investors] want” (CC, PEF &FM). In other words, we can say that there is a necessity for 
adopting a balanced approach, as in the balanced tactics of the compromise strategy in 
strategic response model (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). Compromising actors’ 
interest in an institution, the off-farm alliance in our case, leads that institutional 
arrangements to the path of stabilization and it develops the power of resistance amid 
institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991, & Pache & Santos, 2010). Participant’s views for 
equally considering competing interests of both farms and investors in an off-farm equity 
alliance supports the view of balancing tactic of compromising strategy. Balancing is, in 
fact, a “tactical response” (Oliver, 1991) to off-farm equity alliance that may facilitate an 
equally acceptable structural solution to partners’ competing logics. Oliver (1991) 
referred to other research (Powell & Friedkin, 1986) that has used the balancing tactic of 
compromising strategy to satisfy the competing expectation of different parties in a non-
profit organization.       
   However, the aggregate analysis of participants’ views does not inform us 
about any dominant and unique structural practices for all types of off-farm equity 
alliance partners. Previous scholars (Parkhe, 1993) also confirmed that not every 
strategic alliance structure is not alike and, thus there may not be any unique structure 
for all types of alliance partners. Therefore, equity structure may be flexible enough on 
the choice of partners: “ownership [structure] can be kind of flexible, it depends on the 
structure you have created (CC). This is in line with previous research in the strategic 
alliance (Heide & Miner, 1992).  
8. Implications 
The first implication relates to how farms and equity investors make sense 
of the meaning of logics when they encounter in constructing off-farm equity alliance. 
In their discussions of managing rivalry within competing for institutional logics, Reay 
& Hinings (2009) argue that collaboration is one of the significant elements of the 
institutionalisation process. Following the views of other scholars (Hardy, Lawrence, & 
Grant, 2005; Maguire & Hardy, 2005), Reay & Hinings’ (2009) arguments is that the 
actors of any collaboration intent to take either one of the two identity alternatives: 
partially changing their old identity and taking on a new one or strictly maintaining a 
separate old identity. More significantly, interpreting other works (Huxham & Hibbert, 
2008; Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003) Reay & Hining (2009) continued that this 
choice of identity among collaborators indicates that each collaboration is unique in their 
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structure as partners are different in terms of intentions, goals, desired outcomes, level 
of trust, and openness to knowledge transfer. Putting these views in our context, we 
cautiously draw an argument that both family farms and investors might change their 
old identities and embrace new forms of identity to develop off-farm equity alliances 
successfully. In other words, it would be better for family farms to sacrifice, at least 
partially, their emotional wealth by adopting professional practices to convince 
investors. Correspondingly, investors may also compromise their rigid attitudes towards 
demanding stricter compliance from family farms to the same extent that they expect 
from publicly listed firms. Of course, another argument may emerge around family 
farms needing to make the most changes as they are the resource dependent partner 
(equity capital in this case). However, we did not have sufficient evidence to claim that.  
The second related implication, perhaps more important than the first one, is the 
need to analyse the experiences of the conflicting demands that family farms and 
investors might potentially face before responding to competing logics. This implication 
is rooted in the works of (Pache & Santos, 2010) who argued that complying with every 
conflicting demand for each partner in collaboration is not possible. Pache & Santos 
(2010) suggest that partners might forego some dimensions of logics to satisfy other 
logics. It is an obvious paradoxical tension, especially for the resource dependent 
partners, family farms in our research. To overcome these situations, Pache & Santos 
(2010) suggests that partners might examine the nature of conflicting demands and the 
internal representation of conflict in the collaboration. To Pache & Santos (2010), the 
nature of demands gives an idea about the negotiability of the contact while internal 
representation indicates the degrees of the stakes (one-sided/ two-sided/or multisided) 
associated with the contract. In our research, we also do not argue either family farms 
or investors can respond to every conflict equally. Instead, it depends on the abilities 
and strengths of the partners to off-farm equity alliances.   
9. Limitations and future research 
Findings of this paper raise a further opportunity for future researchers as the farms’ 
and investors’ logics extracted in this paper has been instituted from the small sample 
size. Our position is that findings from this number of advisors allow us to explore 
competing logics in the context of family farms’ off-farm equity partnership that deserves 
consideration for moving forward. However, it is less likely possible to argue that the 
sources of competing views drawn in this paper are exhaustive to fill the conceptual and 
92 
 
theoretical gap. Thus, further research is needed to explore more logics and underpinning 
competing for views from the bigger size of advisors with multiple geographic 
concentration around Australia. 
Another limitation of our findings is that our analysis concentrated less on the 
diverged interviewees’ opinions observed in our data. In one hand, reporting diversity in 
qualitative research findings is highly encouraged for ‘deeper insight’ (Bansal & Corley, 
2011). On the other hand, investigators are recommended to tackle the sense of ‘anything 
goes’ in qualitative inquiry in the name of diversity (Bansal & Corley, 2011). However, 
we acknowledge that this paper can be interpreted through alternative theoretical and 
conceptual lense if the unreported juxtaposition in findings is taken into consideration in 
a wider scope of research. 
One of the important dimensions that have not been covered in our study is how off-
farm equity alliances would minimise the logic of multiplicity by countervailing partners’ 
individual choices, strengths, and culture. Each partner – either farms or investors- has 
separate orientations, sizes, sources, cultures, intentions, and sophistication regarding 
management, governance, reporting, decision-making, exit, control, and the range of 
other issues. Logic management principles, particularly alliance strategy, structure and 
strategic directions are subjected to modification with these dimensions.    
Another possible stream of research omitted in our paper is tailoring partners 
competing for logics in off-farm equity alliances and navigating the associated logics 
management principles with the demands of farms business models and investors’ class 
and preferred investment models. Within the traditional alliance literature, we identified 
different forms of equity alliance: operational and non-operational equity, scale and link 
equity, direct and minor equity, and bilateral and multilateral equity. We also found 
different farm business models, both in literature and in our findings:  sales and leaseback, 
own-operate joint ventures, private equity and passive and active models. On the investor 
side, we found multiple investors: institutional, corporate, family offices and high net 
worth investors. Prior research of equity collaboration in biotechnology industry shows 
transaction specific problems and suggests tasks and environment specific governance 
structure (Pisano, 1989) Researchers might explore the perspective specific analyses and 
may develop some typologies for farming industry equity alliance.   
Due to a lack of empirical research in the field of family farms, we used mainstream 
institutional logics and strategic alliance literature as proxy arguments to cementing our 
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work. This indicates that family farms literature (both empirical and theoretical), 
especially farm financing collaboration and embedded partner’s logics in that 
collaboration, has the potential for future researchers to enrich these particular issues in 
different societal, cultural, regional, industry and country contexts.  
Our findings confirmed the role of specialist advisors in bridging the gap between 
family farms and off-farm equity investors’ alliance. However, exploring the whole 
realm of professional advisors’ roles in this bridging processes was not intended to be a 
part of our research. Examining the role of professional advisors in paving the way for 
off-farm equity collaboration in the family farming industry could be another interesting 
arena for further research. Another important area of research would be exploring the 
equity alliance process in the family farming industry. Researchers could use the Van 
de Ven Poole’s framework (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) to study the family farms equity 
alliance process.  This framework provides four ideal-type approaches to the alliance 
process: life cycle, teleological, evolutionary, and dialectic.    
Another limitation of the study is that it was conducted based on a small sample of 
only primary data. While this qualitative inquiry with small size explores meaningful 
insights regarding farms and investors logics and related practices to manage these 
practices in off-farm equity alliance, research community should be careful regarding 
the generalisation of the findings in their own settings. For establishing, at least a partial 
generalizability (Myers,2000), we invite researchers to extend this research by 
collecting a large qualitative data set relevant to family farms equity financing 
collaborations to unveil the overall picture of such alliance. By bigger data set, we refer 
to naturalistic data (print and electronic media report, social media sentiments, public 
inquiries, and conference proceedings) in contemporary developments around farms and 
agribusiness finance and investment and more in-depth case studies of family farms that 
have successfully developed equity partnerships in any forms. Though we invite further 
research using additional data sets, our stance in this research is like that of other 
scholars (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013) who argue that inductively generated 
qualitative research, even with small sample size, is worthy of generalization. 
Finally, this study acknowledges limitation that views of professional advisors, 
based on which logics of farms and investors have been evidenced in this paper, might 
have ‘social desirability’ bias (Dodou & Winter, 2014). Owing to social desirability 
bias, advisors might have shared their experiences in a manner to justify their 
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professional necessity in the off-farm equity alliance. Having addressed this limitation 
of bias, it was the feeling at the data collection stage that advisors knew the details of 
farms and investors’ competitive strengths and they only expressed the desire to help 
the off-farm equity partners to develop the equity partnership. Moreover, the interview 
questions were worded to avoid potential advisors’ bias.   
10. Conclusion 
One of the most basic conclusions that follow from our study is that off-farm 
equity collaboration is still at an emerging stage in the Australian family farming 
industry context. Various stakeholders, including family farms, investors, professional 
farm advisors, industry representatives, and regulators have a role to play to in 
improving the market for off-farm equity. This study is one of the few first attempts of 
its kind. From the data, we have developed some eight contradictory pairs of logics that 
identify the reasons for possible internal tension in an off-farm equity alliance. However, 
we cannot deny the possibility of more contradictions. As there is the absence of a 
unique off-farm equity alliance fitting the strategic choices and boundaries of off-farm, 
equity alliance partners, the conceptual framework of contradictory dimensions that 
emerged in this research can be used to develop a more comprehensive framework in 
order to yield further insights into internal and external tensions in off-farm equity 
alliance.  
We also proposed two practices- investment readiness and equity 
structuration- for managing the contradictory views in off-farm equity alliances. Like 
our contributions to competing logics of off-farm equity alliance, we also expect that 
these two practices may be used as a point of reference in exploring more practices. 
Another conclusion we may draw from our findings is that neither farms nor equity 
investors dominate in off-farm equity logics. Rather, each of the parties might create 
space for other for ensuring coexistence and to achieve their common goal. Finally, 
we conclude that family farms may take a leading role in demonstrating to equity 
providers that they have taken every step to ensure procedural fairness for the long-
term. We also conclude that off-farm equity alliances can learn many things from its 
traditional counterparts, alliances established in traditional business.       
 
 
95 
 
 
References  
 
Australian Farm Institute (AFI). (2013). Financing the future of farming, Farm 
Policy Journal, 10, (3) 
Agrifood Skills Australia (2015). Contemporary business strategies and learning 
models in the agrifood industry. Nous Group, Canberra. 
http://ardaaustralia.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Nous_report2015-
Agrifood.pdf 
Alexander, T. (2015). Concepts for alternative investment and financing models to 
expand sheep production in Western Australia. Perth, Western Australia: 
https://www.agric.wa.gov.au/sites/gateway/files/Concepts%20for%20alternat
ive%20investment%20and%20financing%20models%20to%20expand%20sh
eep%20production%20in%20WA.pdf 
Almandoz, J. (2014). Founding teams as carriers of competing logics: When 
institutional forces predict banks’ risk exposure. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 59(3), 442-473.  
Anderson, A. R., & Jack, S. L. (2000). The production of prestige: an entrepreneurial 
viagra. The International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 1(1), 
45-56.  
Atherton, L. (1972). The cattle kings. Linkon, NB: University of Nebraska Press. 
Bancel, F., & Mittoo, U. R. (2009). Why do European firms go public? European 
Financial Management, 15(4), 844-884.  
Bansal, P. (T.), & Corley, K. (2011). From the editors—The coming of age for 
qualitative research: Embracing the diversity of qualitative 
methods. Academy of Management Journal, 54(2), 233-237. 
Barbarino, A. (2017). Striking the right balance. Agri Investor, global agr-investment 
intelligence. 
Barden, R. S., Copeland Jr, J. E., Hermanson, R. H., & Wat, L. (1984). Going public-
-what it involves: A framework for providing advice to management. Journal 
of Accountancy (pre-1986), 157(000003), 63.  
96 
 
Battilana, J., & Lee, M. (2014). Advancing research on hybrid organizing–Insights 
from the study of social enterprises. Academy of Management Annals, 8(1), 
397-441.  
Baum, J. A., & Oliver, C. (1991). Institutional linkages and organizational mortality. 
Administrative science quarterly, 36(2), 187-218.  
Berg, S. V., & Friedman, P. (1980). Causes and effects of joint venture activity: 
Knowledge acquisition vs. parent horizontality. Antitrust Bull., 25, 143.  
Berk, J. B. (1995). A critique of size-related anomalies. The Review of Financial 
Studies, 8(2), 275-286.  
Bertels, S., & Lawrence, T. B. (2016). Organizational responses to institutional 
complexity stemming from emerging logics: The role of individuals. 
Strategic Organization, 14(4), 336-372.  
Besharov, M. L., & Smith, W. K. (2014). Multiple institutional logics in 
organizations: Explaining their varied nature and implications. Academy of 
Management Review, 39(3), 364-381.  
Boettke, P. J., & Coyne, C. J. (2009). Context matters: Institutions and 
entrepreneurship. Foundations and Trends® in Entrepreneurship, 5(3), 135-
209.  
Bouchikhi, H. (1998). Living with and building on complexity: A constructivist 
perspective on organizations. Organization, 5(2), 217-232.  
Bryan, D., & Rafferty, M. (2005). Capitalism with derivatives: A political economy 
of financial derivatives, capital, and class.New York: Plagrave Macmillan 
Burch, D., & Lawrence, G. (2009). Towards a third food regime: behind the 
transformation. Agriculture and human values, 26(4), 267. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-009-9219-4 
Burch, D., & Lawrence, G. (2013). Financialization in agri-food supply chains: 
private equity and the transformation of the retail sector. Agriculture and 
Human Values, 30(2), 247-258.  
Bush, S. B. (2012). Derivatives and development: a political economy of global 
finance, farming, and poverty. New York: Plagrave Macmillan 
Carson, D., Gilmore, A., Perry, C., & Gronhaug, K. (2001). Qualitative marketing 
research: Sage. 
97 
 
Chittoor, R., & Das, R. (2007). Professionalization of management and succession 
performance—A vital linkage. Family Business Review, 20(1), 65-79.  
Christensen, L. R., & Greene, W. H. (1976). Economies of scale in US electric 
power generation. Journal of Political Economy, 84(4, Part 1), 655-676.  
Clapp, J. (2012). Food. Malden. MA: Polity Press  
Clapp, J. (2014). Financialization, distance, and global food politics. Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 41(5), 797-814.  
Clemens, E. S., & Cook, J. M. (1999). Politics and institutionalism: Explaining 
durability and change. Annual Review of Sociology, 25(1), 441-466.  
Cobb, J. A., Wry, T., & Zhao, E. Y. (2016). Funding financial inclusion: Institutional 
logics and the contextual contingency of funding for microfinance 
organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 59(6), 2103-2131.  
Collins, R. A., & Bourn, H. J. (1986). Market requirements and pricing for external 
equity shares in farm businesses. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 68(5), 1330-1336.  
Cook, K. S. (1977). Exchange and power in networks of inter-organizational 
relations. The Sociological Quarterly, 18(1), 62-82.  
Commonwealth of Australia. (2014). Agricultural Competitiveness issue paper, 
Canberra, Australia. Retrieved from 
http://agwhitepaper.agriculture.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/issues_paper.pdf 
Commonwealth of Australia. (2015). Agricultural competitiveness green Paper, 
Canberra, Australia. Retrieved from 
http://agwhitepaper.agriculture.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/green_paper.pdf 
 
Corwin, S. A., & Schultz, P. (2005). The role of IPO underwriting syndicates: 
Pricing, information production, and underwriter competition. The Journal of 
Finance, 60(1), 443-486 
Cotter, J., Rochecouste, J., & Mohsin, M. (2016). Murray Darling Basin Regional 
Economic Diversification Program: a review of equity capital investment in 
the development of high-value horticulture. The University of Southern 
Queensland and Queensland Department of Agriculture, Australia 
Cotula, L. (2012). The international political economy of the global land rush: A 
critical appraisal of trends, scale, geography, and drivers. The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), 649-680.  
Currie, G., & Spyridonidis, D. (2016). Interpretation of multiple institutional logics 
on the ground: Actors’ position, their agency and situational constraints in 
professionalized contexts. Organization Studies, 37(1), 77-97.  
98 
 
Das, T., & Teng, B. S. (1996). Risk types and inter‐firm alliance structures. Journal 
of Management Studies, 33(6), 827-843.  
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (1998). Between trust and control: Developing confidence 
in partner cooperation in alliances. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 
491-512.  
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (2000). Instabilities of strategic alliances: An internal 
tensions perspective. Organization Science, 11(1), 77-101.  
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (2000). A resource-based theory of strategic alliances. 
Journal of Management, 26(1), 31-61.  
Dawson, A. (2011). Private equity investment decisions in family firms: The role of 
human resources and agency costs. Journal of Business Venturing, 26(2), 
189-199.  
Day, G. S. (1995). Advantageous alliances. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 23(4), 297-300.  
De Rond, M., & Bouchikhi, H. (2004). On the dialectics of strategic alliances. 
Organization Science, 15(1), 56-69.  
Dewey, J. (2013). Logic-The theory of inquiry. Redditch: Read Books Ltd. 
Dimaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American 
Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160.  
Dodou, D., & de Winter, J. C. (2014). Social desirability is the same in offline, 
online, and paper surveys: A meta-analysis. Computers in Human 
Behavior, 36, 487-495. 
Dorado, S. (2005). Institutional entrepreneurship, partaking and convening. 
Organization Studies, 26(3), 385-414.  
Doz, Y. L. (1996). The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: Initial 
conditions or learning processes? Strategic Management Journal, 17(S1), 55-
83.  
Dussauge, P., Garrette, B., & Mitchell, W. (2000). Learning from competing 
partners: outcomes and durations of scale and link alliances in Europe, North 
America, and Asia. Strategic management journal, 99-126.  
Dyer, J. H., Kale, P., & Singh, H. (2001). How to make strategic alliances work. MIT 
Sloan management review, 42(4), 37-43.  
99 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Schoonhoven, C. B. (1996). Resource-based view of strategic 
alliance formation: Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms. 
Organization Science, 7(2), 136-150.  
Errington, A., & Gasson, R. (1994). Labour use in the farm family business. 
Sociologia Ruralis, 34(4), 293-307.  
Fairbairn, M. (2013). Neoliberalism, finance, and the construction of farmland 
investment. The neoliberal regime in the agri-food Sector: Crisis, resilience, 
and restructuring. London and New York, Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group. 
Fairbairn, M. (2014). ‘Like gold with yield’: Evolving intersections between 
farmland and finance. Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(5), 777-795.  
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2012). Size, value, and momentum in international 
stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), 457-472.  
FAO. (2014). The State of food and agriculture 2014: Innovation in family farming. 
Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/as281e/as281e.pdf 
Fedor, K. J., & Werther, W. B. (1996). The fourth dimension: creating culturally 
responsive international alliances. Organizational Dynamics, 25(2), 39-53.  
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices 
and institutional contradictions. In W.W.Powell & P.J.Dimaggio (Eds.), The 
new institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp.232-263).Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Fuss, M. A., & Gupta, V. K. (1981). A cost function approach to the estimation of 
minimum efficient scale returns to scale, and suboptimal capacity: With an 
application to Canadian manufacturing. European Economic Review, 15(2), 
123-135.  
Gabriel, S. C., & Baker, C. B. (1980). Concepts of business and financial risk. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62(3), 560-564.  
Gasson, R., Crow, G., Errington, A., Hutson, J., Marsden, T., & Winter, D. (1988). 
The farm as a family business: a review. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
39(1), 1-41.  
Gasson, R., & Errington, A. J. (1993). The farm family business. Wallingford: Cab 
International. 
100 
 
Geringer, J. M. (1991). Strategic determinants of partner selection criteria in 
international joint ventures. Journal of International Business Studies, 41-62.  
Geringer, J. M., & Hebert, L. (1989). Control and performance of international joint 
ventures. Journal of International Business Studies, 20(2), 235-254.  
Gerlach, M. L. (1992). The Japanese corporate network: A blockmodel analysis. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(1),105-139.  
Geroski, P. A., Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (2010). Founding conditions and the survival 
of new firms. Strategic Management Journal, 31(5), 510-529.  
Ghosh, J., Heintz, J., & Pollin, R. (2012). Speculation on commodities futures 
markets and destabilization of global food prices: exploring the connections. 
International Journal of Health Services, 42(3), 465-483.  
Gioia, D. A., Corley, K. G., & Hamilton, A. L. (2013). Seeking qualitative rigor in 
inductive research: Notes on the Gioia methodology. Organizational 
Research Methods, 16(1), 15-31.  
Glynn, M. A., & Lounsbury, M. (2005). From the critics’ corner: Logic blending, 
discursive change, and authenticity in a cultural production system. Journal 
of Management Studies, 42(5), 1031-1055.  
Gomes-Casseres, B. (1996). The alliance revolution: The new shape of business 
rivalry: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Gomes, E., Barnes, B. R., & Mahmood, T. (2016). A 22-year review of strategic 
alliance research in the leading management journals. International Business 
Review, 25(1), 15-27.  
Gonzalez, A. (2010). Microfinance funders profiles: A short guide for young and 
small institutions still looking for a match. MIX Data Brief,6, 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1644949 
Gottardo, P., & Maria Moisello, A. (2014). The capital structure choices of family 
firms: Evidence from Italian medium-large unlisted firms. Managerial 
Finance, 40(3), 254-275.  
Gray, B. (1989). Collaborating: Finding common ground for multiparty problems. 
San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass 
Gray, B. (2000). Assessing inter-organizational collaboration: Multiple conceptions 
and multiple methods. Journal of Cooperative Strategy: Economic, business, 
and organizational issues, 243-260.  
101 
 
Gray, B., & Wood, D. J. (1991). Collaborative alliances: Moving from practice to 
theory. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 27(1), 3-22.  
Greenwood, R., Díaz, A. M., Li, S. X., & Lorente, J. C. (2010). The multiplicity of 
institutional logics and the heterogeneity of organizational responses. 
Organization Science, 21(2), 521-539.  
Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. R., & Lounsbury, M. (2011). 
Institutional complexity and organizational responses. Academy of 
Management Annals, 5(1), 317-371.  
Greenwood, R., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutional entrepreneurship in mature 
fields: The big five accounting firms. Academy of Management Journal, 
49(1), 27-48.  
Gubrium, J. F., & Holstein, J. A. (1997). The new language of qualitative method: 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Gulati, R. (1995). Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for 
contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 85-
112.  
Hagedoorn, J. (1993). Understanding the rationale of strategic technology partnering: 
Nterorganizational modes of cooperation and sectoral differences. Strategic 
management journal, 14(5), 371-385.  
Hamel, G., Doz, Y. L., & Prahalad, C. K. (1989). Collaborate with your competitors 
and win. Harvard business review, 67(1), 133-139. 
Harbison, J. R., & Pekar, P. P. (1993). A Practical Guide to Alliances: Leapfrogging 
the Learning Curve: a Perspective for US Companies: Booz, Allen & 
Hamilton. 
Hardy, C., Lawrence, T. B., & Grant, D. (2005). Discourse and collaboration: The 
role of conversations and collective identity. Academy of Management 
Review, 30(1), 58-77.  
Hardy, C., Phillips, N., & Lawrence, T. B. (2003). Resources, knowledge, and 
influence: The organizational effects of inter-organizational collaboration. 
Journal of Management Studies, 40(2), 321-347.  
Harrigan, K. R. (1986a). Managing for joint venture success. New York: Simon and 
Schuster. 
102 
 
Harrigan, K. R. (1986b). Strategic alliances and partner asymmetries: Unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. 
Haveman, H. A., & Rao, H. (1997). Structuring a theory of moral sentiments: 
Institutional and organizational coevolution in the early thrift industry. 
American Journal of Sociology, 102(6), 1606-1651.  
Heath, R. & Tomlinson, A.(2016). A review of farm funding model and business 
structure in Australia. Research Report, Australian Farm Institute. Sydney: 
Australia.  Retrieved from: http://www.farminstitute.org.au/publications-
1/research-reports/a-review-of-farm-funding-models-and-business-structures-
in-australia 
Heide, J. B., & Miner, A. S. (1992). The shadow of the future: Effects of anticipated 
interaction and frequency of contact on buyer-seller cooperation. Academy of 
Management Journal, 35(2), 265-291.  
Hennart, J.-F. (1991). The transaction costs theory of joint ventures: An empirical 
study of Japanese subsidiaries in the United States. Management Science, 
37(4), 483-497.  
Hennart, J. F. (1988). A transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9(4), 361-374.  
Herranz Jr, J. (2007). The multisectoral trilemma of network management. Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(1), 1-31.  
Hitt, M. A., Dacin, M. T., Levitas, E., Arregle, J.-L., & Borza, A. (2000). Partner 
selection in emerging and developed market contexts: Resource-based and 
organizational learning perspectives. Academy of Management Journal, 
43(3), 449-467.  
Hoffmann, W. H., & Schlosser, R. (2001). Success factors of strategic alliances in 
small and medium-sized enterprises—An empirical survey. Long Range 
planning, 34(3), 357-381.  
Hua, X., Chen, Y., & Prashantham, S. (2016). Institutional logic dynamics: private 
firm financing in Ningbo (1912–2008). Business History, 58(3), 378-407.  
Hudson, L. A., & Ozanne, J. L. (1988). Alternative ways of seeking knowledge in 
consumer research. Journal of Consumer Research, 14(4), 508-521.  
Huxham, C., & Hibbert, P. (2008). Manifested Attitudes: Intricacies of Inter‐Partner 
Learning in Collaboration. Journal of Management Studies, 45(3), 502-529.  
103 
 
Hwang, H., & Powell, W. W. (2009). The rationalization of charity: The influences 
of professionalism in the nonprofit sector. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
54(2), 268-298.  
Ireland, R. D., Hitt, M. A., & Vaidyanath, D. (2002). Alliance management as a 
source of competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 28(3), 413-446.  
Isakson, S. R. (2014). Food and finance: The financial transformation of agro-food 
supply chains. Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(5), 749-775.  
Isaksson, M., & Çelik, S. (2013). Who Cares? Corporate governance in today's 
equity markets. OECD Corporate Governance,(Working Papers No.8). OECD 
Publishing. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k47zw5kdnmp-en 
Jaskiewicz, P., Heinrichs, K., Rau, S. B., & Reay, T. (2016). To be or not to be: how 
family firms manage family and commercial logics in succession. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 40(4), 781-813.  
Jay, J. (2013). Navigating paradox as a mechanism of change and innovation in 
hybrid organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 56(1), 137-159.  
Johnson, D. R., & Booth, A. (1990). Rural economic decline and marital quality: A 
panel study of farm marriages. Family Relations, 39(2),159-165.  
Johnson, J. P. (1997). Procedural justice perceptions among international joint 
venture managers. Journal of Cooperative Strategies, North American 
Perspectives, 197-226.  San Fransico, CA,  
Johnson, J. P., Korsgaard, M. A., & Sapienza, H. J. (2002). Perceived fairness, 
decision control, and commitment in international joint venture management 
teams. Strategic Management Journal, 23(12), 1141-1160.  
Jones, C., Boxenbaum, E., & Anthony, C. (2013). The immateriality of material 
practices in institutional logics Institutional logics in action, Part A (pp. 51-
75). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Josefy, M., Kuban, S., Ireland, R. D., & Hitt, M. A. (2015). All things great and 
small: Organizational size, boundaries of the firm, and a changing 
environment. Academy of Management Annals, 9(1), 715-802.  
Joskow, P. L. (1987). Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: 
Empirical evidence from coal markets. The American Economic 
Review,77(1), 168-185.  
104 
 
Kaselimi, E. N., Notteboom, T. E., Pallis, A. A., & Farrell, S. (2011). Minimum 
Efficient Scale (MES) and preferred scale of container terminals. Research in 
Transportation Economics, 32(1), 71-80.  
Katila, R., Rosenberger, J. D., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (2008). Swimming with sharks: 
Technology ventures, defense mechanisms, and corporate relationships. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 53(2), 295-332.  
Kogut, B. (1988). Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9(4), 319-332.  
Kogut, B. (1991). Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire. Management 
Science, 37(1), 19-33.  
Koropp, C., Kellermanns, F. W., Grichnik, D., & Stanley, L. (2014). Financial 
decision making in family firms: An adaptation of the theory of planned 
behavior. Family Business Review, 27(4), 307-327.  
Korsgaard, M. A., Schweiger, D. M., & Sapienza, H. J. (1995). Building 
commitment, attachment, and trust in strategic decision-making teams: The 
role of procedural justice. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 60-84.  
Kotz, D. M. (2010). Financialization and neoliberalism. Relations of global power:  
Neoliberal order and disorder, (pp1-18).  Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press 
Kraatz, M. S., & Block, E. S. (2008). Organizational implications of institutional 
pluralism. The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism, (pp.243-
275). London: Sage. 
Kramer, R. M., & Tyler, T. R. (1996). Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and 
research. In Based on a conference on trust in organizations held at Stanford 
U Graduate School of Business, May 1994. Sage Publications, Inc. 
Larder, N. (2015). Space for pluralism? Examining the Malibya land grab. Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 42(3-4), 839-858.  
Lawrence, G., Richards, C., & Lyons, K. (2013). Food security in Australia in an era 
of neoliberalism, productivism and climate change. Journal of Rural Studies, 
29, 30-39.  
Lawrence, T. B., Hardy, C., & Phillips, N. (2002). Institutional effects of inter-
organizational collaboration: The emergence of proto-institutions. Academy 
of Management Journal, 45(1), 281-290.  
105 
 
Lawrence, T. B., Suddaby, R., & Leca, B. (2009). Institutional work: Actors and 
agency in institutional studies of organizations. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry (Vol. 75). London,Sage. 
Lobley, M., Errington, A., McGeorge, A., Millard, N., & Potter, C. (2002). 
Implications of changes in the structure of agricultural businesses. Final 
report to DEFRA.  
Lok, J. (2010). Institutional logics as identity projects. Academy of Management 
Journal, 53(6), 1305-1335.  
Lounsbury, M. (2007). A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation 
in the professionalizing of mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal, 
50(2), 289-307.  
Lowenberg-DeBoer, J., Featherstone, A. M., & Leatham, D. J. (1989). Nonfarm 
equity capital financing of production agriculture. Agricultural Finance 
Review, 49, 92-104.  
Luo, Y. (2008). Procedural fairness and interfirm cooperation in strategic alliances. 
Strategic Management Journal, 29(1), 27-46.  
Magnan, A. (2012). New avenues of farm corporatization in the prairie grains sector: 
farm family entrepreneurs and the case of One Earth Farms. Agriculture and 
Human Values, 29(2), 161-175.  
Magnan, A. (2015). The financialization of agri-food in Canada and Australia: 
Corporate farmland and farm ownership in the grains and oilseed sector. 
Journal of Rural Studies, 41, 1-12. doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2015.06.007 
Maguire, S., & Hardy, C. (2005). Identity and collaborative strategy in the Canadian 
HIV/AIDS treatment domain. Strategic Organization, 3(1), 11-45.  
Mair, J., & Hehenberger, L. (2014). Front-stage and backstage convening: The 
transition from opposition to mutualistic coexistence in organizational 
philanthropy. Academy of Management Journal, 57(4), 1174-1200.  
Margaroni, M. (2005). “The lost foundation”: Kristeva's semiotic chora and its 
ambiguous legacy. Hypatia, 20(1), 78-98.  
McElwee, G., & Annibal, I. (2010). Business support for farmers: an evaluation of 
the Farm Cornwall project. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, 17(3), 475-491.  
106 
 
McElwee, G., & Bosworth, G. (2010). Exploring the strategic skills of farmers across 
a typology of farm diversification approaches. Journal of Farm Management, 
13(12), 819-838.  
McKenna, B., & Waddell, N. (2007). Media-ted political oratory following terrorist 
events: international political responses to the 2005 London bombing. 
Journal of Language and Politics, 6(3), 377-399.  
McMichael, P. (2012). The land grab and corporate food regime restructuring. The 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), 681-701.  
McPherson, C. M., & Sauder, M. (2013). Logics in action: Managing institutional 
complexity in a drug court. Administrative Science Quarterly, 58(2), 165-196.  
Melichar, E. (1984). financial perspective on agriculture. Federal Reserve Bulletin70 
(1), 1-13. 
Meyer, J., Scott, W. R., & Strang, D. (1987). Centralization, fragmentation, and 
school district complexity. Administrative Science Quarterly,32(2), 186-201. 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure 
as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology,83(2), 340-363.  
Morgan, G. (1983). Beyond method: Strategies for social research. London, Sage. 
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. (1998). Technological overlap and 
interfirm cooperation: implications for the resource-based view of the firm. 
Research Policy, 27(5), 507-523.  
Murphy, S., Burch, D., & Clapp, J. (2012). Cereal Secrets: The world’s largest grain 
traders and global agriculture. Oxford, UK: Oxfam International. Retrieved 
from: www. oxfam. org/en/grow/policy/cereal-secrets-worlds-largest-grain-
traders-global-agriculture 
Murray, F. (2010). The oncomouse that roared: Hybrid exchange strategies as a 
source of distinction at the boundary of overlapping institutions. American 
Journal of Sociology, 116(2), 341-388.  
Myers, M. (2000). Qualitative research and the generalizability question: Standing 
firm with Proteus. The qualitative report, 4(3), 9. 
Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1992). Negotiator cognition and rationality: A 
behavioral decision theory perspective. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 51(2), 157-175.  
107 
 
Nettle, R., Crawford, A., & Brightling, P. (2018). How private-sector farm advisors 
change their practices: An Australian case study. Journal of Rural Studies, 
58, 20-27. 
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal 
reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231.  
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge university press. 
Ohmae, K. (1989). The global logic of strategic alliances. Harvard Business Review, 
67(2), 143-154.  
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of 
Management Review, 16(1), 145-179.  
Oliver, C. (1992). The antecedents of deinstitutionalization. Organization Studies, 
13(4), 563-588.  
Osborn, R. N., & Hagedoorn, J. (1997). The institutionalization and evolutionary 
dynamics of inter-organizational alliances and networks. Academy of 
Management Journal, 40(2), 261-278.  
Ouma, S. (2016). From financialization to operations of capital: Historicizing and 
disentangling the finance–farmland-nexus. Geoforum, 72, 82-93. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.02.003 
Pablo, E., Subramaniam, V., & Krishnaswami, S. (2002). When is equity more than 
just financing? Evidence from strategic alliances. Unpublished working 
paper. Tulane University, New Orleans 
Pache, A.-C., & Santos, F. (2010). When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of 
organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. Academy of 
Management Review, 35(3), 455-476.  
Pache, A.-C., & Santos, F. (2013a). Embedded in hybrid contexts: How individuals 
in organizations respond to competing institutional logics Institutional logics 
in action, part B (pp. 3-35). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited. 
Pache, A.-C., & Santos, F. (2013b). Inside the hybrid organization: Selective 
coupling as a response to competing institutional logics. Academy of 
Management Journal, 56(4), 972-1001.  
108 
 
Pahnke, E. C., Katila, R., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (2015). Who takes you to the dance? 
How partners’ institutional logics influence innovation in young firms. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 60(4), 596-633.  
Park, S. H., & Ungson, G. R. (2001). Interfirm rivalry and managerial complexity: A 
conceptual framework of alliance failure. Organization Science, 12(1), 37-53.  
Parkhe, A. (1993). Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction 
cost examination of interfirm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal, 
36(4), 794-829.  
Parsons, R. (2008). We are all stakeholders now: the influence of western discourses 
of “community engagement” in an Australian Aboriginal community. Critical 
perspectives on international business, 4(2/3), 99-126.  
Pate, J. L. (1969). Joint venture activity, 1960-1968. Economic Review, 54, 16-23.  
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods. London: Sage  
Pfeffer, J., & Nowak, P. (1976). Joint ventures and interorganizational 
interdependence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 398-418.  
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003). The external control of organizations: A 
resource dependence perspective:Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. B., & Hardy, C. (2000). Inter‐organizational collaboration 
and the dynamics of institutional fields. Journal of management studies, 
37(1). doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00171 
Pisano, G., & Teece, D. (2008). Collaborative arrangements and global technology 
strategy: Some evidence from the telecommunications equipment 
industry.  (pp. 145-174). World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 
Pisano, G. P. (1989). Using equity participation to support exchange: Evidence from 
the biotechnology industry. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 
5(1), 109-126.  
Powell, W. W., & Friedkin, R. (1986). Politics and programs: Organizational factors 
in public television decision making. Nonprofit enterprise in the arts, 245, 
269. 
Pratten, C. F. (1971). Economies of scale in manufacturing industry. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
109 
 
Purdy, J. M., & Gray, B. (2009). Conflicting logics, mechanisms of diffusion, and 
multilevel dynamics in emerging institutional fields. Academy of 
Management Journal, 52(2), 355-380.  
Rai, A., Borah, S., & Ramaprasad, A. (1996). Critical success factors for strategic 
alliances in the information technology industry: An empirical study. 
Decision Sciences, 27(1), 141-155.  
Rao, H., Monin, P., & Durand, R. (2005). Border crossing: Bricolage and the erosion 
of categorical boundaries in French gastronomy. American Sociological 
Review, 70(6), 968-991.  
Ravasi, D., & Marchisio, G. (2003). Going public and the enrichment of a supportive 
network. Small Business Economics, 21(4), 381-395.  
Reay, T., Goodrick, E., Waldorff, S. B., & Casebeer, A. (2017). Getting leopards to 
change their spots: Co-creating a new professional role identity. Academy of 
Management Journal, 60(3), 1043-1070. 
Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2009). Managing the rivalry of competing institutional 
logics. Organization Studies, 30(6), 629-652.  
Reay, T., Jaskiewicz, P., & Hinings, C. R. (2015). How Family, Business, and 
Community Logics Shape Family Firm Behavior and "Rules of the Game" in 
an Organizational Field. Family Business Review, 28(4), 292-311. 
doi:10.1177/0894486515577513 
Reay, T., & Jones, C. (2016). Qualitatively capturing institutional logics. Strategic 
Organization, 14(4), 441-454.  
Reuer, J. J., & Koza, M. P. (2000). Asymmetric information and joint venture 
performance: Theory and evidence for domestic and international joint 
ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 81-88.  
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). Developmental processes of cooperative 
interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19(1), 90-
118.  
Rose, D. C., Morris, C., Lobley, M., Winter, M., Sutherland, W. J., & Dicks, L. V. 
(2018). Exploring the spatialities of technological and user re-scripting: the 
case of decision support tools in UK agriculture. Geoforum, 89, 11-18. 
110 
 
Ross, A. (2008, April 26). Profiting from food crisis can be hard to stomach. 
Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/b9b41492-12ea-
11dd-8d91-0000779fd2ac 
Roulston, K. (2010). Considering quality in qualitative interviewing. Qualitative 
Research, 10(2), 199-228.  
Sampson, R. C. (2004). The cost of misaligned governance in R&D alliances. 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20(2), 484-526.  
Saz-Carranza, A., & Longo, F. (2012). Managing competing institutional logics in 
public–private joint ventures. Public Management Review, 14(3), 331-357.  
Schatzki, T. R. (2006). On organizations as they happen. Organization Studies, 
27(12), 1863-1873.  
Schifrin, M. (2001). Is your company magnetic. Forbes Best of the Web, 16-30.  
Schifrin, M. (2001). Partner or Perish. Forbes.com. 
Scott, S. G., & Lane, V. R. (2000). A stakeholder approach to organizational identity. 
Academy of Management Review, 25(1), 43-62.  
Scott, W. R. (2013). Institutions and organizations: Ideas, interests, and identities. 
London: Sage. 
Sewell Jr, W. H. (1992). A theory of structure: Duality, agency, and transformation. 
American Journal of Sociology, 98(1), 1-29.  
Sheppard, B. H., & Tuchinsky, M. (1996). Micro-OB and the network organization. 
Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research, 140, 140.  
Sippel, S. R., Larder, N., & Lawrence, G. (2017). Grounding the financialization of 
farmland: perspectives on financial actors as new landowners in rural 
Australia. Agriculture and Human Values, 34(2), 251-265.  
Smets, M., Jarzabkowski, P., Burke, G. T., & Spee, P. (2015). Reinsurance trading in 
Lloyd’s of London: Balancing conflicting-yet-complementary logics in 
practice. Academy of Management Journal, 58(3), 932-970.  
Smets, M., Morris, T., & Greenwood, R. (2012). From practice to field: A multilevel 
model of practice-driven institutional change. Academy of Management 
Journal, 55(4), 877-904.  
Smith, A. E., & Humphreys, M. S. (2006). Evaluation of unsupervised semantic 
mapping of natural language with Leximancer concept mapping. Behavior 
Research Methods, 38(2), 262-279.  
111 
 
Smith, W. K., & Tracey, P. (2016). Institutional complexity and paradox theory: 
Complementarities of competing demands. Strategic Organization, 14(4), 
455-466. 
Sohn, J. H. D. (1994). Social knowledge as a control system: A proposition and 
evidence from the Japanese FDI behavior. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 25(2), 295-324.  
Spitzeck, H., & Hansen, E. G. (2010). Stakeholder governance: how stakeholders 
influence corporate decision making. Corporate Governance: The 
international journal of business in society, 10(4), 378-391.  
Stewart, A., & Hitt, M. A. (2011). Why Can't a Family Business be more like a 
nonfamily business?: Modes of professionalization in family firms. Family 
Business Review, 25(1), 58-86. doi:10.1177/0894486511421665 
Stokes, D., & Blackburn, R. (2002). Learning the hard way: the lessons of owner-
managers who have closed their businesses. Journal of Small Business and 
Enterprise Development, 9(1), 17-27.  
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory. London:  Sage. 
Spradley, S, J. (1979). The ethnographic interview. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and 
Winston 
Suddaby, R., Seidl, D., & Lê, J. K. (2013). Strategy-as-practice meets neo-
institutional theory. Strategic Organization, 11(3), 329-344. 
Tallman, S. B., & Shenkar, O. (1990). International cooperative venture strategies: 
Outward investment and small firms from NICs. MIR: Management 
International Review,30(4), 299-315.  
Telser, L. (1980). A Theory of self-enforcing agreements. The Journal of 
Business, 53(1), 27-44. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2352355 
Thiele, F. K. (2017). Family businesses and non-family equity: Literature review and 
avenues for future research. Management Review Quarterly, 67(1), 31-63.  
Thomas, D. R. (2006). A general inductive approach for analyzing qualitative 
evaluation data. American Journal of Evaluation, 27(2), 237-246.  
Thornton, P. H. (2004). Markets from culture. Institutional logics and organizational 
decisions in higher education publishing.Standford: Stanford University 
Press. 
112 
 
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical 
contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher 
education publishing industry, 1958–1990. American Journal of Sociology, 
105(3), 801-843.  
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Institutional logics. In R. 
Greenwood,C.Oliver & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
organizational institutionalism,(pp.99-128). Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). The institutional logics 
perspective: A new approach to culture, structure, and process: Oxford: 
University Press. 
Todeva, E., & Knoke, D. (2005). Strategic alliances and models of collaboration. 
Management Decision, 43(1), 123-148.  
Tracey, P., Phillips, N., & Jarvis, O. (2011). Bridging institutional entrepreneurship 
and the creation of new organizational forms: A multilevel model. 
Organization Science, 22(1), 60-80.  
Van de Ven, A. H., & Poole, M. S. (1995). Explaining development and change in 
organizations. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 510-540.  
van Vliet, J. A., Schut, A. G., Reidsma, P., Descheemaeker, K., Slingerland, M., van 
de Ven, G. W., & Giller, K. E. (2015). De-mystifying family farming: 
features, diversity, and trends across the globe. Global Food Security, 5, 11-
18.  
Varadarajan, P. R., & Cunningham, M. H. (1995). Strategic alliances: a synthesis of 
conceptual foundations. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 23(4), 
282.  
Venkataraman, H., Vermeulen, P., Raaijmakers, A., & Mair, J. (2016). Market meets 
community: Institutional logics as strategic resources for development work. 
Organization Studies, 37(5), 709-733.  
Weber, R. P. (1990). Basic content analysis.London: Sage. 
Weild, D., & Kim, E. (2010). Market structure is causing the IPO crisis—and more. 
Capital Market Series, Grant Thornton.  
Widdowson, H. G. (2008). Text, context, pretext: Critical Issues in discourse 
analysis (Vol. 12). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
113 
 
Williams, J. W. (2014). Feeding finance: a critical account of the shifting 
relationships between finance, food, and farming. Economy and Society, 
43(3), 401-431.  
Williamson, O. E. (1983). Credible commitments: Using hostages to support 
exchange. The American Economic Review, 73(4), 519-540.  
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Simon 
and Schuster. 
Wolf, S. A., & Bonanno, A. (2013). The neoliberal regime in the agri-food sector: 
crisis, resilience, and restructuring. London: Routledge. 
Wood, D. J., & Gray, B. (1991). Toward a comprehensive theory of collaboration. 
The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 27(2), 139-162.  
Yan, A., & Gray, B. (1994). Bargaining power, management control, and 
performance in the United States-China joint ventures: a comparative case 
study. Academy of Management Journal, 37(6), 1478-1517.  
Young, L., & Denize, S. (2008). Competing interests: the challenge to collaboration 
in the public sector. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 
28(1/2), 46-58.  
Zilber, T. B. (2013). Institutional logics and institutional work: Should they be 
agreed? Institutional logics in action, Part A (pp. 77-96).Bingley: Emerald 
Group.
  
  
 
   114 
 
Breaking Financial Lock-in in Family Farms through Off-Farm 
Equity Financing  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Mohd. Mohsin1, Julie Cotter2, Claire Beattie3, and Afzalur Rashid4 
School of Commerce, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Australia 
 
 
Research Article Ready for Submission 
 
 
Statement of Contribution of Joint Authorship 
 
1Mohd Mohsin:        (Candidate and Principal investigator of the manuscript) 
 
Data collection established methodology and theoretical framework, data analysis, 
reviewing literature, writing and compilation manuscript, creation of tables and 
figures. 
 
 
2Julie Cotter:          (Principal Supervisor and Co-author of the manuscript) 
 
Involved in accessing interview participants, commented on data analysis and 
manuscript compilation, and supervised the content of the manuscript 
 
 
3Claire Beattie:       (Associate Supervisor and Co-author of the manuscript) 
 
Assisted in methodological aspect, supervised theoretical aspects with analysis and 
findings, assisted in manuscript editing.    
 
 
4Afzalur Rashid:         (Associate Supervisor and Co-author of the manuscript) 
 
Supervised and assisted in manuscript editing.    
 
 
 
This chapter in an exact copy of the paper prepared in a manuscript form 
 
 
 
  
  
 
   115 
 
Chapter three: Paper Two 
Breaking Financial Lock-in in Family Farms through Off-Farm Equity 
Financing  
Abstract 
We adopt an interpretative narrative analytical technique to study the off-farm equity 
accessing the experience of three Australian family farms. Our qualitative inquiry 
reveals that family farms remain financially stuck to traditional financial models over 
generations. Nevertheless, family farms with the desire to expand tend to create new 
financing paths triggered by internal and external financing needs. Stories of three 
family farms’ external equity journey gave us five narratives regarding their new 
financing path: motivation for change, soul reflection, right partners, 
professionalization, and letting go and taking on narratives. Linking these narratives 
with path dependent theory, path creation processes and new path creation theory, we 
developed a four steps off-farm equity accessing process: responding to triggers, 
searching for alternatives, spotting obstacles, and getting ready. Our interpretation is 
that this four-stage path creation model breaks family farms’ financial as well as 
institutional lock-in and makes sense of family farms’ investment readiness process. 
We contribute to the farm financing, institutional path dependent, path creation, and 
investment readiness literature.   
Key Words: off-farm equity, path dependent, path creation, family farms, narratives, 
investment readiness, Australia 
1. Introduction 
Researchers have already acknowledged the fact that there have been few 
changes, over the last century, in the ways family farms finance their capital needs 
(Mishra & Moss, 2017). For this paper, those farms are defined as family farms where 
all the strategic and operating assets remain under the control of family members, all 
the decision are kept under family, and a few proportions of external labour is hired to 
operate the farm businesses (Van Vliet et al. 2015, Djurfeldt, 1996). Family farms 
generally stick to traditional financing choices, mainly with bank debts and internal 
(generational) equity capital. This restricts their growth potential and ability to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope. During the 1980s, developed economies’ 
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farming sectors, the US farming sector, experienced changes in financing structure of 
farms and agriculture (Mondelli, 2012). As part of these changes, off-farm equity 
started to supplement the debt-based financing model. Recent research also shows a 
shift among family businesses from the traditional paths of financing towards external 
equity financing (Neckebrouck, Manigart, & Meuleman, 2017). In the contexts of 
family farms, private investors including institutional equity, private equity firms, 
family offices, and high net worth individual (Wessel, Decker, Lange, & Hack, 
2014;Welsh, Memili, Rosplock, Roure, & Segurado, 2013) have also emerged as 
suppliers to off-farm equity capital to family farms. However, much less is known 
about how family farms attempt to access off-farm equity from these private investors. 
In this paper, our ambition is to depict why and how Australian family farms are 
diverting their traditional financing path towards an innovative financing path, namely 
off-farm equity capital.  
The Australian family farms’ financing model, like the other economic 
settings, has also been bank-based for a long period, approximately for the last 100 
years (Heath & Tomlinson, 2016). Family farms object to off-farm capital injections 
owing to farms’ emotional fears of losing farms ownership, generational inheritance, 
and sensitiveness to outsiders (van Vliet et al., 2015; Casson, 1999). Structural changes 
and post-neoliberalist conditions in the Australian agricultural sectors have created 
renewed pressure on family farms to expand their capital base. Driven by this new 
force, Australian family farms, in recent times, has witnessed a shift towards accessing 
capital from off-farm investors. A small number of Australian farms are currently 
accepting off-farm capital in different forms. Despite this shift, motives, and ways of 
exploring off-farm equity capital have not seriously been examined yet in the 
literature. To understand this change, two questions were considered in exploring this 
setting: why farms start their off-farm equity journey and how family farms access off-
farm equity. 
To answer these questions, we relied on the individual experiences of the off-
farm equity accessing the experience of three family farms. From a theoretical point 
of view, as has been explained in the theoretical section of this paper, the family farms’ 
financing experiences in our study can be related to the essence of organizational path 
  
  
 
   117 
 
dependence, path creation processes, and new path creation theory. According to path 
dependence theory, the present policy of an institution is the outcome of gradual 
progression of certain events, having specific historical roots (Woerdman, 2004; 
Arthur, 1990; David,1994). This institutional evolution may cease which then create 
institutional lock-in (Woerdman, 2004). Institutional lock-in emerges from using sub-
optimal policies in the absence, or even in the presence, of optimal policies 
(Woerdman, 2004). Institutional lock-in, however, breaks when new developments in 
the institutional environment emerge. In our research, we use the concept of 
institutional lock-in to understand the family farms’ financial lock-in. 
Traditional financing may be a sub-optimal option at least for those family 
farms who have the willingness to expand, and the potential to grow, for example, 
medium-sized/commercial/corporate farms. Family farms may also become tied to 
institutional path dependence, originating from this suboptimal financing policy. 
Family farms’ financing strategies evolve from their generational dependency and 
historicity (Cruz & Nordqvist, 2012; Jones & Khanna, 2006). Generational influence 
has a key role in the family business’ (family farms in our case) life cycles (Steier, 
2003; Gersick, 1997). This locked-in in financing strategy can be termed financial 
lock-in. This financial lock-in is subject to breaking with the changes of any new 
development in farms’ financing needs and with other environmental changes 
affecting farms’ financing options. The journey to off-farm equity from a bank-based 
model (a sub-optimal choice) by family farms is a break of this financial lock-in. 
However, even though, extant literature, recorded the injection of off-farm capital in 
family farms, it does not depict why and how family farms shift these sub-optimal 
financing models towards efficient financing options, off-farm equity capital in our 
case. Moreover, the family farm financing literature has merely used the idea of path 
dependence and path creation in explaining family farms financing strategies and 
rarely explains the shifts towards changes in financing policy.  
This shortcoming in the extant literature on off-farm equity finance in family farms 
can also be studied from intergenerational perspectives. One of the core areas that has 
not received proper refers to how generationally progressed (Sonfield & Lussier, 2004) 
family farms, which are at 1st/2nd/3rd generation stages or beyond (Cruz & Nordqvist, 
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2012), shift the generationally constituted internal financing paths towards new 
financing path. The literature shows that the process of going to public equity routes 
by listed family firms is blessed with ample contributions (Bahadir, DeKinder, & 
Kohli, 2015; Xiong & Bharadwaj, 2011; Luo, 2008; Carter & Manaster, 1990) 
regarding systematic paths and stages for accessing initial public offering. Similar 
empirical work in the case of unlisted family businesses, i.e., family farms industry in 
our research is rarely observed in our literature review.  This missing part in the private 
family businesses financing literature is worth addressing as family farms, like other 
firms, also reconfigures (Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998) their financing sources 
in a bid to respond to constraints of existing financial structures (resources) (Capron, 
Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 1999) and to ensure their long-term survival (Karim & 
Mitchell, 2000).  
Using the concept of lock-in, we treat debt and internal based financing models as 
sub-optimal, rather than the optimal one at least for a specific group of farms. Our 
position in this paper is to break out this lock-in in the family farm sector. This is what 
coincides with the claim of Woerdman (2004) who have argued it is better to break 
out of the sub-optimal tradition of an institution if adopting a superior alternative leads 
the institution to a better trajectory. Based on the arguments presented, we aim to 
explore how family farms shift their financing path from traditional to off-farm equity 
markets. In the next section, we will explain the conceptual grounding of the study 
including path dependence, institutional lock-in, financial lock-in, and path creation. 
In the third section, we will discuss the theoretical linkages between our study and the 
empirical settings. The choice of methodological aspects is discussed in the fourth 
section followed by the analytical issues discussed in section five.  Section six shows 
findings as per interpretative narratives, while section seven interprets the narratives 
and their implications. Finally, we discuss the implications, limitations, and 
opportunities for further research and offer some concluding remarks in section eight. 
2. Conceptual grounding  
2.1.Path dependence  
During the last two decades, the notion of “path dependence” has become a 
popular currency of theoretical knowledge in the field of organizational and 
  
  
 
   119 
 
management scholarly conversations (Vergne & Durand, 2010; Sydow, Schreyögg, & 
Koch, 2009). From the pioneering work on “path dependence” of Paul David and Brian 
Arthur (Arthur, 1990, 1989; David, 1985), our understanding of path dependence is as 
follows: today’s economic events of any actors (for instance, state, society, firms, and 
individuals) are the aggregation of their historical systematic and non-systematic 
events. Consequently, these actors become path-dependent (Schreyögg & Sydow, 
2011) and the processes engaged in the middle becomes non-ergodic, which makes 
actors and process captivated by their history (David, 1985, 2001). This captivity is 
known as historical lock-in (Arthur, 1989, 1990). Following their work (Arthur, 1990, 
1989; David, 1985) a group of scholars (Brunninge & Melander, 2016; Dobusch & 
Kapeller, 2013; Sydow,Windeler, Müller-Seitz, & Lange, 2012; Koch, 2011; 
Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011; Schreyögg, Sydow, & Holtmann, 2011) have paid 
attention to demonstrating the conceptual, empirical, and methodological surface of 
path dependence. Others, however, qualify path dependence as processes and 
outcomes rather than a formal theory, as scholars are yet to identify systematically, 
measure and explore the relationship of the actors and events involved (Vergne & 
Durand, 2010). 
2.2.Path Dependence in family farms  
History is the one fundamental component to path dependence.  Historical 
regimes that are the maxim: “history matters” (Jones & Khanna, 2006), also dictate 
the destiny of family firms as history collects undeniable (Suddaby & Foster, 2017) 
“brute facts” (Searle, 1995) for any form of organization. Family firms’ successors 
develop a dynastic kingdom, known as also proprietary/personal/ “family capitalism” 
(Chandler Jr, 1993; Jones & Rose, 1993), through transferring “intergenerational 
altruism” that passes financial and non-financial capital to the next generations thereby 
protecting decision making rein (Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008; 
Casson, 2005). Proponents of family business’ dependence on generations discuss 
many benefits of being under generational control. They argue that family control 
ensures capital, labour, information, trust, and loyalty, especially in the regime of 
infant capitalism and less secured economic and political environments, with trust 
being seen as the key managerial tool of business (Rose, 2000; Jones & Rose, 1993). 
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Through maintaining this path of generational chains, family predecessors transfer a 
sense of deep smartness, i.e., what, why and why to do and not to do something 
(Leonard-Barton & Swap, 2005), and the successors receive competitive advantage, 
first-hand experience and tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Toyama, 2005; Nonaka, 
Toyama, & Nagata, 2000).   
While the literature mentioned above has much appreciation for the role of 
historical path dependence in achieving valuable resources and insights by family 
firms, researchers (Lubinski, 2011; Chandler 1993) also advocated for infusing 
modern managerial entrepreneurialism into family firms to create greater success for 
firms and to protect them from business failure. Scholars further think that reliance on 
historical path dependence makes family firms susceptible to “Buddenbrooks 
syndrome” (Lorandini, 2015; Mann, 2011). Buddenbrooks syndrome may inactivate 
firms’ operations beyond third generation (Lorandini, 2015; Mann, 2011; Jones & 
Rose, 1993) push them towards “conservatism and backwardness” (Jones & Rose, 
1993), make them less entrepreneurial and less competitive (Jaskiewicz, Combs, & 
Rau, 2015), and make them vulnerable to lack of long-term innovative success 
(Kammerlander, Dessì, Bird, Floris, & Murru, 2015).  
As per change theory literature, the intergenerational traditions, practices, and 
norms of family firms, as organizations, are “imprinted” (Stinchcombe & March 1965) 
in family firms’ organizational lives (Boeker, 1989), structures (Baron, Hannan, & 
Burton, 1999), network structures (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013), performances 
(Romanelli & Tushman, 1986), and environmental adoption (Johnson, 2007). These 
intergenerational influences can create “traditionalising” (Stinchcombe & March 
1965) and “structural inertia” (Hannan & Freeman, 1993) effects in family firms’ 
organizational histories that inhibit firms’ growth (Suddaby & Foster, 2017). What is 
more significant is that this kind of closed family entrepreneurship (Miller, 1983) 
imposes challenges for external capital, skills, and knowledge accessibility (Lubinski, 
2011).  
2.3. Family farm (Institutional) lock-in  
The phrase lock-in has been used extensively in cross-disciplinary research 
including research related to technology (David, 1985), institutional process (North, 
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1990) including political (Pierson, 2000), financial (Jia & Guo, 2008) and project 
infrastructure (Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, van Wee, & Molin, 2010), organizational process 
(Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011) and corporate capital (Blair, 2003). The technological 
lock-in was used in the literature about the economics of technology by many scholars 
(Wilson & Tisdell, 2001; Cowan & Gunby, 1996; Cowan, 1990,1987; Arthur,1989; 
David, 1985; Dosi,1982). An amalgamation of these works indicates that technological 
lock-in in a market/economic setting is reached when users prefer to use existing 
technological product to new ones, irrespective of their relative efficiency. These 
studies also pointed out increasing returns to adoption, referring to increasing utility 
from the usage of that technology, is one of the main reason for technological lock-in. 
Four reasons were also empirically evidenced for this increasing return to adoption 
(Arthur, 1994): “scale economies,” “learning effects” “adaptive expectations,” and 
“network economies.”  
The notion of technological lock-in has also been adopted in the institutional 
economics (Pierson, 2000; North, 1993, 1990) to explain institutional lock-in. It means 
that emerging changes in institutional practices including political (Pierson, 2000), 
financial (Jia & Guo, 2008), and economic (Woerdman, 2004) domains, are impacted 
by existing norms that face challenges to change their trajectories (Pierson, 2000). 
Pierson (2000) also has related the increasing returns framework of technological 
economics (Arthur,1994) with “historical institutionalism” and claimed that it fits 
better in social science, and in particular with political systems. Capital lock-in is 
another term used by Blair (2003) in the corporate law literature to refer to the situation 
experienced by minority shareholders of a closely held corporation in which they do 
not have any opportunity of selling their shares, and they cannot force the company to 
pay income or capital gain due. From the work of Woerdman (2004), Hogeland (2015) 
has reported a lock-in model that is based on institutions’ culture, history, perception, 
and learning engagement in terms of switching costs. According to Hogeland (2015), 
firms are less likely to compromise their familiar territory (institutional lock-in) owing 
to the fear of switching costs. To address why an institution, become locked in, in his 
model Woerdman (2004) mentions four elements of institutional lock-in:  
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i. the existence of superior alternatives, institutions, or technology that   competes 
with dominant sub-optimal alternatives;  
ii. the dominant sub-optimal alternatives demonstrate stability or increasing 
effectiveness;  
iii. information asymmetry and lacks knowledge about the superior alternatives; 
and   
iv. a larger amount of switching costs to accessing superior alternatives from 
suboptimal alternatives 
 
Agriculture, as per Jefferson agrarian view, is one of the most fundamental 
institutions in an economy as the other units of occupation hinges on the availability 
of food and fiber produced by farmers (Hogeland, 2015). Family farms are considered 
the most valuable form of agricultural institutions (Hogeland, 2015). Based on 
previous research (Goel, 2013; Roessl, 2005), Hogeland (2015) suggests that agrarian 
ideology may put family farms under institutional lock-in due to farms’ resistance to 
change, preferences for the status quo, sticking to outdated products and business 
strategies, and excessive independence in doing works. By institutional lock-in of 
family farms, we accept the definition of Haase, Roedenbeck, & Söllner (2007) and 
North (1990) who have argued that institutional lock-in emerges due to being 
committed to a traditional style of doing work and being persistent in avoiding changes 
that tradition. Moreover, the unwelcoming attitude developed among family farms 
towards outsiders originates from an ‘insider/outsider’ culture, resistance to change, 
the inclination to maintaining the status quo, and sticking to existing strategies, 
products, and techniques (Hogeland, 2010; Roessl, 2005).  
2.4. Family farm financial lock-in 
Based on the above conceptualization of lock-in, in this paper, we introduce the 
term financial lock-in in family farms. In our understanding, family farms can fall into 
the trap of capital shortage, long-term equity capital in particular, by confining 
themselves to traditional financing models over generations. We also argue that this 
financial lock-in is a form of institutional lock-in as this generational tradition of 
financing practices can be seen as an institutional rule or pattern and is embedded in 
formal and informal structures (Zucker, 1977) of family farms. Moreover, the whole 
family farm sector is inflicted with “environment syndrome” (Zucker, 1987) and thus 
they reproduce the same funding models. Interpreting scholarly conversations (Mishra 
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& Moss, 2017; Casson, 1999; Dodson, 1994; Scofield, 1972), by traditional farm 
financing path, we mean using the following sources of finance:  generational finance; 
internal equity (personal / family finance and personal retained earnings); short-term 
bank loans; and credit service – leasing capital- long-term bank loans by mortgage. 
Being stuck to traditional financing options, bank debt and internal equity, has negative 
consequences on family farms, as emphasized in the study. 
3. Empirical settings and theoretical underpinnings   
Our empirical setting for depicting the ways of breaking out the farms’ 
financial lock-in is the Australian family farm business sector. We have several 
reasons for the choice of this setting: first, the farm business funding model in 
Australia is subjected to the suboptimal financing tradition. Over the last three decades, 
Australian farm businesses primarily funded their farm finance through debt financing 
(Heath & Tomlinson, 2016). Debt usage, as well as debt servicing efficiency of 
Australian farm businesses, have increased during this period. On average, each farms’ 
debt usage capacity has increased from $200,000 in 1990 to over $500,000 in 2015 
while, during the same period, the debt coverage ratio of each farm, on average, has 
improved from 7% of each dollar gross farm income to 9% (Martin, Shafron, &Philips, 
2017). Despite the upsurge in farms’ sizes, and innovation as well as the succession of 
Australian farm businesses through debt financing, there have always been talks 
among Australian policymakers, practitioners, farmers, and researchers regarding the 
sustainability of a debt-based model. Thus, voices have been raised to explore new 
sources of financing to tap into the farms’ scale advantage (Heath & Tomlinson, 2016). 
Second, the needs of $1000 billion investment ($600 billion for capital 
investment and $400 billion for revenue investment) to increase Australian farms’ 
productivity from 2014 to 2050 (The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
(ANZ) 20 & Port Jackson Partners, 2012), has placed the issue of alternative finance, 
and off-farm equity capital in particular, under thoughtful consideration. Equity capital 
is one of the most suitable financing mixes, especially, for projects with a long-term 
orientation and for developing new projects and expansion of current projects 
(Isaksson & Çelik, 2013). Equity providers, like debt providers, are unlikely to claim 
returns from day one from capital users and intends to share proportionate risks of the 
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projects being undertaken. These are an important consideration for farm businesses. 
Last, but not least, Australian farm businesses experience seasonal variability and 
lower government support than comparable economies which do not allow the 
majority farms to gain growth beyond the current declining level of competitiveness 
(Heath & Tomlinson, 2016).  
A theory explaining the process of breaking financial lock-in and shifting 
financing routes from one to another in family farm businesses remains 
underdeveloped in the farm and agricultural financing literature. Traditional capital 
structure theories, such as pecking order theory (POT) (Donaldson & Fox, 2000; 
Myers & Majluf, 1984) and trade-off theory (TOT) (Titman, 1984) have extensively 
been used in the context of family firms and non-family firms’ capital structures and 
financing decision (Ahmed Sheikh & Wang, 2011; Graham & Leary, 2011; King & 
Santor, 2008; López‐Gracia & Sánchez‐Andújar, 2007). One of the main limitations 
of these theories in explaining family business financing decisions is that the normative 
view on rational behaviour assumption of these theories may lead to erroneous 
conclusions (Koropp, Kellermanns, Grichnik, & Stanley, 2014). For example, if used 
in family farms, pecking order theory might suggest family farms require access off-
farm equity as a last resort as bank debt is least preferred in this theoretical model 
(Tappeiner, Howorth, Achleitner, & Schraml, 2012). Family farms, by contrast, would 
be benefitted if they used off-farm equity with their equity to unfold their growth and 
scales, given the drawbacks of debt financing. Trade-off theory, if used in family 
farms, would also motivate family farms to access debt capital up to a certain level, 
which might underestimate the potential financial risks of using excessive bank debt 
(De Jong, Verbeek, & Verwijmeren, 2011).   
Our selection of theory for this research was data informed. The narratives of each 
farm in our study show that each farm maintains a legacy of generational history, 
generational financing, and non-financing practices (operational and management), 
which still plays a role at present. Sample family farms want to keep up these 
trajectories even in the future. This perspective of data resonates with path dependency 
theory. Each sample farm on our study, however, wants to shift their old financing 
path and was ready to access equity capital from outside investors as they thought 
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current financing options fell short of achieving their strategic goals. This pattern of 
data fits with the concept of breaking financial lock-in, path creation process and new 
path creation theory. 
Path dependency theory stresses that actors of any technology, institution, 
products, and industry, industrial locations, and organisational processes may become 
locked-in with a “once found solution.” Lock-in with once found solution happens due 
to the presence of “increasing returns to that solution or network externalities or 
absence of exogenous or external shocks” (Simmie, 2012; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011; 
Vergne & Durand, 2010; Beyer, 2010; Arthur, 1994, 1990, 1989, David, 1985). Based 
on the studies of technological path dependence (David, 2001; Cowan & Gunby, 1996; 
Arthur 1994,1989), Sydow et al. (2009) mentioned four mechanisms that lead an 
organization to be path dependent benefitting actors’ self-reinforcement dynamics. 
Sydow et al. (2009), has noted how an organization can become path dependent 
following a three-stage process: 
i. it is triggered by a historical event that leads to a particular direction;    
ii. it is governed by a set of common practices, which dominate over any other 
alternative; 
iii. it creates such a limited scope for the organisation that puts the organisation 
into lock-in.   
Following the above organizational path dependent view (Sydow, 2009), we also 
argue that family farms become financially path dependent according to the following 
process:  
i. generational relation and historical dependence of family farms with 
commercial banks give a natural advantage to family farms in getting bank 
loans, which in turn creates a certain financing direction for successors;  
ii. for long-term banking relations, each party involved establishes norms and 
practices that become dominant on other norms; and  
iii. these conditions induce family farms to use a particular bank financing model, 
irrespective of the benefits of using other financing options.  
 
Following the above process, family farms get immerse into financial lock-in. 
This financing pattern can also be termed as the acts of institutional historicity. 
Institutional historicity refers to a situation whereby any decision taken by a firm, in 
the past, has an impact on the present and future course of action of that institution 
(Beyer, 2010).  
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Path-dependent, however, is not permanent phenomena and is susceptible to 
change if the prevailing conditions to path dependency, as outlined above, do not 
remain valid any longer (Beyer, 2010). Thus, path dependency theorists have proposed 
a path creation process (Garud & Karnøe, 2003, 2001), and other theories, namely, 
new path creation (Garud, Kumaraswamy, & Karnøe, 2010) and hybrid socio-
economic new path creation theory (Simmie, 2012), to theorize such situations. Our 
observation in data motivated us to select path creation process (Garud & Karnøe, 
2001) and hybrid socio-economic theory of new path creation (Simmie, 2012). 
Usurpingly, actors (entrepreneurs or firm owners) are one of the key elements in path 
dependency, the path creation process, and path creation theory. 
Path creation process (Garud & Karnøe, 2001) suggests creating a new path is the 
mindful deviation of entrepreneurs. Disregarding short-term pressure, actors 
(firms/owners) cross firms’ old boundary and create a new momentum towards a new 
path over time to cross the initial boundary (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). As shown in the 
discussion chapter, we found evidence of boundary crossing and new momentum 
generation in our data when family farms start their off-farm equity journey. Path 
creation theorist view entrepreneurs as active market players and actors responding to 
real-time development of firms’ environments to shape the path of firms’ future 
courses of actions, while the position of entrepreneurs is passive in path dependency 
argument (Stack & Gartland, 2003).  
The Main crux of this hybrid theory of new path creation (Simmie, 2012) is that it 
entertains all processes engaged in path creation journey where all actors, not only 
entrepreneurs but also other associated actors, make a joint effort to create a new path, 
to overcome associated barriers and to create path dependent trajectory for the new 
path. In this research, we have noticed that each of our sample family farms has been 
active in breaking their traditional financing path and were motivated to engage with 
off-farm equity collaborators to satisfy their financing needs. The equity journey of 
each farm progressed with the joint efforts of farms and investors, and the processes 
were reflexive (Simmie, 2012), rather than canonical (Garud et al., 2010). Therefore, 
it fits best with the hybrid theory of new path creation.  
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4. Research methodology  
4.1. Research design 
 We have taken the constructionism view (Roulston, 2010) of the semi-
structured interview for this study. Following the narrative enquiry idea of a “believing 
game” (Elbow, 1987), our interview proceeded in a mutually empathetic manner 
(Connelly & Clandinin,1990; Schegloff, 1997) with our farm participants 
collaboratively (Elbow, 1987) to understand each other’s voices: farms’ experiences 
and researchers’ prompts to farms views. Our “interpretive imperative perspective” 
(Brockmeier & Meretoja, 2014), helped us develop interview narratives (Elliott, 2005; 
Alvarez & Urla, 2002) during our interview sessions. A narrative research approach 
has widely been discussed in scholarly conversations in many fields of knowledge. For 
this study, we have taken a selective (Robinson & Hawpe, 1986) and categorical 
narrative (Elliott, 2005) analytical position, a similar position to recent work (Singh, 
Corner, & Pavlovich, 2015) to report narrative wiring. These narrative methods 
concentrate on only a targeted range of interview data, similar to our inquiry, as 
opposed to a holistic approach to narrative analysis (Elliott, 2005) which accounts for 
every bit of data. We visited and analysed three farms’ stories about their off-farm 
equity financing journey to get to know the true reasons, actions, and sequences of 
events (Bruner, 2009; Rimmon-Kenan, 2003). Narrative analysis can efficiently record 
this process of changing from one approach to another in an organizational context 
(Pentland, 1999), like in our case.     
4.2. Sampling and data 
 The data are in the form of the semi-structured interview using open-ended 
question with the owners of family farms to tell their own story. As our semi-structured 
interview data have all the qualities of a narrative structure including sequences, voice, 
focal actors and contexts (Pentland, 1999), we treated each interview as a story. Story 
and narratives have been interchangeably used in our research as suggested by 
Cunliffe, Luhman, and Boje (2004), like as seen in Sonenshein (2010), even though 
there are differences (Cunliffe et al., 2004). To construct a representative sample, we 
chose those farms that either have already accessed off-farm equity or are in the 
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process of doing so. The reason for selecting this sampling criterion was to grasp 
family farms’ lived experience in breaking their traditional models of financing.  
 During our data collection stage, we accessed four cases to “know the most” and 
to able to reach a certain amount of depth in each case (Maxwell, 1992; Stake, 1978). 
Even though we interviewed four owners (one individual from one farm) of four 
different farms, we treat our respondent as a case for analytical induction (Crouch & 
McKenzie, 2006; Abbott, 1992). Individual respondents, if they can demonstrate a link 
between their experiences and environments, can claim to be an agency of a particular 
set of instances. Individuals with such characters may be termed as a case for their 
deep understating of that phenomenon. In our research, farm owners interviewed 
qualify as case as each of them showed a greater amount of farming experiences which 
were in constant dialogue with their environment (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006; Abbott, 
1992).   
 Guided by the principle of theoretical sampling in qualitative research (Glaser, 
1967), we justify our sample as representative as we explored the depth of each case 
and received rich information about each case (Curtis, Gesler, Smith, & Washburn, 
2000; Patton, 1999). We excluded one farm from our final analysis as we observed 
that the excluded farm did not have the same characteristics or was not, at least, very 
close to, the other three farms in terms of scale, size, capital needs, industry focus, and 
professional preparations for off-farm equity. The three-included farm was from cattle 
industry, and the excluded farm was a horticultural farm. The reason we kept cattle 
farms was that they were from a capital-intensive industry with strong growth 
potential, and cattle farms require more scale capital for a long time than horticulture 
farms. Off-farm equity capital also serves the same purpose of this capital intensity. 
This decision to exclude the horticulture farm was methodologically necessary to 
develop a common storyline (Martin, Feldman, Hatch, & Sitkin, 1983) of almost 
similar types of farms, based on their story scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1975).  
 While the three remaining cattle farms were similar in the ways identified above, 
they provide a heterogeneous sample since the three farmers differed considerably in 
their view on the shared journey, for example, retaining control was very important for 
one farm, while another was ready to commit their whole farm to the venture. Table 1 
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shows a timeline of different events (Sonenshein, 2010) that the three farms 
experienced in off-farm equity journeys. 
 Interview data have been recognised as one of the compelling sources of data in 
storytelling research where the narrative is developed as an analytical outcome 
(Creswell, 2012; Elliott, 2005; Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, & Zilber, 1998). Two of the 
authors conducted interviews, from August 2015 to March 2016, in two ways: face-
to-face interviews with the owners of two family farms and a telephonic interview with 
another family farm. We recorded and transcribed each interview lasting on average 
70 minutes. Each farm was actively engaged in farm business over generations. Farms 
were selected using a snowball technique to ensure the quality of the subject matter of 
the study by ensuring information-rich cases (Creswell, 2012; Patton & Appelbaum, 
2003; Patton, 1990). Actual names of farms have been replaced with pseudonyms. 
 To ensure quality data from farms of this study, the researcher developed a 
conducive environment during interview periods (Riely & Hawe, 2005) that ensured 
rapport – trust and respect- with interviewees and the experiences they shared 
(DiCicco-Bloom & Cabtree, 2006; Douglas, 1985; Spradley, 1979). Rapport in the 
qualitative interview is very important and can generally be achieved through four 
stages: exploration, apprehension, cooperation and participation (DiCicco-Bloom & 
Cabtree, 2006). In this study, the rapport was developed following the steps reported 
by Riely & Hawe (2005).   First, before starting the interview, we ensured flexibility 
to our participants to share their day to day experiences regarding farm financing and 
their thinking about the potential new source of finance. Second, we demonstrated 
empathic consideration at every stage to farms in a sense that interviewees were given 
them full freedom to be informationally conservative - whatever they liked to disclose 
and hide, they could. Third, we promised to be trustworthy with our participants by 
keeping their identity confidential. Finally, throughout the interview, we were mindful 
to listen to their experiences, sought interviewees’ permission to records their 
interview verbatim, and stopped recording during an interview session where they 
objected to recording. 
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4.3.Case overview 
 This study is about understanding why and how family farms changed 
traditionally constructed financing paths. Three cattle farms from a single region were 
selected for the study, as going to multiple regions was not possible for the 
investigators. The sample farms had operational and business units in multiple 
locations in Australia including South, North, and Central Queensland, and some part 
of New South Wales (NSW). This multiple geographical network works as a proxy for 
multiple regions for the sampling purpose of the study. In addition, sample farms of 
the study were engaged in a portfolio of farm business in the cattle industry including 
seed stock, genetics supply, and feedlot, cattle breeding, and grazing. The scale of the 
three farms was 20,000 to 60,000 head of cattle, and the total area of land of each farm 
was between 60,000 and 300,000 hectares. These attributes of the sample farms, such 
as a portfolio of business, locational diversity, and variety in scale and land size, serve 
the purpose of selecting informationally rich and representative cases in a qualitative 
inquiry (Patton, 1990). This richness in information ensures generalizability of our 
findings, at least in the sense of “ideographic,” “holographic” “naturalistic,” or 
“analytical” generalization, as noted by Sandelowski (1995).   
 One cattle farm interviewed had already changed their business model and 
accessed off-farm equity. The other two cattle farms are now in the change process of 
their business model at the time of interview and were about to access off-farm equity. 
The sequence of events that we have outlined in Table 1 is not the exact sequence we 
observed in the data; rather we arranged the data in sequence to explain the deep 
structure of the surface of the narratives (Pentland, 1999). Our access to data was only 
limited to the surface of the phenomena we wanted to explore, which is a common 
challenge in the narrative analysis (Pentland, 1999). 
4.4. Regional overview of sample farms 
The three farms analysed in this study were from the northern region of the 
Australian beef industry. Of the total 32530 Australian beef cattle farms, Northern 
Australia (Queensland, Northern Western Australia, and Northern Territory) holds 
8830 beef cattle farms, 97% of these farms are located in Queensland,  whereas 23700 
farms  are located in Southern Australia (Southern Western Australia, South Australia, 
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New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania) (Martin, Philips Leith, & Caboche, 2013). 
The farms of these two regions have achieved different experiences of the growth and 
development of beef industry over the last 20 years due to their distinct differences in 
terms of climate, pastures, industry infrastructure, farm business characteristics, and 
proximity to market (Martin et al. 2013). 
The beef industry in northern Australia is influenced by natural endowments—
rainfall, temperature patterns, and soils. These factors play a significant role in the 
production system, processing plans, transportation system, and the other stages of the 
value chain of the northern beef industry(Gleeson, Martin, & Mifsud, 2012). Northern 
Australian beef cattle production systems are highly reliant on pasture as the main feed 
source, and pasture growth itself is dependent on rainfall through the wet season. From 
1977‒78 to 2011‒12, industry output and input use were highly variable, largely 
because of climate factors (Martin et al. 2013)  and the destocking and restocking 
activities that hamper output growth are determined the (Dahl, Leith & Grey 2013). 
Rainfall in northern Australia is dominated by monsoon systems that create a distinct 
wet season (usually September to March) and dry season (usually April to October). 
This limits the growing season for pastures and, unlike southern Australia, makes it 
difficult to finish cattle for markets in one production year. 
Table 1: A Comparative Business Performance of Top 25% and Avg. Business Beef 
Cattle Farms        
Return 
Indicators 
2001-03 2004-06 2007-2009 2010-2012 Long Tem Avg. 
Avg. 
Business 
Top 
25% 
Avg. 
Business 
Top 
25% 
Avg. 
Business 
Top 
25% 
Avg. 
Busines
s 
Top 
25% 
Avg. 
Business 
Top 
25% 
*OR 0.3% 4% 0.2% 2.6% 0.1% 2.2% 0.4% 2.4% 0.2% 2.6% 
** CR 10.8% 11.5% 7.6% 8.4% 4.1% 6.6% (3.3)% (4.6)
% 
4.8% 5.5% 
*** TR 11.1% 15.5% 7.8% 11.0% 4.2% 8.8% (2.9)% (2.2)
% 
5% 8.1% 
Source: The Northern Beef report: 2013 Situation Analysis (Holmes & Counsell 2014), 
*OR= operating return, **CR= capital return, ***TR= total return  
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The financial performance of the northern beef industry for last 12 years (2001-
2012) reveals that majority of Northern beef producers- by region, herd size and 
market- are not economically sustainable as they are not able to fund present and future 
liabilities (McLean, Holmes & Counsell 2014). Table 2 shows the 12 years (2001-
2012) average total business return for the average farms and top 25% farms are 5%  
and 8.1% respectively which was negative by (2.9%) and (2.2%) averaged in the in 
most recent years (2010-12) (McLean, et,al. 2014). The long-term return trend for both 
the top performers as well as average businesses are declining, as shown in table 1, has 
three implications: overall industry profitability is declining meaning that there are 
some industry factors that are out of the reach of individual farm business unit, the 
performance of top 25% indicates that there are opportunities for improvement of 
performance for the average cattle farms if the issues of financing, investment, risk 
factors are efficiently managed.  
Grey literatures in cattle financing (McLean et,al. 2014; Martin et al. 2013; 
Tasman, 2012; Gleeson et,al.  2012)  shows that the value of equity of beef farms has 
a positive (negative) relation with the reduction (increase) of  farms debt and increases 
(decreases) in capital investment and  livestock number. Of all the capital assets used 
in the cattle industry in this region, land value is the leading factor, as land asset 
constitute more than 75% of the balance sheet of the northern beef. Nine percent of 
beef cattle producing farms in northern Australia, 5 percent in southern Australia and 
around 18 percent in the northern live cattle export region were estimated to have 
equity ratios below 70 percent in 2012‒13 (Martin et al. 2013). 
5. Analysis 
 In this study, we used an interpretive narrative approach (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2015, Creswell, 2013) to identify narrative themes (Gubrium & Holstein, 
2002; Patton, 1990) in the semi-structured interviews with family farm owners. As our 
data show temporal events and a logical and chronological sequence (Chatman, 1980), 
which are necessary and sufficient conditions to conduct narrative story (Franzosi, 
1998), we have chosen the narrative analytical lens for the reporting our results. 
However, narratologists have devised many techniques for narrative writing (for 
example, Crites,1986; Robinson & Hawpe,1986; Ricoeur, 1984; Spence, 1982; 
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Chatman, 1980; Labov & Waletzky, 1967) and researchers are often encouraged to 
use any suitable technique due to lags in an agreed-upon narrative reporting template 
(Connelly & Clandinin, 1990). We attempted to analyse every case using a sense of a 
whole to get an overall picture (Poirier & Ayres, 1997; Polkinghorne, 1988) of the 
farm’s experience: from beginning to end of their off-farm equity journey.  
We also looked for a logical sequences and coherence (Franzosi, 
1998;Chatman, 1980) among the events that farms undertaken or about to take in 
equity journey, through “enchainment” (Bremond, 1966), “embedding” (Todorov, 
1981) and “joining” (Rimmon-Kenan, 2003) because a temporal representation of 
events does not create a narrative story unless the events are connected (Franzosi, 
1998). We coded, categorized, and interpreted data both manually and electronically, 
using text analysis software: N-Vivo.11 and Leximancer version 4 (Basit, 2003; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
To proceed with our inductive multi-case research (Miles & Huberman, 1994), we 
followed a five-stage analytical device which is close to the work of (Singh et al., 
2015). Within these five stages, first, we read over and organised our interview data; 
second, we openly coded the data; third, we axially codded the open codes; fourth, we 
developed themes from categories; and finally, we theorised them. These steps, 
however, were not straightforward (Lichtman, 2013), we were back and forward 
(Eisenhardt,1989; Crites,1986) in interpreting the texts to understand farms’ financing 
journey in their temporal locales (Carr, 1991; Crites, 1986): past-present-future. We 
treated the narrative of each farm’s equity journey as a journey of transformation to 
prosperity (Halliwell, 1987) and a change of fortunes (Franzosi, 1998).  
We show the “composite narratives” (Dunford & Jones, 2000) in finding section 
based on opinions of the three owners of the three separate farms. For composite 
narratives, we use the case context presented in Table 2 (Langley, 1999). To ensure 
the credibility of our analysis, we have tended to disclose our modifying role in 
reporting the story (Poirier & Ayres, 1997). First, we attempted to construct the 
narrative through an artful process (Brown, 1998), using our own interpretive 
hermeneutic (Brockmeier & Meretoja, 2014), to give the audience a credible picture 
(Jeffcutt, 1994) of farms’ off-farm equity journeys  To this end, we looked at each se 
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of interview data from a particular chronological position to establish an order (Labov 
& Waletzky, 1967), in the acts, and events (Czarniawska, 1997) of that particular 
farm’s off-farm capital journey. Second, interviewers used prompts to elicit important 
issues that farms might not have disclosed otherwise. Finally, we constructed an 
interpretation of the participants’ comments during interview sessions by asking 
clarification and developing a juxtaposition of any issues that the interviewer did not 
understand. 
Table 2: Time and milestones for off-farm equity journeys, extracted from data 
Timeline Milestone Description Significance of milestone 
T1 Questioning 
traditional 
financing model.    
Current financing mode 
seemed to be insufficient to 
meet farm financing demands. 
Started the first discussion on how to 
overcome the financing constraints.   
T2 Off-farm equity 
initiative starts 
primary 
considerations.   
Searching for right investors 
and investment model. 
 Setting a mindset for change and 
foundation for changes. 
 Farms agreed that they would 
invite someone outside of farms 
with long-term capital. 
 Farms explored many forms of 
external capital (preferably 
equity and global supply chain/ 
networking, with some 
observation). 
T3 Off-farm equity 
initiative in-
progress: failed 
attempt. 
Off-farm equity initiatives 
failed due to mismatch with 
equity partners and farms’ less 
professional setup. 
 Farms learned much from their 
maiden off-farm equity failure.   
 Farms determined to refine their 
positions. 
T4 Off-farm equity 
initiative restarts: 
refining initiatives 
start.  
Major refining initiatives 
include: preparing 
information memo, business 
plan, governance, and 
reporting protocol. 
 Farms investigated off-farm 
equity further and detailed their 
investment cases. 
 Farms teased out the partners 
they wanted to ally with. 
 Farms visualised governance, 
reporting and ownership 
mechanisms. 
T5 Off-farm equity 
initiative in -
progress: 
decomposition of 
farms’ choices. 
Family farms faced many 
contradictions with off-farm 
partners on various issues 
including control, culture, and 
trust. 
 
 
 Contradictions with equity 
partners needed to be resolved.  
 To tease out causes for 
contradictions and to devise a 
resolution mechanism they 
searched for mediators. 
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Timeline Milestone Description Significance of milestone 
T6 Off-farm equity 
initiative in -
progress: 
intermediation 
process. 
Internal advisors/ external 
advisors were appointed, and 
professional advisors with 
global reputation were 
consulted.    
 Farms were benefitted from 
professional intermediates  
 Professional advisors guided 
them to professionalize farms’ 
documents and business 
structure 
T7 Implementing off-
farm equity 
initiatives. 
Farms bought changes to their 
business models and overall 
operations. 
This implementation of different 
professional steps gave a positive 
message to investors. 
T8 Developing 
successful off-
farm equity deals: 
at the deal 
scenario. 
Constructing a successful off-
farm equity partnership. 
Farms are now fully/partially 
ready to access off-farm equity. 
T9  Post deal 
scenario: exit or 
continuation. 
Farms needed to fix an exit 
point from the off-farm equity 
deal. 
Exit and continuation strategies in 
place, uncertainties minimised well 
ahead of time. 
6. Findings 
Our main research question was: why and how family farms access a new 
financing path of off-farm equity capital beyond their traditional path. In this section, 
we presented five composite narratives based on the case contexts shown in Table 1. 
6.1. Motivation for change narrative  
All the farms in our study have been using bank dominated traditional financing 
model for generations. Farms also shared the reasons their businesses and operations 
were financially challenged owing to some weaknesses of this traditional mix. Thus, a 
motivation narrative developed among farms regarding the changing of traditional 
financing models. This narrative means that there was a growing concern among farm 
owners about whether the bank dominant financing model would be able to meet their 
financing needs. These concerns were the drivers of motivation. In support of this 
narrative, every farm shared reason why banking models can limit their prospects. 
Table 3 summarizes the reasons and presents the illustrative quotes, which emerged 
during the interview. Farm participant A mentioned two factors for moving towards 
off-farm equity: scaled capital for expansion and the bank’s inherent weakness to meet 
that financing needs. According to Farm A, farms and agribusinesses need a large 
amount of capital to maximize farms’ yields. Nevertheless, the farm thinks that 
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commercial banks, individually, are not capable enough to satisfy this mammoth need 
for capital even though the farm could manage the proportionate equity to leverage 
ratio to access the loan.   
Farm C participant identified that changed macroeconomic conditions due to the 
emergence of global financial crisis (GFC), and its downsizing consequences on 
farms’ commodity prices, and profitability, was responsible for going to off-farm 
equity. Farm C participant noted that after the GFC, the commodity prices had 
dramatically fallen, and farm found itself in a very challenging position in such a 
changed business environment. Farm C also added, following the GFC, impacted by 
poor profitability and limited cash inflows, cattle farms tumbled into financial risk as 
they failed to pay the banks’ interest payments. Farm B’s story revealed that it wanted 
to access off-farm equity for strategic reasons. For instance, it wanted to develop 
processing and export supply chain in the domestic or global market. Farm C injected 
off-farm equity to diversify its farm businesses as they thought that banks did not like 
to share any of the risks.   
 
Table 3: Illustrative quotes supporting the motivations for change narrative    
Scalability  “Like most business, in agriculture scale is the way to get efficiency and 
the way to drive more yield out of business. so that being the case, the only 
real way to raise a significant amount of additional capital was through a 
capital raise type arrangement”. (Farm, A) 
Bank 
Limitations 
on capital 
“GFC came along, and we have seen some very challenging conditions 
around the cattle trading dynamics, [and] it really changed the pricing 
dynamic you saw you know the figure steer market from about a $2.20 to a 
$2.50 market drop to sort of a $1.50”. (Farm, C). 
Bank 
incapability to 
provide 
bigger capital 
“The family debt funded model, we wanted to expand further limited by 
equity versus debt rations--- maybe could have borrowed incrementally 
more here and there, but ultimately could not have borrowed the sorts of 
volumes of capital we wanted to actually build a business.” (Farm, A) 
Strategic 
choice: 
vertical 
integration 
“We are looking for strategic and best one that cannot just deliver cash to 
help us with that expansion but could then offer other things that will help 
us develop a supply chain and/or to lead them through various domestic or 
international export channels.”(Farm, B) 
Farm 
financial risk 
from price 
risk 
“[fall in cattle price due to GFC] really tighten cash flow and unit 
profitability of a lot of these enterprises then all of a sudden these 
enterprises now had a larger debt, you know larger debt loading larger 
interest commitments.” (Farm, C). 
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6.2. Right capital and right partner narrative 
 Once concern for their banking model was experienced by our sample farms, 
they were looking for alternative financiers and financing models that might match 
their preferences. One of the worrying things we observed in the equity journey of 
each farm was how to determine the right form of capital from the right partners. 
Thus, the narrative of right partners and partnership models was developed. 
This narrative includes question around the types of investors, a form of 
partnerships, the content of capital, financial capital or strategic capital, and cultural 
affinity. Different farms showed different intentions to use the off-farm capital. Cash 
capital would help farms to expand the scale and to excel in efficiency. “Through a 
capital type of arrangement, we wanted to build business scale to get efficiency and 
to drive more yield” (Farm A). In the context of strategic capital, farms referred to 
gaining access to reputation, processing ability, and global supply chain networks. A 
supporting quote about the strategic capital from Farm C is: “We see some 
advantages particularly in the diverse types of investors but from a strategic style of 
investor”, While Farm B noted: “We want to have someone that can solve that 
breading position for us would be attractive or someone with a processing 
capability”. 
Farms expressed different views in selecting the right partners and mentioned 
names of some possible partners in their discussions including public investors, 
institutional equity, private investors, and high net worth individual from both 
domestic and foreign sources. One farm (Farm A) mentioned its obvious choice for 
institutional investors with cash capital, preferably from the culturally aligned 
overseas market. Reasons for choosing institutional investors were to raise a big 
volume of capital. Participant of Farm A quoted:    
Private equity, public markets, private high net worth individuals, I   
suppose an option--- but private equity isn’t really made for agri-
investing because from an investment horizon perspective, -- I also do 
not think the public market works for agriculture because they are just 
too volatile. I believe we can get a massive injection of capital through 
institutional investors.    
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Farm B also preferred institutional partners in the form of cash and strategic 
capital both from domestic and international sources. Farm B also did not reject the 
possibility of accessing capital from the diverse type of investors. Farm C is not sure 
about the right panthers but likes to be a wide open range of potential investors with 
the same cultural setup. Farm C pointed: 
 I guess we probably don’t know the answer to that sort of question (nature 
of equity capital and expectations) entirely yet; we have kind of mapped 
out a matrix of looking at the different investment categories that have an 
attraction to the business so be that worth of domestic nature or 
international nature. 
  Regarding the right model of off-farm investment, farms interview revealed us 
many possible models: “joint venture” (Farm A and C), “off-take agreement” (farm 
B), and “passive equity” (Farm C). Cultural affinity with farms and investors is 
another important issue that determines that right capital narrative.  Farms indicated 
that they might sacrifice the best offer from the most legitimate investors if those 
investors come from culturally different orientation. Rather, the farm would accept 
some discounted offer from investors with the same cultural background. One 
exemplary quote is:  
“Cultural fit and strategic direction are going to mean a lot to us and will 
probably particularly being that we are keeping you know a stake in the 
business that we feel we in some cases we might leave some value on the 
table in terms of not going with the highest bidder as such because we feel 
that second or third position actually fits better with us (Farm C)”. 
6.3.Soul- reflecting the narrative   
This narrative is about examining the family farms’ shortcoming of farms’ 
business model while they decide to access off-farm equity. We found that farms have 
been under family dominance. Most of the farms started to acknowledge that they have 
weaknesses in their business model to access off-farm equity. This self-evaluation of 
their business models is treated as self-reflecting narrative.  Some representative 
quotes in this regard included: 
“We were at a bit of a crossroads then, and we decided and looked at do 
we want to proceed with this, or do we just want to forget about it and go 
back to what we do, and we decided at that stage we were going to proceed 
(Farm A).”   “We are not probably as robust as a normal corporation is 
(Farm C).” “I do not think you have any choice other than to make sure 
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that your business looks professional as much as possible, but I have a 
limited background to do that (Farm B).” 
 
 The intensity of soul-reflecting has also been deepened among farms once they 
had experienced failure in their maiden off-farm equity journey without sufficient 
preparation. Data revealed to us two that of three farms started their off-farm equity 
journey without much homework on how to change their business model and how to 
act with investors. Participants of Farm A and C shared their experience of failure and 
the lessons they learned from their failure. Farm A’s experience was that their business 
model lacked professionalism: “we tried almost 18 months (to access off-farm equity), 
it did not work, as it was in true family style; it was not good enough and was not 
professional enough” (Farm A). While Farm C’s experience was that, they were not 
happy with the investors’ model as investors did not give fair share due to the naïve 
business model of Farm C.  
“I do not think that party (investor) was as genuine in their approaches to 
the sector as they wanted us to manage the operations, so we did not own 
any of the lands; we would get paid like a management fee for running their 
assets (Farm C).” 
 
 Both farms took this failure as a learning piece as they decided to restructure 
the business, “We actually reversed engineered it so when we decided to proceed” 
(Farm A) and engaging with professional advisors: “we have just recently engaged 
with outside professional advisors (to spotting) our perspective” (Farm C). 
6.4. Professionalization narrative  
 This narrative developed as farms felt contemplations for moving from 
the family paradigm to a professional model. Without being professional, farms 
cannot raise capital, “You have to be very professional, you will not raise capital 
unless you are professional (Farm A).” It is evident from the data that not every farm 
is at the same level of professionalism. Thus, their experiences were also different. 
We, however, focused on finding the recurring elements that created the 
professionalization narratives. Recurring elements were: changing the inflexible 
family approach to their business, seeking help from professional mentors, and 
developing professional documents.  
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 All farms were in the process of changing the old style of doing business. 
For example, farm A converted its “drawing type” of the business structure into 
“wage based” business structure. Data relating to this narrative meant us that before 
starting their off-farm equity journey, owners of Farm A was not used to segregating 
their personal accounts (income/expenditures/asset) from the business accounts. All 
these were fully mingled and were fully confidential. With five years of preparation, 
Farm A commercialized their approach.   
“We were a commercial operator running a lifestyle through our business, 
and we were over those five years. We also even started to rectify that, so 
when we first started back here, we were all taking drawings which are a 
standard family style business type arrangement. By the end of it, we were 
all on wages before we even went into a joint venture. So that we could 
start to represent that this business can sustain a wage type structure versus 
a drawing type structure” (Farm A).”  
 
Farm A also exposed all of their personal track records, even the criminal history, to 
satisfy the investors. Farm A noted:  
“They [investors] delved into our personal backgrounds, …. they did 
private checks, private and criminal checks. So, they [investors] made sure 
we have no criminal record that was a concern to them (Farm A)”. 
 
 Farm B had also shown an intention to change the business structure, which 
had been instigated almost for 20 years earlier. The reason for this change as this 
structure was rigid and they wanted to make it simple: 
 “We think that we put structures, a company structure was put in place 
20 years ago, and then things have changed over a period that results in 
a corporate structure that was inflexible and not particularly attractive. 
So, something I have been working on quite a bit over the last few months 
is looking at our structure and try to determine how we can simplify ( 
Farm B)”.  
 
  To this end, Farm B has been working hard to renovate its “tax planning” and 
other “structuring” of the family farms for the last seven years with the help of 
external professional analysis. This analysis of an external advisor will make the 
investment proposition of Farm B “a fairly robust” model. Farm C indicated that their 
business structure, like other family farms, was still focused on “tax avoidance” and 
was “not efficient like the corporate model.”  
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 The other recurring element of professionalization narrative we observed was 
seeking the help of professional advisors to corroborate farms’ off-farm equity 
journey. Professional advisors helped farms identify investors, prepare the document, 
and minimise the contradiction between farm and investors. In its story, Farm A 
showed its great satisfaction for the level of changes advisors brought to its farms’ 
structure to access to capital: “to be honest, with the help advisors we did the changes, 
and it brings us to a great place in our career (Farm A).” Farm A talked about using 
two pivotal actors in preparing a document that he used to make changes happen: (1) 
internal advisor and (2) an external advisor. To farm A, the information memorandum 
(IM) was one of the key documents in its professionalization mission. The Internal 
advisor helped Farm A in preparing IM. Farm A shared: “[We] went to eight very large 
corporate advisors” to substantiate ‘our’ idea business and asked them to advocate on 
behalf ‘our’ business to investor’s communities. Farm A further opined: “we actually 
did an IM up and took it to them and said, this is how we like to do business, would 
you represent us.” As a complementary question, the interviewer asked about the 
contents and necessity of the IM. Farm A participant responded that IM contained the 
farm’s identity, “financial modeling around the investment case,” and implications of 
historical farm financials. With this information, Farm A was able “to set the scene of 
investment readiness” rather than “naively” claiming “they were investment ready.” 
 The other two Farms, B, and C also showed greater interest in getting support 
from farm advisor in preparing different documents. The Farm B participant explained 
that it prepared a short investment brochure that will be sent to legitimate investors 
and the farm advisors market,  
“When we go out to third-party investors there would be a short brochure 
prepared, which probably be 94 to 96 pages long, which may have to be 
on a no-name status, but we will highlight the opportunity to the potential 
investors, and then that would be sent to a broad investor market, both to 
the investors that we’re familiar with and also the advisors”.  
 
 It (Farm B) also shared that it had already prepared information memorandum 
to provide a bigger picture of its farm business to investors:  
“[We] will follow that up with an information memorandum which will 
probably be 30, 40 approximately 50 pages long, containing our details we 
decided to make it, and that information memorandum will set out exactly 
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what is [our business] and who we are, it will have the details of previous 
financial returns as well as forecasted financial returns that should consider. 
It will provide considerable detail about existing investments and the type 
of assets that we still want to acquire but don’t yet have under the contract. 
So, the investors have a pretty quick picture of who we are, what we want 
to do and what their [investors] return is going to be”. 
 
    In terms of taking help from advisors as mentor, Farm B mentioned that all the 
steps necessary to succeed in the equity journey would be taken by itself as they had 
ample internal experience in writing the documents, “I was a finance manager, so I 
have written lots of perspectives, product disclosure statements and information 
memorandums in my role as a lawyer--- so I would probably write a lot of it (Farm 
B)”.  However, it showed its positive attitude towards taking advice from an advisor if 
in-house skills fell short of required skill. Farm B participant implied: “but if I did not 
have that background and even considering that I do that would be input from certain 
external advisors, in relation to the content of that document.” 
 Farm B is also working with developing other tools such as, “reporting protocol,” 
“corporate structure chart” “human resource responsibility structure” and “exit plan.” 
In all of these document, family members of Farm B would prepare the documents, 
and they would also take help from external professional. 
 Farm C is already using outside independent managers as a mentor, 
“independent managers outside of the family are already in place, I guess for 
streamlining what the ownership structure will be.” In additions, Farm C has also 
recently engaged with external professional advisors to prepare the documents 
needed to go to external equity. Farm C participant stated: 
We have just recently engaged an external advisor in the space, so I guess 
really in my view of it we have got a period of works out into about 
March next year February / March around really locking down business 
plan, you know, building financial model from our perspective what it 
will look like with an outside partner I guess you know, and the 
management structure and all that 
6.5.Letting-go and taking -on narrative 
 This narrative refers to the actualization of commitment to transforming 
different domains of unprofessional styles of doing business. During their off-farm 
equity journey, family farms agreed to let go of their traditional styles and to take on 
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different professional styles in accessing off-farm equity (see Table 4). Farm A let go 
of their lifestyle of farming, cultural rigidity, privacy around investors, individualistic 
strategy and embraced decisions making. Farm A also relinquished its tactics of selling 
only half of its business at a premium price. Instead, it accepted the strategy of selling  
Table 4: Farm transformation process, extracted from data 
Letting go Taking On Case 
Lifestyle farming  Commercial farming approach A 
Intertwined transaction Normalisation of transaction A 
Culture of rigidity  Culture of adaptability A 
Closed book attitude   Open book attitude A 
Individualistic approach  Team approach A 
Premium offer Discounted offer A 
Selling a part of the business Selling the whole of the business A 
Impractical valuation Pragmatic valuation A 
Old business structure 
(complex) 
New business structure (Simplifying) B 
No details documentation Details of investment case (historical returns/ future 
returns) 
B 
No disclosure to investors Informing legitimate investors/ shortlisted investor B 
Incompetence in business Developing more robustness in business to fight risks B 
Family style of structure  Corporate structure B 
Undefined responsibility HR responsibility structure B 
Family driven analysis Professionally analysing business drivers to ensure 
profitability  
B 
 The idea of a fully family 
board 
The big shift in governance: bringing in independent 
members 
C 
No management structure Disciplined management restructuring (appointing 
CEO /CFO) 
C 
Unaudited financials  Audited set of documents for more accurate financial 
performance 
C 
100% control by family 
business 
Modeling the business to sell equity up to 90% C 
the whole business at a discounted offer with a correct valuation. Farm B showed a 
commitment to forgoing its complex business structure, the tendency of not disclosing 
the business and the family style of business structure, which has defined job 
specification. Farm B committed to developing an investment case of their capital and 
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commitment to restructure their business with defined specific roles that could be 
shared with potential investors. It also wished to develop a professional analysis of 
their profitability letting go of the family driven analysis. Likewise, Farm C also 
wanted to give up the idea of a fully family-based board, 100 % ownership, no 
management structure, and unaudited financial statements. Instead of these, it wanted 
to take on the offer of selling up to 90% of its farms, creating governance, appointing 
a chief financial analysist external to the farms and who would do auditing of financial 
statements for investors. 
7. Discussion 
 A primary contribution of our study is that unveils the process of how family 
farms access off-farm equity. Our findings indicate some five narratives from off-
farm equity experiences of three family farms. These narratives include motivation 
for change, soul searching, right partners and right capital, professionalization and 
letting go and taking on narratives. Linking these narratives with the path creation 
process and new path creation theory, we find four themes in family farms’ off-farm 
equity journey, as discussed in this section. Four emergent themes from these 
narratives are responding to triggers, searching information, self-auditing, and 
becoming professionalised. Connecting these themes, we developed a new financing 
path creation process for family farms in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 
Responding to 
emerging 
triggers 
Step 2 
Searching for 
alternatives  
Step 3 
Spotting challenges:  
Self-auditing 
Internal Trigger 
 being scalable 
 strategic advantage 
External trigger:  
 banking compliance 
 Commodity prices 
 Growth potential  
 
 source, size, 
culture, and 
time horizon 
  investors types 
 investment 
model 
 business model/ 
structure/governa
nce/reporting/ow
nership 
 learning from 
failure 
 Document ready 
 information ready 
 internal advisors 
 external advisor 
 Governance 
structure 
 reporting practices 
Step 4 
Getting 
professionally  
ready (Preparation 
and transformation) 
Figure 1: Off-farm equity path creation process and associated investment readiness 
components, authors’ own model based on findings 
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 This model allows family farms to understand how farms that have taken this 
journey break financial lock-in and start a new financing path towards more innovative 
financing, off-farm equity in our case. Secondly, we believe we have also contributed 
to the investment readiness literature. Integrating the concept of investment readiness 
and path creation, we regarded the financing path creation process incorporates 
investment readiness process. Based on the findings, it is reasonable to note that family 
farms are expected to professionalise their traditional business model and practices 
once farms decide to create new financing path. Actions taken by family farms in new 
financing path creation process makes the farms ready for funds. Finally, our study 
also contributes to the literature of organizational path dependence and new path 
creation. To the best of our knowledge, path dependence and path creation concept has 
not been used in changing the financing direction of family farms. We extend 
previously scholarly discussion of path dependence and path creation view in family 
farm financing.  
7.1. Path dependency view before starting off-farm equity journeys   
            The institutional and financial lock-in, described in section 2.4 and 2.5 of this 
paper, and the historical dependency of all farms on traditional finance, such as internal 
equity and bank debt, can be related to path dependence in many ways. Our findings 
show that previous generations played a significant role in selecting traditional sources 
of finance. Current generations stick to that initial financing practice because farms, 
as an institution, “are carrier of history” (David, 1994) and they cannot avoid the 
imprinting of institutional heritage such as culture, norms and practices (Sydow et al., 
2009; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) of financial strategy. In the path-dependent process, 
broader historical institutional setting determines the rules of the game for a firm’s 
survival (Vergne & Durand, 2010), no matter that particular settings are inefficient 
globally (North, 1990; Pierson, 2000). In this study, we observed that the family farms 
had generally established an initial financial structure that seemed to be less efficient 
in meeting farms’ needs for finance. This initial financial condition in our study is the 
reference point of financial path dependency.   
           What interpretation of this path dependence can we draw in the context of our 
research? One interpretation is that historic financial path dependency, even if it seems 
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to be smaller (Arthur, 1994), might create “butterfly effects” (Hilborn, 2004) in family 
farms’ trajectories. Butterfly effects refer to actualising or missing some futuristic 
larger scale outcome in any organizational settings if small-scale changes in the 
historical condition are not duly taken care of (Hilborn, 2004). The consequence of 
this sensitivity to this financial condition is that it may put firms in (financial) lock-in 
(Vergne & Durand, 2010). Driven by this financial lock-in, “penguin effects” (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985) may emerge in the farming industry. This means that despite having 
good intentions, family farms cannot change their financial lock-in, due to “systematic 
diachronic” condition (Senge, 2006) unless external forces and actors intervene in the 
process (Garud & Karnøe, 2003, 2001).  
7.2. Path creation view in off-farm equity journeys 
 Family farms in our findings did not want to continue with this initial financing 
path dependent situation. Instead, farms wanted to break this financial path dependency 
and create alternative financing paths for their capital needs. Our interpretive lens on 
narratives developed in Section 6, has found four steps for path creation as depicted in 
Figure 1. Following the new path creation process (Garud & Karnøe, 2001) and the new 
path creation theory (Simmie, 2012), these four steps have been articulated for this 
study.  
   The first path creation step towards a new financing path (off-farm equity) in our 
study was to recognise the internal and external triggers by family farms. We refer to 
internal triggers are those that arouse farms’ own perspectives, for example, farms’ 
desire to increase their scale and to a develop strategic advantage, such as bringing the 
farm into the global market through a supply network or accessing raw materials which 
they currently lack in. By external triggers, our study points to those factors that 
originate from changes in the macroeconomic environment and the financial system. To 
put the example of changes in the financial system, one farm indicated that they were 
given the tougher condition of loan sanction from commercial banks owing to the 
changes in banking regulation after the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008. Regarding 
macroeconomic changes, another farm referred to falling profitability due to the falling 
of commodity prices. This hampered farms’ capacity to cash generation. Consequently, 
financial risks for that farm emerged, as it could not service bank loans in a timely 
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manner. On the other hand, growth in export markets provides an incentive to expand 
the business and increase profitability. This is more likely to drive capital expansion 
than falling commodity prices. All these triggers motivated farms to explore new 
sources of financing.     
     This proposed four-step financing path creation process in our research can be 
seen as resembling the new path creation process outlined by Simmie (2012). 
Proponents of this path creation theory argue that path creations start with “mindful 
deviation of knowledgeable of agents” (Garud & Karnøe, 2001) (farms in this case) 
from an initial condition of being path dependent (Simmie, 2012). This shift from the 
initial condition happens in three ways: (1) by accidental efforts of human agency 
(farms owners in this case), (2) through a dynamic process of agents (farm owners in 
our case) and (3) diverse elements that reconfigure actions of that path (Garud et al., 
2010; Karnøe & Buchhorn, 2008;Tsoukas, 2008; Callon, 1990; Garud & Karnøe, 
2001). 
   In our research, findings support all these three dimensions for farms’ deviation 
from path dependency to a path creation process.  The role of the human agency is 
evident in the sense that current farm owners are the key agents who perceive the 
benefits of the change. Accidental issues were also found in our research, such as 
unexpected economic, financial, and regulatory shocks that triggered them to deviate 
from their initial financial condition. Finally, farm owners (actors) responded in 
systematic approaches based on emerging financing alternatives in farm finance 
industry.    
    Initial financial conditions (in the path dependent stage) seems to be less 
appropriate as our farms experience exogenous contingencies (Arthur, 1989), such as 
economic downturns, commodity price risk, and new banking regulations, and self-
reinforced (Vergne & Durand, 2010) ambitions, for example, farms’ desire to escalate 
scale, scope, and skills in their farming. Farms may consider this stage as an 
opportunity to discover, create (Alvarez & Barney, 2007) and cultivate serendipity and 
contingency of path creation (Garud et al., 2010) for accessing alternative forms of 
off-farm equity as” fortune favours the prepared mind” (Garud, Nayyar, & Shapira, 
1997). During this stage, farm entrepreneurs may introduce themselves with new 
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combinations of sources of financing for the entrepreneurial process (Schumpeter, 
2013). 
   Once family farms decided to respond to internal and external triggers to 
change traditional financing paths, the second step in our model in the path creation 
process started with the search for alternative financing. In this stage, farm owners 
search for suitable off-farm investors. Two farms mentioned their preference to 
develop a partnership with institutional investors as this form of capital partners could 
provide a large amount of capital, while another mentioned they did not like to bring 
someone with a large amount of capital because of the apprehension of losing control 
of their farms. Another farm was not sure about the kind of investors it would access, 
and that was why it would approach a large number of potential investors. Findings 
also indicate what farms mentioned about different investment model, such as’ co-
investment, joint venture, passive equity, off-take equity, under which they like to ally.  
  This step of searching alternatives can be linked with boundary spanning stage 
of path creation process (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). At the boundary spanning stage, 
entrepreneurs translate their ideas about interacting with others and develop ground to 
substantiate those ideas (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). In addition, at this stage entrepreneurs 
try to consider what other actors think to transform their innovative ideas into shared 
and stable ones. In our research, we also identified the searching stage, with family 
farms trying to understand the pulse of the off-farm investors to get insights into 
investors’ expectations. Farms attempted to develop such shared paths that would 
convince both investors and farms. Previous research in organisation path creation 
(Gruber, 2010) also shows that searching for alternatives in path creation helps 
entrepreneurs better understand the ex-ante issues of the most efficient path (Gruber, 
2010; Sydow, Windeler, Möllering, & Schubert, 2005). 
 Linking the resource-based view (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Choi & Shepherd, 
2004) with the path creation concept, our interpretation is that during this stage family 
farms can explore their maximum scales and scope if they can perceive the correct 
information regarding the right off-farm investors, partners, models, sizes, and 
management capabilities required. Following the view of searching for alternatives   in 
organization path dependence (Gruber, 2010), another important consideration is that 
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farm owners’ level of experience, knowledge, aspiration (farms’ expectation of other 
referent farms), farms’ individual attributes, and the level of financial capital matters in 
creating off-farm equity path (Cyert & March, 1963). Searching for different 
alternatives helps farms to access broader information about investors which is crucial 
for successful off-farm equity deals (Tang, Kacmar, & Busenitz, 2012). 
 The third step in the off-farm equity path creation process is spotting farms’ 
challenges in accessing off-farm equity, which we have termed as self-auditing. We may 
compare this stage with the momentum generation stage of path creation (Garud & 
Karnøe, 2001). Having paraphrased the explanation of Garud and Karnøe (2001), we 
understand that entrepreneurs may go through a critical revision of actors’ strengths and 
can identify the viability of innovative ideas. Our findings suggest that family farms 
identified some professional barriers to off-farm equity injection in their farms, including 
traditional business models, rigid business structure lacks a solid business plan, high level 
of confidentiality, poor governance, and reporting. Off-farm investors are not impressed 
with these poor professionals’ setups, as all types of investors including individual and 
institutional investors want to see professional set up of the business (Fernando, 
Schneible, & Suh, 2014). Institutional investors, however, want more professional picture 
than that of individual investors, as the former are full-time investors and appoint 
professional analyst to oversee their investments (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003; Utama & 
Cready, 1997). This stage of professional barriers can also be linked with the concept of 
“institutional hysteresis” in Simmie’s path creation theory (Simmie, 2012).        
   Two of our farms experienced failed attempt of equity journey: One farm failed 
after 18 months while another had two consecutive failed equity attempts- one after three 
years and the other within 12 months. While entrepreneurial failure can either be 
beneficial (Cope, 2011) or harmful (Coad, 2014), our position in this research is that these 
failures are learning experiences for family farms in the entrepreneurial process 
(Verduyn, Caroline Essers, Olaison, & Meier Sørensen, 2014). Any failure that gives 
knowledge and professional pitch to entrepreneur can be labeled as a good failure 
(Verduyn et al., 2014). In our research, learning from failed equity attempts also gives the 
opportunity to evaluate. Following the evaluation concept of entrepreneurial learning 
(Corbett, 2005), we draw an interpretation that farms can assess their plan for off-farm 
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equity and may decide whether they can move forward or restructure their business, 
management, governance, and reporting structure.  
 The final step in our model is to get professionally ready, particularly within the 
domains of farms, which involves bringing some changes where family farms perceive 
that it is good for them to professionalise, before going ahead in off-farm equity journey. 
We relate these steps with the new path establishment process of new path creation theory 
(Simmie, 2012). To correctly reflect the professional readiness of family farms in this 
study, we regarded two issues: (1) preparation, and (2) transformation. These two issues 
can be related to the stage of the new path establishment’s process as explained by Simmie 
(2012). To Simmie (2012), this stage of new path creation is achieved through an 
“incremental” innovative change or by “radical breakthrough.” We relate our observation 
of incremental change to the actors following any of the following options: 
“displacement,” “layering” or “conversion” (Simmie, 2012). In new path creation theory 
(Simmie, 2012), displacement means gradually raising firms’ salient futures of 
benchmarking; layering indicates introducing new norms and practices with existing 
ones, and conversion refers to revising institutional practices.  
  In our study, we see the pattern of layering and conversion in preparation and 
transformation for external equity. Layering is found in a sense that each of the farms has 
newly developed their investment case, information memorandum, business plan, board 
structure, and reporting protocol. Conversion is evident in the sense that family farms 
appointed internal advisors, consulted with external advisors, and used the experiences of 
in-house talent to modify their family dominant structure into a professional set up. These 
initiatives of observed family farms were seemed to be different regarding pace and scope 
(Plowman et al., 2007; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). From our point of view, some of 
the main reasons for this difference in pace and scope among family farms was owing to 
their size, spending capacity and commitment, and individual preferences.  
   Changes in traditional farms’ practices and structures intended to convince off-
farm investors may provide direct and indirect benefits. Regarding direct benefits, our 
view is that family farms can access off-farm equity demonstrating farms’ “reliability and 
accountability” (Sydow et al., 2009) to investors. With regard to indirect benefits, family 
farms can develop purposive planning (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010), improve 
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environmental fitness (Greve, 2002), secure environmental alignment (Desai, 2010) and 
survive competitive threats (Sydow et al., 2009). Together, these transform their new 
financing path into a “higher degree of functionality” (Garud & Karnøe, 2003). 
7.3.  Path creation view and investment readiness in off-farm equity 
Cases presented in this study do not only illustrate how family farms navigate 
their new financing path of off-farm equity but also portrays the farms’ actions and 
commitment to investment readiness. Investment readiness refers to understating the 
investors’ concerns about entrepreneurs in accessing external equity financing and 
developing business plans; business models, market connections, management 
practices; governance arrangements; presentational strengths; and taking professional 
advice (Silver, Berggren, & Veghohn, 2010; Mason & Kwok, 2010; Mason & 
Harrison, 2004; Douglas & Shepherd, 2002). Family farms’ financial lock-in could be 
related to the theme “investment readiness program and access to finance” noted in 
Mason and Kwok (2010) and (Seet & Graves, 2010). These authors mentioned three 
main categories of barriers to accessing external equity for unquoted firms, family 
farms in this case. These barriers mainly reflect the equity seekers’ weaknesses as 
attributed to (1) equity aversion, (2) invest ability, and (3) presentational failure. 
Equity aversion manifests family farms’ negative attitude toward off-farm equity; 
investability indicates family farms’ poor fit with no or poor investment case; while 
presentational failure happens when family farms cannot generate sufficient 
documented information for investment proposals (Oakey, 2007; Howorth, Westhead, 
& Wright, 2004;  Mason & Harrison, 2002; Mason & Rogers, 1997; Harrison, Dibben,  
& Mason, 1997;  Hutchinson, 1995).  
Experiences in new financing path creation can help family farms to prepare 
themselves to become investment ready for off-farm investors. Every step in new 
financing path creation is unique and gives some lessons for investment readiness for 
family farms. In our study, we have compared the first two steps of path creation, 
responding to triggers, and searching alternatives, in Figure 1, with the equity aversion 
dimension of investment readiness (Mason & Kwok, 2010). Within the investment 
readiness process, recognition of triggers means that families express their aspiration 
to grow and to increase their scales with external equity. By searching for alternatives, 
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family farms remove their informational gaps about potential sources of external 
funds, investors’ characteristics, types, and professional advisors. Previous research 
has suggested that information seminars can be a suitable alternative to know about 
equity partners, types, debt limitations, intermediators, risk and return (Mason & 
Kwok, 2010). Self-audit of in our path creation model can be linked to the investability 
dimension of investment readiness. In this stage, family farms can identify their 
personal and business shortcomings because of which investment proposal may be 
rejected (Feeney, Haines Jr, & Riding, 1999). This step also helps family farms to 
understand what the external financiers’ requirement is (Mason & Kwok, 2010). 
Getting professionally ready, the final step of our path creation process can be related 
to the presentational failing dimensions of investment readiness (Mason & Kwok, 
2010). During this stage, family farms can develop their written documents, business 
plans, organizational structures, governance, and reporting structures, and appoint 
professional advisors. 
Earlier research has suggested some ways to develop investment readiness for 
external capital. Three essential steps suggested by Douglas and Shepherd (2002) are 
technology readiness, market readiness, and management readiness. In the context of 
path creation for alternative financing for family farms, a judgment of using 
investment readiness for funding is quite similar. Based on the analysis of findings and 
the conceptualization of new path creation and investment readiness, we have 
interrelated these two notions. In this research, we have shown that following the four 
steps of new path creation, family farms exposed to non-traditional financing modes 
are breaking their previous structural lock-in. Similarly, investment readiness prepares 
firms to access funds from external financiers bringing changes to firms’ attitudes, 
system, processes, and structures. In line with the sense-making concept of 
organizational change (Weick, 1995; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), we argue that actions 
taken by family farms in new path creation make sense for investment readiness.  
8. Implications, future research, and conclusion      
We like to present the academic and managerial implications of our study. From 
an academic perspective, firstly, this study advances the literature of family farms 
financing linking with the concept of institutional lock-in, financial lock-in, 
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organizational path dependence, and path creation. Our conceptualization of these 
terminologies could be used as frameworks in the future research of family farms’ 
financing. Second, our new financing path creation model of family farms would guide 
family farms’ researchers to identify:  the external and internal triggers to new 
financing strategies; the right models needed for the right farms; the steps involved in 
off-farm equity journeys and the professional tools needed in this process. Third, the 
evidence that we observed in the farms off-farm equity journeys might help theorists 
and academics to think about why it is problematic to keep family farms stuck to the 
same financing model over generations; why breaking out of familiar financing 
territory is a necessity; and how this breakout may happen. Finally, the three case 
studies have been conducted based on an interview with only one member of each farm 
without looking into any other secondary documents. Taking interviews with more 
individuals from the same farms as well as more farms and inspecting their secondary 
documents might reveal more interesting findings.  
From a practical perspective, this study provides some lessons for family farm 
owners. First, family farms can meet their capital needs, economies of scales, and 
growth potentials if they adopt a fluid form institutional arrangement (Schreyögg & 
Sydow, 2010) which might open the opportunity for alternative financing for family 
farms. Second, family farms might accept the idea that they can acquire the skill of 
“organizational ambidexterity” (Filippini, Güttel, & Nosella, 2012; Simsek, 2009; 
Benner & Tushman, 2003) to make them professional in initiating the new financing 
paths. Third, family farms would also be aware of the fact if they do not shift their 
traditional financing path in response to environmental turbulence, they may find 
themselves become “tired pioneers” (Berghoff & Möller, 1994) and “entrepreneurially 
lethargic” (Nicholas, 1999) because they might be locked in a complacent and 
conservative inherited tradition. Consequently, a “lackluster enterprise culture” 
(Nicholas, 1999) might emerge in family farms that may cause a downgrade to their 
overall economic growth (Chandler, Hikino, & Chandler, 2009; Fletcher, 1965). 
 Despite the contribution that we have described in section 7, our research has 
some limitations that attract a further research direction. Firstly, our findings were 
based on the interview only with the only one participant of each farm who was part 
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of the incumbent generation actively engaged in accessing off-farm equity. Interviews 
with one member of the current generation might not uncover all significant details of 
the story of financial path dependency and new financing path creation. Thus, 
interviews with the predecessor generation, interviews with other active farm members 
of the current generation, and analysing farms’ historical documentation would 
provide many insights into farms’ financial path dependency and path creation.   
 Secondly, all the farms interviewed were from the cattle industry. Our 
justification for taking cattle farms as a sample was that cattle industry is a capital 
intensive, which requires long-term patient capital, and off-farm equity capital is 
generally the most suitable mix of capital for meeting this long-term capital needs. The 
investigation into a more heterogeneous group of sample family farms also warrants 
research attention. Because, family farms are different regarding sizes, capacities, and 
capabilities to explore opportunities, mechanisms, objectives, and strategies, for 
passing through new financing paths, this may not be same and nor straightforward for 
all types of family farms. Thirdly, this study has used the concepts of lock-in (Arthur, 
1994), path creation process (Garud & Karnøe, 2001), and new path creation theory 
(Simmie, 2012) that were originally developed in case technology development. Even 
though, motivated by the work of (Sydow et al., 2009), we have given our own 
justification for using these concepts, but potential scholars could do more research on 
how to bring some adjustment to these concepts to better use them in the context of 
family farms, rather than readily use them in family farms’ context as they are. 
Furthermore, even though our study shed light on the changing of the historical 
financial path dependence and the creating of new financing paths, researchers should 
further explore what the specific roles of off-farm investors and intermediators are in 
the process of path creation because in path creation multiple agents are involved 
(Simmie, 2012). 
 Challenges to access to sufficient finance for family farms are a common 
phenomenon all over the globe. Off-farm equity capital has emerged as a ubiquitous 
alternative solution. Benefits of accessing off-farm equity seem to be remarkable to 
farms and investors. Off-farm equity may also entail different risks for family farms for 
a number of reasons from various sources as evidenced in the literature. However, the 
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scope of our study was not to fully explore the risks dimensions of off-farm equity in 
the Australian context. Despite this upside and downside of off-farm equity, systematic 
ways of accessing off-farm equity for family farms are notoriously challenging. This 
study gives researchers, farms, and practitioners a practical understanding of how family 
farms have taken to this challenge. This study explored two issues: the motives behind 
family farms change their traditional financing and how they create off-farm equity 
financing paths. Exploring motives for off-farm capital and the ways to access off-farm 
equity is of course very significant about solving family farms’ financing problems but 
represents a tip of the iceberg. Family farms may have the courage to go beyond their 
familiar territory to better handle the steps involved in new financing path creation 
process. Developing investment readiness skill through the new financing path creation 
process is undoubtedly a great learning experience for families in enhancing their 
suitability for this new financing path.  However, even before entering the process of 
creating a new financing path, family farms can master relevant investment readiness 
skills including professional orientations.  
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 Chapter Four: Paper Three  
Governance structure for family farms in the context of off-farm equity 
financing 
Abstract 
We explored governance structures for family farms wishing to access equity capital 
from off-farm investors. Interviews with family farm owners and farm investment 
advisors suggested three governance themes that family farms consider in the 
governance process: governance culture, governance alignment, and governance 
structure. Linking with institutional theory, we interpreted these themes as process 
phenomena and considered investors and advisors to be the normative background 
institution. The board structure and reporting practices appeared to vary based on 
investors’ heterogeneity and farms’ characteristics. Our study contributes to research 
on the finance, governance, and reporting of family farms.   
Keywords: Family farms, off-farm equity, governance, reporting, and institutional 
theory  
1. Introduction                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
This paper explores the governance processes and practices of private family 
farms in the context of off-farm equity investors.4 Family farms tend to access capital 
from traditional financing sources: internal (family) equity, debt and leasing capital 
(Dodson, 1994,1992; Scofield, 1972). Nonetheless, off-farm equity capital as defined in 
this study is “the capital derived from sources other than retained earnings or the internal 
capital of farms” (Wang et al., 2002), is not a new source of farm finance in many 
developed economies, such as New Zealand, the United States, and Canada (Painter, 
2010; Eves, 2005; James Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1988), and is in an emerging stage 
in Australia. Off-farm equity arrangements and possible economic models explaining 
the behaviors of farms and investors in relation to off-farm equity have been addressed 
                                       
4 For the purpose of this study, family farms are those farms in which family members hold 
the ownership of land and other assets, enjoy decision making freedom on operational 
aspects (van Vliet et al., 2015) and employ a small proportion of hired labor (Djurfeldt, 
1996; Errington & Gasson, 1994). 
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in the previous research (Collins & Bourn, 1986; Fiske et al., 1986; Lowenberg-DeBoer 
et al., 1988; Matthews & Harrington, 1986; Penson, 1977; Raup, 1986). Although the 
use of off-farm equity has a number of financial and operating benefits for farm 
businesses (Wang et al., 2002; Barry et al., 2000; Lowenberg-DeBoer et al.,1989; 
Collins, 1988; Fiske et al., 1986; Raup, 1986;) and for equity investors (Raup, 1986), 
family farms have not yet been able to fully explore this equity market for meeting their 
long-term capital needs (Collins & Bourn, 1986).  
Many studies have found high transaction costs, inflexible financing 
arrangements, and moral hazard problems between farms and investors and the peculiar 
organizational structure of farm businesses (Wang et al., 2002; Barry & Robison, 2001; 
Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989) to be significant barriers to the external equity market. 
Evidence also suggests that the poor institutional set-up for uniting the interests of farms 
and equity investors (Dodson, 1994,1992), complex business arrangements (Johnson et 
al., 2009), and diverse governance challenges (Calus & Van Huylenbroeck, 2005) are 
the main barriers to external equity in farm businesses. Motivated by these challenges 
to the external equity market, we conducted semi-structured interviews with farm 
owners and farm investment advisors to explore institutionalized governance 
mechanisms for family farms wishing to access external equity. 
Family businesses have become a dominant economic player in most countries 
around the world (Zahra & Sharma, 2004; Shanker & Astrachan, 1996). Since the outset 
of the 21st century, researchers have identified corporate governance as a significant 
theme in family business research (Debicki, Matherne, Kellermanns, & Chrisman, 
2009). Although prior research has provided a wealth of insights about family business 
governance mechanisms, most studies focus on public family businesses. Very little 
attention has been paid to the governance structure of private family farms, a less 
researched branch of family businesses (Glover & Reay, 2015), which might legitimize 
the farm businesses to outside investors to access equity capital. In this article, we are 
particularly concerned with governance structures that ensure off-farm equity 
partnerships for private family farms with off-farm investors, including institutional, 
corporate and individual investors. We propose the following main research question: 
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Which institutionalized governance structure can facilitate off-farm equity capital for 
private family farms?   
Researchers in farm and agricultural finance have criticized traditional financing 
mixes of internal equity, debt, and leasing as inefficient. They argue that excessive 
reliance on these forms of capital may force farms into more financial risks (Kalecki, 
1937) and liquidity risks (Fiske et al., 1986).  Others (Barry & Robison, 1986, 2001; 
Allen & Lueck, 1998) claim that the idiosyncratic attributes of farms, natural and 
biological shocks to the output of farms, and the production cycle hamper the 
effectiveness of traditional financing. Therefore, since the 1980s, equity capital from 
off-farm investors has received academic attention as an alternative source of capital in 
the capital structure mix of farms (Barry & Robison, 2001; Collins & Bourn, 1986; Fiske 
et al., 1986; Lowenberg-DeBoer, 1989; Wang et al., 2002). 
Agricultural finance researchers have highlighted the lack of a proper 
conceptualization and research framework in off-farm equity in the farming industry 
(Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989; Mondelli, 2011). Agricultural commentators, 
independent farm finance experts, and the grey literature on farms and agriculture have 
also stressed the importance of the family farm governance structure for accessing 
equity capital from off-farm investors. However, there may be at least three reasons why 
researchers have focused less on the private family farms’ governance structure for 
developing equity partnerships with off-farm investors. First, they may believe that 
family farms are not interested in taking capital from off-farm equity investors because 
this trend of accessing capital may degrade their emotional ownership and sense of 
belonging (Björnberg & Nicholson, 2012). Second, the challenges in obtaining accurate 
sources of data about the financial, business and management structure of family farms 
may demotivate scholars to undertake this type of research. Third, because family farms 
are synonymous with small farms (Collier & Dercon, 2014) and struggle to find 
successors (Wheeler, Bjornlund, Zuo, & Edwards, 2012; White, 2012;  Mishra, El-Osta, 
& Johnson, 2004), researchers may believe that family farms have little significance in 
the economy and may gradually be cannibalized by their corporate rivals.  
As family businesses are an important economic institution and an emerging 
institutional field (Sharma et al., 2014; Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 
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2012; Melin & Nordqvist, 2007), these businesses can adopt a set of governance 
structures, practices and procedures, like every other institution (Nordqvist, Sharma, & 
Chirico, 2014). Family farms, as a branch of family businesses, is no exception. In line 
with the literature (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004; Lansberg, 1999), and for this 
study, we have defined institutionalized governance structures as the practices and 
procedures that satisfy the internal and external stakeholders of the family farm business. 
More specifically, we focus on the governance process, board and reporting aspects of 
the family farm business. In turn, family business scholars have found that this form of 
business involves two domains of corporate governance: family governance and business 
governance (Neubauer & Lank, 1998; Klein, 2009; Gallo & Kenyon-Rouvinez, 2005; 
Mustakallio, Autio, & Zahra, 2002; Aronoff & Ward, 1996; Donnelley, 1988; Gersick, 
1997). According to these studies, the main corporate governance components of family 
businesses are the family council, the shareholder meeting, the top management team and 
the board of directors. 
Some other scholars (Minichilli, Zattoni, & Zona, 2009; Corbetta & Salvato, 
2004) have raised questions about the effectiveness of these governance components in 
family businesses due to a high degree of heterogeneity in family businesses. 
Consequently, other researchers have coined the idea of the configurational corporate 
governance approach for family businesses based on family involvement in ownership 
and management, the ownership and individual context, generational life cycles, firm 
complexity, and governance task specification (Nordqvist et al., 2014; Chua, Chrisman, 
Steier, & Rau, 2012; Chen & Nowland, 2010; Bettermann & Heneric, 2009; Klein, 
2009, 2008). Despite these scholarly developments in family business governance 
literature, governance components and reporting practices in a purely family farm 
context are still missing in the broader family business research.   
The tie between firms’ ability to access external financing - debt as well as equity 
capital - and corporate governance is well established in the academic literature 
(Mande, Park & Son 2012; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, Williamson, 1988) from different 
theoretical standpoints. An agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) perspective 
defines corporate governance as the “ways in which suppliers of finance to corporation 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
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While the asset specificity theory (transaction cost economics perspective) articulates 
the corporate governance structure based on external finances- debt or equity- firms 
intend to use and the nature of assets they belong to. Firms may get benefit using debt 
governance, also known as a simple governance model if they hold more redeployable 
assets while equity governance, also known as a complex governance model, is 
suitable for projects with non-redeploy able assets (Williamson, 1988).  
Adapting good corporate governance practices by firms generates benefits to 
equity users (firms),  equity suppliers (investors) and the financial market as whole, in 
a number of ways (Mande, Park & Son 2012;Beck & Levine, 2008; Dittmar & Mahrt-
Smith, 2007; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000) 
i. firms raise more equity capital from domestic and foreign sources;  
ii. firms can increase their value of firms through efficient investment decisions 
as corporate governance create a commitment to select the right project ; 
iii. firms can use external capital more efficiently, thus, reduces the overall cost 
of capital 
iv. safeguards external investors’ investment from the potential risks of 
expropriation through legal protection 
v. reduces the information asymmetry and searching cost for investors through a 
high-quality reporting system  
vi. it promotes overall market confidence of a financial market which facilitates 
long-term capital inflow to firms in an economy from different sources  
 
Most of the extant literature in corporate governance mainly focused on 
traditional listed firms’ equity financing. Corporate governance research needs to 
extend to the area of family farms to mitigate the long-term equity capital shortage. Our 
research aimed to explore how family farms develop an institutional framework and the 
governance practices that family farms adopt throughout the governance process if they 
wish to establish an equity partnership with off-farm investors. In particular, using 
qualitative we explored the governance process and practices of private family farms in 
the context of off-farm equity investors. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 
farms that had either secured off-farm equity capital or were on the pathway to the 
equity process and with investment advisors engaged in the off-farm equity capital 
process in the Australian family farm industry. An inductive thematic analysis of the 
data has provided us with three governance themes and eight associated subthemes that 
family farms might consider in the off-farm equity accessing process. We visualize and 
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explain all themes from the processual view of governance, following the 
institutionalization process of Tolbert and Zucker (1999) (Figure 1). Our study 
contributes to research on family business governance, farm and agricultural finance; 
and family farms literature. 
2. Family farm governance: Evolving dimension 
Historically, family farms were characterized as self-sufficient regarding land, 
labor and highly contorted governance structure in terms of decisions making, 
ownership and management (Errington & Gasson 1994). Family farm’s needs, such as 
alternative means for living, seasonal shocks, uneven productions cycles of farms, and 
urgency for more capital for capital-intensive technology, challenged the self-
sufficiency of family farms (Errington & Gasson 1994). Consequently, an 
“individualization” approach of family farm governance style gained momentum due 
to sociological changes (Benito 2002; Alegre 1997).  Structural changes in the farming 
industry put pressure on family farms to migrate to the world of modernisation from 
individuation paradigm due to farms’ reliance on paid outside workforces (Cahuzac & 
Détang-Dessendre 2011; Laurent 2013). Family farms adapted a more complex form 
of “organizational and governance structure” (Moreno-Pérez et al. 2011) due to 
structural pressure,  large off-farm labour demand (Benito 2002), and ample amount 
of capital penetration in agriculture. This change in the farm and agriculture industry 
pushed the family farms to adopt extended family farms model (Moreno-Pérez et al. 
2011) which is typically  “multifunctional” in nature, and beyond the conventional 
farming style (Lobley & Potter 2004; Renting et al. 2009). Multifamily farms and or 
partnership style of farms became into existence in British 
(Marsden,Minton,Whatmore,& Little,1989)  in Australia (Pritchard et al. 2007)  in the 
US (Allen & Harris 2005), in Canada (Bollman 2005; Machum 2005), in Belgium 
(Calus & Van Huylenbroeck 2005), and in Netherland ( van der Veen & van Bommel 
2005). 
Following this extended version, family farms governance structure got multiple 
variations in different economic settings. Scholars termed it as neither family nor 
corporate (A Australian model) (Pritchard et al. 2007), hybrid management structure 
(a Canadian model) (Magnan 2012), and entrepreneurial governance set up ( a French 
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Model) (Mundler & Rémy 2012). Another research (Tauer, 2014) in the US proposed 
two more family farm governance model: parent-child partnership model and sole 
proprietorship model. Of these two, the parent partnership farm governance model is 
more efficient than that of sole proprietorship due to professional work segmentation 
and sound management relation among the partners. Another recent study in French 
portrayed that multifamily farms show the corporate style of management, but it wants 
to keep the business in the hands of the family through the family foundation (Moreno-
Pérez, 2015; Moreno-Pérez & Lobley, 2015). In structure, family farms want to make 
sure of three things at the farm level (Moreno-Pérez, 2015, Moreno-Pérez & Lobley, 
2015): (1) partial contribution of capital and labour by the family itself, (2) family 
oriented farm management; and (3) the intention to keep family legacy farms. 
Changes in farm size is another obvious consequence of structural changes in the 
farming industry and so is in farm governance model.  Large farms gradually became 
dominant in the farming industry(Ahearn et al. 2009) and cannibalized the existence 
of small farms (Blandford & Hill 2006). Larger farms have transaction cost efficiency 
due to competitive edges in market knowledge, technical knowledge, input price, 
finance and capital (Poulton et al. 2010). While small scales farms have transactions 
cost efficiency regarding labour supervision, local knowledge and food purchase and 
risks (Poulton et al. 2010).  
To summarise, we hold that view that the classical model of farm governance has 
become outdated due to structural transformation in family farms (Lobley & Potter 
2004; Brookfield & Parsons 2007; Moreno-Pérez & Lobley, 2015; Moreno-Pérez, 
2015). Some different variants of family farm models as discussed above are Sole 
trader ship model, parent-child partnership model, entrepreneurship model, purely 
corporate model and holdings (involving same households but different stakeholders. 
The inclusion of different stakeholders (farms and investors) in the farm's governance 
structure will, of course, raise the debate of asymmetric participations of capital, 
control, labour and decision making (Moreno-Pérez & Lobley, 2015; Moreno-Pérez, 
2015).  This weakness of farm governance models created the needs for new farm 
governance style which has not been explored yet by the scholars (Moreno-Pérez & 
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Lobley, 2015; Moreno-Pérez, 2015). This research intends to explore what farm 
governance framework will look like if external equity investors are taken as an equity 
capital partner. 
3. Empirical settings and theoretical underpinnings 
The Australian family farming industry is an interesting setting for this study for a 
number of reasons. First, the right mix of financing for Australian farms and the 
agribusinesses industry is currently at risk. Over the past 100 years, the traditional bank-
based financing model has become inefficient in meeting the growth and working capital 
needs of the farming industry due to the complex structural changes in the industry 
(Heath, & Tomlinson, 2016; Australian Farm Institute (AFI), 2014; National Farmers’ 
Federation (NFF), 2014; Australian and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ), 2012. 
Second, currently, approximately 95% of all farms in Australia are family dominant, and 
they still lack transparent management, information infrastructure, and mature financial 
governance (ANZ, 2014; Commonwealth of Australia, 2014; 2013) Third, Australia has 
a global presence in the farm and agricultural industry, holding 9% of the total global 
share (Lowder, Skoet, & Raney, 2016). 
Although this paper considers evidence from Australia, its findings have global 
relevance across family farming and agricultural domains where this industry needs to 
secure off-farm equity from external investors and must respond to external investors’ 
demands to adapt governance and reporting initiatives, especially in an environment in 
which government to a larger extent does not intervene (Pritchard, Burch, & Lawrence, 
2007; Gray & Lawrence, 2001). In addition, the existence of a larger set (90% of farms) 
of family-dominant farms around the world (Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), 2014)) and the dominance of family farms over a larger proportion 
(70-80%) of farmland (FAO, 2014) around the globe signifies the global implications of 
this research. 
Theory selection process of this paper was inductive (Thomas, 2006; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). Governance themes developed from this research is indicative of the fact 
that farms wishing to access off-farm equity require to adopt governance practices, 
formal/ informal. The interpretive line of argument from these findings is that off-farm 
investors,  as a resource (equity capital in this case)  providing stakeholders,  as well as 
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professional advisors possibly want to see family farms as a “legitimate unit of 
organization” (Meyer & Rowan 1977 ; Benson,1975) before they go for accessing off-farm 
equity. This perspective of this data resembles with institutional theory. 
The institutional theory explains how and why an organisation adopts some 
distinct process, strategies, schemas, and outlooks derived from social interaction and the 
environment where the organization operates (Selznick 1996). The main crux of the 
institutional theory is to develop organizational norms and practices and to clarify the 
isomorphic institutional pressures of environmental actors and actions behind these 
norms and practices (Kondra & Hinings 1998),  even though scholars differ on many 
variants of institutional theory (Scott 1987; DiMaggio 1988; DiMaggio 1991). By taking 
an attempt to adopt special characters, to achieve distinct skills, and to get training and 
competencies, an organisation becomes institutionalised (Selznick 2011). 
Institutionalisation is a fair process that can be referred to as "the emergence of orderly, 
stable, socially integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely organized, or narrowly 
technical activities” (Broom & Sociology 1955).  Family businesses have also now 
widely been accepted as a separate orgnisational unit  (Sharma et al. 2014)  due to 
significantly considering this field by a specific set of interested institutions and 
individuals including professionals, academics, and researchers (Melin & Nordqvist 
2007). 
Our research fits with the institutional theoretical framework in three dimensions 
(see detailed discussion in Section 6): first, in line with institutionalists (Dimaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Selznick, 1996; Broom & Sociology, 1955), our participants also argued 
that family farms could adopt some formal and informal norms and practices prior to 
seeking off-farm equity capital. Second, we identified three farm governance themes in 
our findings from a sequential process of institutionalization, following the institutional 
framework of Tolbert and Zucker (1999). Third, according to new institutional theory 
(Selznick, 1996), we treated off-farm investors and farm investment advisors as new 
sources of normative institutional isomorphism (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983) who exert 
indirect normative pressures on family farms, insisting that farms adopt governance 
practices to ensure the farms’ legitimacy (Larson, 2017; Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Collins, 1979) as institutions. 
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4. Research methods 
4.1.Study participants and data collection  
We explored the perspectives of two major parties engaged in off-farm equity 
transactions in the family farm industry: family farms and farm investment advisors. We 
designated these two groups as two separate panels: Panel A (farm investment advisors) 
and Panel B (family farm owners). These two separate sets of interviewees enabled us to 
triangulate our research findings and to cross-check the opinions of both groups to 
determine any substantial discrepancies among the participants (Denzin, 1978). Farm 
investment advisors are in a good position to provide relevant data on investors’ position. 
Also, farms investment advisors can provide an alternative perspective on farming 
families and play a significant role in educating and bringing the two parties (farms and 
investors) together.  
Panel A: Farm industry advisors. This panel included 14 investment advisors from 
the Australian farming industry who have been successful and have a consistent track 
record in advising off-farm investors; family farms and the agribusiness industry for the 
last 10-20 years. This panel included four specialist agricultural investment advisors, 
three agricultural specialists from accounting or consulting firms, three farm 
management group advisors, one agribusiness banker, two agricultural fund managers 
and one finance manager of a business involved in supply chain investment. This sample 
consisting of a diversified group of advisors who were working on the ground 
authenticated our findings from multiple perspectives. 
Panel B: Family farms. This panel included 4 family farms from Australia. Of 
these 4 family farms, 2 had already received equity capital from off-farm investors, 
and the other 2 were about to obtain off-farm equity. These farms represented either at 
4th- or 3rd-generation and are of different sizes.  
To ensure quality participants for our study, we requested that our interviewees 
refer or introduced us to some of the best subsequent participants, according to the 
snowball sampling (Patton, 1990). Proceeding in this manner, we constructed a chain of 
4 farms and 14 farms investment advisors working in the Australian farming industry 
and interviewed them one-on-one. We have not further extended our participants’ chain 
because we agreed that the ideas and experiences shared by the interviewed participants 
  
  
 
   185 
 
became almost theoretically saturated (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), given that no new ideas 
were emerging.  For the convenience of our participants, we conducted nine face-to-face 
interviews (6 with farm advisors and 3 with farms) and seven telephone interviews (6 
with farm advisors and 1 with a farm). We recorded and transcribed approximately 1070 
minutes of interviews (793 minutes of interviews with farm advisors and 277 minutes 
with farms), which varied from 107 minutes to 25 minutes but averaging 62 minutes. 
We started our interview with some descriptive questions (Taylor, Bogdan, & 
DeVault, 2015; Kvale, 1996) and opinion questions (Patton, 2002) to understand the 
experiences and opinions of our participants about farm financing and governance. 
Throughout the interviews, once we wanted to clarify the meaning of any primary 
response by our participants (Stewart, 2002), we produced some probing questions 
(Minichiello, Aroni, & Hays, 2008) and applied a reflective probing strategy (Minichiello 
et al., 2008) on the primary question to double check our understanding. Our interview 
was semi-structured and in-depth in the sense that we continued our interview discussion 
by producing some interpretative prompts for uncovering the realities and truths behind 
our respondents’ experiences, given that we intended to construct meaning out of these 
experiences, without sacrificing the analytical meaning (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002) of 
what our participants referred to. At the beginning of this study, one of the authors 
attained formal ethical permission from his/her university to conduct the interview. 
Another author used his/her personal and professional network in the negotiation process 
of accessing the interviewees. All names of the participants and their locational identities 
have been disguised to maintain confidentiality.   
4.2. Data analysis 
The focus of our study is to explore suitable governance structures for farm family 
businesses in Australia from the perspectives of family farm investment advisors and 
farms. Being more diverse than their non-family business counterparts (Nordqvist, Hall, 
& Melin, 2009) and being highly heterogeneous in themselves (Melin & Nordqvist, 
2007), we applied an in-depth interview approach to gain more profound insights and to 
capture the complex and dynamic organizational reality of family businesses (Nordqvist 
et al., 2009; Sharma, 2004). Following the interpretative approach in which 
understanding something means seeing something (Denzin, 2001), we used a naturalistic 
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abduction view (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009; Suddaby, 2006) to situate our empirical 
position. We were inductive throughout every stage of our data analysis, given that we 
interacted with the data back and forth to obtain the embedded meaning (Glaser & 
Strauss, 2009) of categories, patterns, and themes (Patton, 1990).  
Our data analysis techniques to find the themes fell under the six-phase framework 
prescribed by Braun and Clarke (2006), which is very close to the framework suggested 
by Marshall and Rossman (2014). In the first phase, we read the data repeatedly and 
thoroughly to familiarize ourselves with them. Second, we generated initial codes by 
being very open to the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and used in vivo coding (Ryan & 
Bernard, 2003) to understand the meaning of the data in the participants’ language. Third, 
we attempted to categorize the initial codes to generate potential themes. In this phase, 
we refined the initial categories and themes into inductive categories and themes through 
sensitizing concepts (Bulmer, 1979) and started to be more analytical by ideally 
classifying categories and themes (Patton, 1999).  In doing so, we did not force the data 
to fit into a category or theme of our choice but, rather, portrayed a better picture of our 
participants’ opinions cohesively by protecting their originality. During the fourth stage 
of reviewing the themes, we checked extracts under each theme and category to confirm 
that the themes were internally homogeneous (Patton, 1990) and determined that the 
selected themes be distinctive to ensure the external heterogenetic nature of the themes 
(Patton, 1990) Fifth, we revised the names and numbers of the themes, and finally, we 
produced the report of our data.  
The interviews covered specific areas: the limitations of current farm financing 
models; the benefits of off-farm equity in farm businesses; the sources of off-farm equity; 
different equity structures; farms’ preferences for off-farm equity providers; off-farm 
equity providers’ preferences for farm businesses; governance requirements for family 
farms; family farms’ management requirements; family farms’ reporting issues; family 
farms’ decision-making process; family farms’ ownership and control issues; exit issues 
for family farms; and external investors’ say about all of these issues. Only some 
selective segments of the interview data related to off-farm equity investment model, 
farm governance, boards, reporting, and conflicts have been visited and revisited back 
and forth both manually and automatically to collate the related codes in separate nodes, 
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concept maps, mind maps, and spreadsheets. In this paper, we wanted to explore the 
governance and reporting issues that may motivate external investors to invest equity 
capital in family farms. We coded the transcripts using the splitting and lumping coding 
technique via a text management and analysis software, NVivo Pro 11. For a more 
accurate coding outcome produced in NVivo 11, we generated another automatic concept 
(code) sheet by using another text analysis software, Leximancer, 4. The researchers sat 
together to reach an understanding and to make sense of shared and contrasting themes 
and patterns in the data.  
5. Findings 
The study aimed to explore institutionalised governance structures for family 
farms to construct partnerships with off-farm investors. More specifically, as part of 
the institutionalised governance structure, we wanted to understand the governance 
process, the board and the reporting practices for family farms to access equity capital 
from external investors. An inductive thematic analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews with farms and farm investment advisors identified three governance 
themes with associated sub-themes: governance culture, governance alignment, and 
governance structure that family farms adopt in the off-farm equity capital accessing 
process. There were some variations and overlaps in the participants’ responses 
regarding governance processes and practices of family farms. We selected three 
themes and the related sub-themes that were dominant in the discussions and were in 
line with the research question of this paper.  In the following section, we detail each 
of the three themes and their subthemes with supporting quotes. 
5.1.Theme one: The governance culture 
overall, most of the participants of two panels talked about the governance culture 
as one of the key areas that family farms can address before adopting any formal or 
informal governance structure. From our participants’ views, we incorporated three 
relevant issues under this theme: getting ready to change, developing business 
capabilities and engaging with professional advisors, to develop a governance culture 
at the farm level. We discuss these sub-themes of theme one in the following section. 
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5.1.1. Ready to change 
 Family farms wishing to access off-farm equity capital may show a serious 
commitment to change their traditional family business model. Almost all participants 
felt that most Australian family farms were emotionally attached to their farms and 
that their business and family transactions were intertwined. The participants 
consistently considered that family farms might change their current trajectories, have 
a positive mindset and open attitude and be transparent in each of their transactions if 
they wanted to access off-farm equity capital. For example, one participant noted: “You 
have to strip all that family bias out of it and take it back to a more clinical, [and need 
to show] here is the balance sheet; here is the profit and loss A/c; here is what we 
think; and here is how we consider it” (Panel A). Other interviewees also said that the 
best family farms, which had already been successful in obtaining off-farm equity 
converted their family style of business into a business paradigm: “the best farming 
operations in Australia are the corporate families – the big families who already take 
the emotion out” (Panel A). Another successful farm noted it changed its mindset once 
it had decided to obtain equity capital: “we just want to forget about it (family emotion) 
and go back to what we do, and we decided at that stage we were going to proceed” 
(Panel B). 
5.1.2.  Capability and communication 
 In creating a governance culture, family farms also can enhance their business 
capability and improve communication with potential equity investors. The 
participants argued that constructing reliable evidence for the business case of the 
farms’ project might ensure their capability among the investment community, given 
that investors do not rely on any blind project idea.  For instance, one of the participants 
noted: “Farms need to be able to demonstrate their track record rather than say: ‘I 
am a good operator’” (Panel A). Additionally, developing constant communication, 
either formal or informal, with potential equity investors can transmit farms’ intentions 
and passion for governance. One of the participants suggested: “At least once a year 
sit down and literally have an entire strategic day about where you are going, what 
next year is, what your budgets look like, how are we on track, how are we going to 
deploy capital, are we changing our commodity strategy” (Panel A). This 
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communication helps educate investors regarding family farms’ business and 
strategies. 
5.1.3.  Engaging professional advisors 
 During the change and capability development process for farm governance, 
family farms generally prepare some documents and ensure some benchmarking 
governance elements. We found a list of documents in our data that family farms may 
prepare for the equity accessing journey: the business plan, financial reporting, 
forecasting, the information memorandum, the board structure, ownership, and the 
control mechanism and exit plan. Most farms find it challenging to prepare these 
documents due to their financial illiteracy. To that end, farms need to employ 
professional advisors, either external or internal, to develop their knowledge and skills. 
Regarding external advisors, one participant noted: “They [farms] must acknowledge 
the professional advisors as aid and should ask for [their] help where their [farms’] 
capabilities stop” (Panel A). Moreover, external investors also wanted sound 
managers outside of family farms to ensure their fair share in the equity deal: “They 
[investors] were happy for an external company to be the actual manager of the 
project” (panel A). Another participant argued that internal advisors could help farms 
prepare basic documentation, such as the information memorandum, whereas external 
corporate advisors helped authenticate it: “We have always used an internal advisory 
in our business. With his help, we established our information memorandum. We took 
that to the corporate advisory market” (Panel B). 
 In summary, the interview participants in both panels seemed to suggest that 
all family farms are wishing to access off-farm equity capital m self-determination for 
change, increase their skills and take advice from farm advisors. This transformation 
creates a positive image in the market for family farms and prepares family farms for 
the next stages of governance. 
5.2.Theme Two:  The governance alignment 
The interview participants were nearly unanimous on the importance of 
aligning the underlying issues of farms’ governance structure. Their opinions revolved 
around identifying the confronting governance issues that may emerge from the 
disparity between family farms’ and equity investors’ expectations equity deals. The 
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data also suggested that goal disparity arises from the future goal directions, the 
dynamics of equity models and the nature of family farms. During the alignment stage, 
the governance foundation is laid to determine the future governance direction of farms 
and to avoid any potential disputes that may arise at any stage of the equity deal. The 
interviewees indicated that family farms tend to tackle three important issues at this 
stage: documentation, equity arrangements and investor types, and control as well as 
conflict. 
5.2.1. Documentation   
The family farm governance framework for off-farm equity is expected to have a 
clear form of direction and role clarity at the very beginning through proper 
documentation. Participants emphasized that it is important to determine upfront the 
challenging issues among farms’ key stakeholders for the smooth functioning of the 
governance framework. The data also indicated that the participants in both panels 
considered the shareholder agreement to be one of the key documents to prepare 
upfront to clarify the different aspects of farms’ governance. Thus, the shareholder 
agreement could be in place well ahead of governance journey. One of the participants 
noted: “---and set up in a shareholders’ agreement, so everyone is clear about what, 
what his or her respective roles are” (Panel A). Analysis of the interviews (Panel: A) 
showed up the following elements of the shareholder agreement:  the strategic plan, 
the board rules, the foundation for the board, the decision-making boundary, the voting 
mechanism, the reporting contents and frequency, the asset buying and selling strategy, 
human resource policies, ownership, shareholder rights, control and conflict, 
contingency events, and exit options. 
 One of the significant benefits of having a shareholder agreement, as part of 
governance, that was noted by the participants was to avoid any future conflicts. The 
participants from panel B were also unanimous in fixing future issues by constructing 
documents such as the shareholder agreement. One of the successful farms of this 
group noted other documents that it felt important: the security holder agreement, 
subscription agreements, the executive employment contract, the land sales contract, 
a delegation of authority, limitations of authority, and distribution deeds, to satisfy 
equity partners. 
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5.2.2. Equity arrangements and investor types 
In addition to documenting underlying governance matters, family farms can 
gather knowledge regarding the equity suppliers and related equity arrangements to 
design a better governance structure. For the participants, knowing the equity 
arrangements meant knowing different issues: “the equity structure, equity investors’ 
sources, equity sizes, the duration to wait or to exit in the investment, risk and return 
preferences and underlying assets.” The participants were unanimous in the view that 
the equity arrangements in the Australian family farm industry differed mainly from 
three sources: “the equity structure, equity sizes, and equity sources.” For example, 
one of the participants noted: “I guess each investor is a little bit different” (Panel A). 
According to the participants in Panel A, the different types of off-farm equity models 
that are currently used in the Australian off-farm equity market include: “Co-
investment, the joint venture, the equity partnership, sales, and leaseback, own operate, 
offtake equity and passive equity.” The analysis of the interviews indicated that every 
model was unique in its characteristics and required a separate governance structure. 
Farms tend to take the model that fits their choices and brings the necessary elements 
into their governance framework.   
We found that the co-investment model was one of the emerging equity models 
in which farms and investors co-own the farm, ensuring the ownership skin for both 
parties. One of the interviewees noted: “Co-investment structure gives you (farming 
families) an ability to create a ring fence type of structure where farming families do 
not need to sell everything up to unwind it and the investor can own some of the assets 
and participate on their own or can have capital gain and 100% of the benefit of the 
gain of those assets” (Panel A). However, there was an opinion in the interviews that 
no equity model can be treated as the best or the worst because the “Their [investors] 
requirements are different, so if an investor A might be in, say, a leaseback, investor 
B might be in a direct own and operate, and it’s not to say that any is better or worse” 
(Panel A). Among the participants in panel B, we found a mixture of preferences for 
the equity model. For example, one farm preferred a 50-50 joint venture model; 
another farm opted for a 50-50 equity partnership, a third intended to pursue a passive 
equity contract, whereas another farm liked the off-take equity agreement. One 
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participant shared: “Our preference would be to attract an investor who can deliver 
something in addition to cash such as a large breeding program, someone who 
requires considerable off-take and can open up distribution networks for us” (Panel 
B). 
 Equity investors’ sources also matter in upfront governance issues because the 
investors’ country of origin determines the level of sophistication of farms’ governance 
requirements. The interviewees expressed different experiences about the sophistication 
level of various investors originating from various parts of the world.  In the interviews, 
we found that investors, institutional investors, in particular, from North America, 
Canada, and the US, and European investors were highly sophisticated because they 
ensure due diligence and, accordingly, want good governance practices at the farm level. 
One interviewee noted: “US institutions or Swiss institutions show a more professional 
approach to investment” (Panel A). In turn, another interviewee said that Asian 
investors (China and Singapore) were believed to be short-term oriented and less 
sophisticated, “You would say that Asian investors, as a rule, are not as sophisticated 
as the other investors” (Panel A).  
 The analysis of the data also informed us about different types of investors in 
Australian family farming: institutional, corporate, private equity, fund managers, and 
high-net-worth individual investors. In the data, we further observed that, of these 
investors, institutional investors intended to invest a large volume of capital for a 
longer period to maximize their return and to diversify their portfolio. One interviewee 
from Panel A noted:  “The reality is that for most of us at the institutional level, for it 
to be attractive enough, they (farms) have to be actually very large numbers as they 
[institutional investors] look for a scale of $80-$150 million and these guys are talking 
30- to 40-year investment time horizons, as well, so they understand long-term 
agricultural trends, they are investing in agricultural assets globally and that is 
actually good, patient capital” (Panel A). In contrast, most participants in panel B 
wished to engage with an off-farm equity partner to access a larger amount of capital 
to enhance their scale, “[the] only real way to raise a significant amount of additional 
capital was through a capital (institutional) raise type arrangement” (Panel B).  
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5.2.3. Control and conflicts 
 In addition to appraising equity arrangements and investor types, farms and 
investors may align their controlling and conflicting expectations of the off-farm 
equity deal. In the data, we observed that farms preferred two types of control: 
traditional control and win-win control.  Two of the farm participants (Panel B) argued 
in favor of keeping very traditional, meaning that all types of control would be 
completely under the family farm. Family farms were ready to take a small scale of 
off-farm equity capital to avoid giving total control to equity providers “One thing 
that's important to us [farm] is not handing over, not wanting to issue too much equity 
so that we then lose control over our operations.  So, clearly, our operations, it is 
worth a certain amount of money. We do not want to go off and buy, have someone 
give us one hundred million dollars to go on and buy a series of assets that means that 
we become a minority shareholder in something that we do not control” (Panel B). 
 On the other hand, another two farm participants (Panel B) wanted a balanced 
position in controlling aspects of the farm business. Their views suggested that it is 
necessary to sacrifice a fair share of their farms’ control to motivate equity investors 
to come to equity terms, “If we [farms] go in and put money into this company and 
then we just take all the control out of the company and take all the control for 
ourselves, then we are not going to engage our partner”.  
 Having addressed the controlling aspects, farms and investors can work on 
aligning those issues for which there might be conflict in the equity deal. The 
participants noted some farm-specific factors, such as the possible exit plan of farms, 
farms’ expected period of the off-farm equity deal and the farms’ generational conflict 
as potential factors of conflicts. If farms embrace external capital for a quick exit from 
the business forever by selling the business, then ownership does not matter to the 
farm, “It depends, there are some who want to exit” (Panel A). On the other hand, if 
farms want to stay in business, structuring the ownership structure has real 
significance, “But if they want to stay, yes, then there are situations where they want 
to keep the ownership of it, and that is how they structure[it] in a shareholding 
agreement. So, it actually depends on the issue” (Panel A). Appendix 5 represents 
more quotes on control and conflict aspects of governance. 
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 One of the participants noted that the farm’s generational conflict shapes the 
farm ownership structure if the off-farm equity is taken for a longer period. The next 
generation may not come to the same opinion as the current generation, or it will 
replace the current generation, “If you are talking about a 35-year investment horizon, 
you could be talking about one-and-a-half generations of custodians running that 
asset, and often, it is difficult to obtain that alignment between one generation and the 
next generation within the family” (Panel A). However, we found no unique 
preferences for control and conflicts. According to our data, the controlling and 
conflicts resolution is actually determined mainly on a deal-to-deal basis because 
farms are very diverse: “I think we are talking about 350-odd-thousand family farming 
operations, and everybody is so completely different” (Panel A).  
5.3.Theme three: Board and reporting practices 
The third governance theme that we identified was shaping the governance 
structure with suitable board elements and reporting strategies. This theme 
encompassed the participants’ perceptions of the family farms’ governance shape 
within their formal and informal board. Reporting transparent financial and non-
financial farm information to external investors was identified as another aspect of this 
theme. The participants’ views regarding these two elements are described below.  
5.3.1. Board formalization and flexibility 
 One pattern on the board of farms was that large family farms might construct 
a formal board with diversified and skilled members while they prepared to obtain 
capital from large and scaled external institutional or corporate equity investors: “We 
often see the board-type creation where you have institutional or large sophisticated 
investment participants” (Panel A). These investors preferred a formal board structure 
because they were highly disciplined and practiced internal due diligence mechanisms; 
one of the participants felt: “More and more institutions are looking to bring that 
management in-house” (Panel A). 
The participants also suggested the membership criteria of directors and other 
members of the formal board. For example, three participants (Panel A) mentioned to 
include independent directors on the board along with the CEO and the CFO, “A 
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formal Board with independent directors with the accounts audited, it has got a CEO, 
a CFO.” Interestingly, another participant (Panel A) expressed concern regarding the 
tempo and integrity of board independence in Australian family farms, “there is one 
family in five years that I have come across where they actually already have a board 
in place that’s two independent directors, although I do sort of question the 
independence in my own mind” (Panel A). However, there was also, in a limited 
number of case, a sense of flexibility in the board structure for institutional and 
corporate investors. As one advisor put it, “with the large institutional investors, they 
are always going to want that board (formal) structure; its flexibility will depend on 
the size of the agricultural project and the intensity of it” (Panel A). 
 In contrast to the formal board, the other pattern around board structure 
observed in the data was an informal board under various names, such as “external 
board, strategic board, advisory committee, mid-tier board, operational board, industry 
facilitator and professional advisors.” This flexibility in the board structure was 
influenced by investors and farms. Private investors, for instance, high-net-worth 
individual investors and family office investors, did not look for a formal board: “With 
private investors and family offices and stuff, you do not actually see the board 
structure” (Panel A). Many participants argued that a formal or full-time paid board 
was not highly likely and, sometimes, was not necessary for a small or mid-sized 
family farm due to the smaller transaction size and lower level of complexity in the 
transaction. As one of the participants noted: “In the smaller co-investment 
opportunities, so, in the midrange, and the midrange is sort of approximately the 10 
million to 50 million brackets, I do not know that a board is necessary; what I think is 
very effective is the external advisory board” (Panel A).  
 Another participant considered a mid-tier board to be more realistic for mid-
range family farms, rather than formal boards: “I think that might be more valuable in 
the mid-tier than a truly formal board structure because the mid-tier is still fairly 
simplistic as far as a management structure goes” (Panel A). Some believed external 
investors were looking for some room on the board by any of the available means: 
including an independent advisor or a third-party advisor or, at least, an industry 
facilitator to work on investors’ behalf, “They dictate who sits on the board from their 
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side. They very often have representatives on the board and or third-party advisors” 
(Panel A) 
 The participants also indicated that non-executive directors and professional 
advisors with agricultural industry knowledge were the most eligible members to 
include in the informal board. The informal board should strive to develop and execute 
the farm business strategy, to align the interests of farms and investors, to protect 
capital, to tap into farm business opportunities and to bridge the farm-investor 
communication gap. This was echoed in one advisor participant’s opinion, “Their 
[professional advisors] role is definitely to help develop the strategy between the 
investor and the farmer, and they actually should be experienced people who can add 
a considerable amount of value to the strategy” (Panel A). However, most of the farm 
participants (Panel B) were in favor of keeping the board informal, flexible and simple. 
For example, one participant noted: “When we raised capital, we remained nimble and 
an effective functioning business, not a top-heavy board decision-making-type 
process-driven business” (Panel B). Other forms of informal boards that the farm 
participants noted included: “The collaborative board, the joint board, and the 
informal communication platform” (Panel B). Another interesting board variant noted 
by one participant was the purely family-dominated board, “My preference is to not 
have independent or external board members because, you know, I guess we would 
prefer to be running our operations ourselves without having to have decisions made 
with third parties” (Panel B). 
5.3.2. Reporting complexity and simplicity 
Similar to board formalization, the participants also commented that 
institutional and corporate investors wanted more complex, detailed financial 
reporting.  By complex reporting, the aggregate analysis of our findings informed us 
of some reporting constructs: real-time reporting, approximately ten years of historical 
profits, audited financial statements, preferably semi-annual, benchmarking 
accounting data, managerial and strategic reporting, financial metrics, and 
commodities. Institutional equity investors want a clear idea of farms’ profitability 
through a historical track record at the very beginning, “Institutional investors and 
even some of the corporates want to have a look at consolidated financial records 
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covering 5-10 years” (Panel A). Another participant noted that institutional investors 
also want real-time financial information, “I think that transparent real-time reporting 
will become a straightforward requirement of wholesale institutional investment in 
agriculture” (Panel A). Quarterly or monthly financial statements were another 
reporting tool, as suggested by one of the participants: “I do not see quarterly 
reporting in the investment structure unless you are in the institutional end and you 
have got a board structure and a more corporatized structure” (Panel A). 
Another view of reporting, as suggested by the participants, was simple types of 
reporting. By simple reporting, our interviewees referred to a simple business plan, 
informal communication, a financial picture of the investment case and less rigid 
(frequent) financial statements. The participants recommended simple reporting in a 
smaller or medium-sized equity deal, “There might be the reporting of profit and loss 
once a year in a smaller and middle-low-tier investment structure but not the balance 
sheet” (Panel A). Another participant emphasized following the more common styles 
of reporting that were already in existence in the farming industry, “Just providing 
half-yearly or annual management figures and then accountancy sort of reports for 
the annual tax, that would be common” (Panel A). Thus, the participants stressed 
keeping the reporting protocol simple, especially when small farms and private 
investors are in the deal. Even large farms and institutional investors also needed some 
informal reporting through continuous communication in addition to formal reporting. 
Appendix 4 represents more quotes on board and reporting aspects of family farm 
governance 
6. Discussion  
This paper explores the governance process and practices for family farms 
wishing to access off-farm equity capital by using semi-structured interviews with 
family farms owners and family farm investment advisors. Our overall findings draw 
attention to the process, practices, and pressures of the family farm governance 
framework. We have identified three themes: creating the governance culture, aligning 
the governance issues and shaping the governance structure, and eight associated 
subthemes from our study. We interpret these themes from an institutional theory 
perspective. The dynamics of this theory have implications for adopting formal and 
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informal processes and practices for any unit of organization. Moreover, although not 
empirically tested in our study, we consider off-farm investors as well as farm 
investment advisors as isomorphic background institutions that appeared to exert 
indirect normative pressures on the family and farms’ governance process and 
practices. This section explains how institutional theory relates to the governance 
processes, practices, and pressures in this study. 
6.1.Processual view of governance: Institutionalization of family farms 
Institutional theory advocates adopting some distinct process, strategies, schemas, 
and outlooks derived from social interaction and the environment in which the 
organization operates (Selznick, 1996). An organization becomes institutionalized if it 
attempts to adopt some special characteristics, to achieve distinct skills, and to obtain 
training and competencies (Selznick, 2011). Several institutional theorists (Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1999,  1983; Ritti & Silver, 1986; DiMaggio, 1982; Berger & Luckmann,1967) 
suggest different institutionalization processes for organizations. In this study, we 
incorporate Tolbert and Zucker’s (1999) conceptualization of three stages of a sequential 
institutional process: habitualization, objectification, and sedimentation, to guide family 
farms to change their traditional processes in the governance journey. We categorize the 
first theme and associated sub-themes of our study as the transformational stage of family 
farms’ institutionalization process, whereas the second theme and respective sub-themes 
have been marked as a foundational stage. Finally, the intensification stage has been 
related to theme three and its relevant sub-themes. All of the sub-themes under each theme 
are considered as practices that family farms can consider in the family farm governance 
framework. Figure 1 shows this conceptualization of our research. 
6.1.1. Transformational stage 
 Following the institutionalization process of Tolbert and Zucker (1999), we compare 
our transformational stage of the family farms governance process with the 
habitualization stage, the first stage of the institutionalization process of Tolbert and 
Zucker (1999). During this stage, data demonstrated to us the practices that family farms 
undertake. We have summarized that practices in Figure 1. Regarding the associated 
practices at this stage, family farms are expected to familiarize themselves with the 
different aspects of governance as part of the institutionalization process (Quinn, 1988). 
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Findings confirmed to us that farms are required to frame positive attitudes towards 
changing their traditional family farm business practices and adopt new practices 
(Selznick, 1996) driven by the demands of equity investors. Family farms may also 
establish some arrangements, policies, and procedures (Tolbert & Zucker, 1999) to make 
these changes useful. Farms may search for the best alternative solution to their 
governance problems that are technically and economically viable (Leblebici, Salancik, 
Copay, & King, 1991; Anderson & Tushman, 1990) or adopt any tailored suggestions 
developed by others (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983), for example, a professional farm 
advisor.  
                                 
Governance stages of family farms based on (Tolbert & Zucker, 1999) 
This phase is only the beginning of making family farms an effective unit of 
organization. This process of converting family farms into an effective organization 
supports the view of other researchers (Powell, 2003; Steier, 1998; Stinchcombe, 1997; 
Sahlman, 1990; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Williamson, 2007; Williamson, 1973; Coase, 
1937) who identify creating governance as one of the pivotal tasks of any organizational 
system. In creating the governance culture, in line with other research, we also argue that 
family farms can enhance the governance culture by increasing their learning capacity 
through coaching and consulting (Schein, 1996), as well as conducting a cultural audit to 
Governance Pressures: Farm Investors and Farms Investors as Background Institutions  
Both farms and farm investment advisors exert indirect normative pressures on family farms to 
form a governance structure 
Governance process: Three stages of the Institutionalized Governance Structure 
Stage One:  
Transformational Stage 
Stage 2: Foundational Stage Stage 3:  Intensification Stage:  
Governance Practices: Practices Associated with Three Stages  
1. Creating Governance 
Culture 
 Being ready to change 
 Establishing capability 
and communication 
 Engaging with 
professional advisors  
2. Aligning Governance 
Issues 
 Becoming documented  
 Knowing equity 
arrangements and investors 
 Organizing the control and 
conflicting aspects 
3. Structuring Governance 
Elements  
 Developing a formal and 
informal board structure 
based on an equity deal 
 Adopting complex and 
simple reporting practices 
Figure 1: Institutionalization process of family farms 
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examine the tone of farms and to identify the farms’ areas of improvement (Castellano & 
Lightle, 2005). 
6.1.2. Foundational stage 
When family farms create a governance culture and friendly environment, they enter 
the second stage of the governance process, in which farms address the issues that might 
affect their governance process in the future. The different associated practices that family 
farms can acquire are shown in Figure 1, which is based on our findings. In line with the 
objectification stage of Tolbert and Zucker (1999), during this stage, family farms, in our 
case, may collect and document the associated information from different sources to 
assess the potential threats to their governance mechanism. In doing so, before shaping 
any governance structure, it is significantly important for family farms to reach a 
consensus with off-farm investors through proper negotiation documentation, for 
example, the shareholder agreement. Negotiation can be defined as: “a process of 
potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties, with some apparent 
conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could otherwise” (Lax 
& James, 1986,p.11). In the negotiation process of equity collection, our interpretation 
from the findings that family farms might consider an integrative negotiation strategy 
(Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thomas, 1992), which focuses on creating moderate values 
for each party involved in the contract (in this case, family farms and off-farm investors). 
This type of negotiation can also create a compromising attitude among the partners, 
farms, and investors, as it tends to concentrate on the dual concerns of the partners (Rubin, 
Pruitt, & Kim, 1994; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Previous research has also linked 
governance with negotiation (Cohen, 2008; Ness & Haugland, 2005; Lewicki & Litterer, 
1985). 
In obtaining the maximum value from negotiation, family farms may get the 
understanding of the expectations of off-farm equity investors, the level of control that 
family farms want to have and the conflicting issues that may arise in the equity deal. Our 
findings indicate that both of these key stakeholders, farms, and investors, of the off-farm 
equity transaction, are heterogeneous. In line with the previous research on the 
heterogeneity of equity investors (Fernando, Schneible, & Suh, 2013), our research also 
confirms some sources of investors’ heterogeneity stemming from equity arrangements, 
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equity sizes, sophistication levels, the investment’s time horizon, and risk-return 
expectations. The family farms in our study were also viewed as being diverse regarding 
their business model, equity expectations, sizes, equity model preferences, and investment 
time horizon, as well as their level of tolerance for ownership and control. Previous 
research has further found some sources of family businesses heterogeneity: goal-related 
heterogeneity (Barnett, Long, & Marler, 2012), governance-related heterogeneity 
(Arregle, Naldi, Nordqvist, & Hitt, 2012) resource-related heterogeneity (Verbeke & 
Kano, 2012) and control-related heterogeneity (Chua et al., 2012). Amplifying the various 
sources of farm and equity investor heterogeneity, however, is beyond the scope of this 
study. Based on our research, we argue that these sources of heterogeneity, among both 
farms and investors, have a substantial bearing on selecting suitable governance practices 
by farms wishing to access off-farm equity capital. 
6.1.3. Intensification stage 
In stage three of the farm governance process, family farms reach the intensification 
stage of the governance process, which we believe is similar to the sedimentation level 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1999). During this stage, family farms can increase the depth of the 
institutional structure (Eisenhardt, 1988) by adopting suitable practices. Our findings 
indicate that no single set of governance practices fits with all sets of equity deals. We 
concentrated on two governance elements in our findings: the board structures, and the 
reporting protocols. These governance elements vary by equity deal. Naturally, the board 
structures and reporting protocols are relative terms among family farms and off-farm 
investors. The suitability of certain board and reporting structures may vary by family farm 
business model and by the choices of off-farm investors. Based on our data, we can argue 
that the key to obtaining equity capital by family farms depends on balancing the formal 
and informal elements of governance, based on the choices of farms and investors. This 
aligns with previous studies that have found some formal and informal elements 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006) of governance.    
Another interpretation of our research is that we have not been able to prescribe a 
common set of governance and reporting best practices to follow for all sets of family farms 
wishing to obtain equity. One of the reasons might be that family farms are often entirely 
different from one another, as noted above, about their business structures, sizes, and equity 
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model preferences. The other reasons might be related to the investor heterogeneity effects. 
Investors are also non-homogenous with different equity arrangements, sizes, and levels of 
sophistication. In such an environment, we cautiously argue that family farms might be 
better off taking differing configurations of governance shapes according to the spirit of an 
equifinal under configuration approach of governance (Nordqvist et al., 2014; Fiss, 2007). 
The configuration approach might allow family farms flexible governance, structuring the 
opportunity to ensure performance incommensurate with organizational and structural 
priorities (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993) in an environment where differing governance 
structures are highly likely (Goel, Jussila, & Ikäheimonen, 2014; Carney & Gedajlovic, 
2003).  
6.2. Case-specific off-farm equity governance scenarios 
Taking the above view, in Figure 2, we propose seven possible equity deal 
scenarios and some associated taxonomies of governance elements based on our findings. 
Of these seven scenarios, we argue that there is a high possibility that an equity deal will 
occur in four scenarios: scenario 1 (large farms with institutional investors); scenario 2 
(large farms with corporate investors); scenario 5 (medium farms with corporate investors 
and medium farms with high-net-worth individual investors); and scenario 7 (small farms 
with corporate investors and small farms with high-net-worth individual investors). In the 
other three scenarios, shown in Figure 2, we believe that there is less likely that an off-farm 
equity deal will occur. According to our findings, one of the main reasons for this 
discrepancy is the different investment size expectations of investors and the different scales 
of family farms. The data is not extensive enough to provide other possible reasons for these 
scenarios. With regard to the governance structure, farms’ institutional investors would be 
better off adopting a formal governance structure with a formal board, a higher level of 
reporting, and a formal exit plan for obtaining equity from institutional investors because 
these investors are highly sophisticated. On the other hand, for accessing equity from retail 
investors, a simple governance structure is more likely to be effective because these 
investors are not as highly sophisticated as institutional investors are (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 
2003; Utama & Cready, 1997). Another governance structure that we can propose for family 
farms is to form an alliance governance structure (Hagen & Choe, 1998) in which farms and 
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investors can compromise their mutual stakes in each other and can monitor each other’s 
actions. 
In summary, by passing through the three stages discussed above, family farms can 
achieve institutionalization that, in turn, will increase the possibility of family farms’ 
legitimacy, resources and capabilities (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977) and minimizes the risk of death of family farms (Oliver, 1991).   
Figure 2: Case by case governance and reporting requirements of off-farm 
equity, authors’ interpretation of data 
 
 
6.3.Investors and advisors as Background Institution 
Institutional isomorphism encourages every unit of organization to become thickly 
institutionalized (Selznick,1996) and to achieve the status of legitimacy as an 
institution (Aldrich, 2008). Institutionalists discuss three types of isomorphism in the 
literature: coercive, mimetic and normative (Scott, 1987; Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Relying on the conceptualization of two different types of institutions: Background 
and Proximate institution coined by Calori, Lubatkin, Very, & Veiga (1997) and 
Whitley (1992), to generate isomorphic pressures, we label investments and farm 
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investment advisors as background institutions that exert normative pressures on 
family farms to adopt a governance structure.  
Background institutions can exert normative isomorphic pressures on the 
organization (Calori et al., 1997; Schein, 1985). Normative pressures are passed 
through to an organization through engagement with professional networks (Mizruchi 
& Fein, 1999; Dimaggio & Powell, 1983) and the professional training institutions, 
workshops, seminars and professional trade magazines (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 
1989; Galaskiewicz, 1985). Although no direct influence of normative pressure 
through off-farm investors and off-farm equity capital was demonstrated in our 
research, we argue that an indirect influence of normative pressure can stem from these 
two groups. Indirect normative pressure can come from off-farm investors through 
reliance on equity providers for long-term capital, in which the family farms’ reliance 
on expert knowledge and business, as well as financial and managerial skills, may 
generate indirect normative pressures. After becoming successfully institutionalized, 
family farms ensure legitimacy and a governance structure. 
 
Previous research has also identified different institutions in the context of family 
businesses research using institutional theory. The family and the business are the two 
overlapping institutions, and each is run based on different rules and norms that 
influence their decision making and behaviors (Ward, 2011; Sandig, 2004; Gersick, 
1997; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992; Lansberg, 1983). These two streams of institutions have 
opposing views because each of them has distinctive expectations of the other 
(Schuman, Stutz, & Ward, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2008). The three-circle family 
business model is composed of the family, the business, and ownership (Gersick, 1997; 
Tagiuri & Davis, 1992), which may also be considered three separate institutions in 
the institutional process in the family business context (Melin & Nordqvist, 2007) that 
then also create isomorphic pressures. Each of these three institutions, again, has 
different attributes stemming from different ownership structures, different sizes, 
various generations of ownership and management, different industry orientations, 
different trajectories, and various level of family involvement in management (Aldrich 
& Cliff, 2003; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Sharma, 2004). 
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7. Contributions and practical implications 
This research contributes to the broader area of the private family businesses 
literature in several ways. First, it adds new evidence to the governance and reporting 
literature on private family businesses (in this case, family farms). Our findings 
demonstrate that the governance process, board structure and reporting structure of 
family farms enable them to construct an equity partnership with off-farm investors.  
Second, this study enriches the family farm and agribusinesses finance literature 
through the different off-farm equity deals revealed by our findings. Family farms that 
are interested in off-farm equity will be able to select the right equity option based on 
their position. Finally, we have addressed the call by Dodson (1992) to develop a 
suitable institutional framework for family farms to unite farms and investors for an 
equity market deal to occur. In this institutional process, our research cautiously treats 
equity investors and farm investment advisors as normative isomorphic forces. As 
normative forces, investors and advisors might expect broader sets of norms from 
family farms that may increase family farms’ identity. However, constructing this 
identity is complex and reciprocal (Greenwood et al., 2017).  
 Furthermore, our study has substantial implications for family farms, equity 
investors, farms, and agribusiness investment advisors and farm policymakers. Family 
farms that need true patient capital become aware of the diversity of equity 
arrangements, whereas equity investors also become knowledgeable about the farms’ 
level of tolerance for external parties. Because they play a key role in matching the 
right farms with the right investors, advisors can make a more informed decision in 
addressing farm’s financing problems. 
8. Limitations and further research  
Although our study provides new perspectives on family farm governance to attract 
off-farm equity capital to family farms, we acknowledge some limitations that create 
opportunities for further research. One of the main limitations of our study is that our 
data did not sufficiently help us identify the specific governance elements of each equity 
model based on the preferences of farms and equity investor sizes. We encourage other 
researchers to explore the good governance practices of each equity model and to 
populate the governance choices of both farms and investors. Second, we mainly 
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depended on the views of family farms and farming industry advisors to extract 
governance structures that were convincing to off-farm investors. However, there is 
another avenue for further research, which involves including external investors as 
another source of data. Third, our findings are subject to constraints regarding their 
generalizability, given that we are uncertain how our findings may apply to other farming 
industry settings in which the off-farm equity investor base is strong. Research in some 
other comparable economies can also be conducted. Third, we have conducted interviews 
with farm owners who had either already accessed equity or were in the process of equity. 
Research that includes family farms that are not yet in the equity process can be 
conducted to gain more insights. Finally, our interview participants were small in size: 
four farm owners and 14 farm professional advisors. Future researchers can also take this 
limitation as an opportunity to extend our works.  
9. Conclusion  
Our study explores the governance processes and practices for family farms 
wishing to access off-farm equity capital. We have found that family farms may adopt a 
systematic process to adopt a governance framework. We have argued that family farms 
can pass through three sequential stages: creating a governance culture and environment, 
aligning governance-challenging issues and accepting suitable governance elements. 
Family farms wishing to access off-farm equity can create a governance-friendly culture 
in the very first stage. Then, they address all future issues, know about the attributes of 
equity providers and be aware of farms’ choices for aligning their governance. During 
the final stage, family farms implement their choice by selecting the right governance 
elements. Our study further suggests that a “one size fits all” governance framework may 
not be suitable for every type of family farm and every type of farm equity investor owing 
to the diversity of farms and investors. Our study suggests that larger groups of farms 
may adopt a formal governance structure, and sophisticated reporting protocols if they 
want to access off-farm equity from institutional and corporate investors whereas middle-
sized and small farms can develop informal governance if they would like to access 
equity from private retail investors. Overall, our study suggests that family farms pay due 
attention to their governance structure in line with their abilities and investors’ 
preferences if they want to access off-farm equity 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
Summary, Contribution, Legitimization, and Future Research Agenda  
1. Background, motivation, and importance 
I began this thesis with five main observations in the literature. First, I observed 
one stream of literature that sketched the transition of the bank-based subsidised farm 
credit regime to the market-based regime (Ouma, 2016), as well as to the post 
neoliberalism era (Botterill, 2016; Lawrence & Campbell, 2014; Argent, 2000). This 
transition was the outcome of structural changes in the farm and agricultural industry, 
which induced farm businesses to establish a financing partnership with off-farm 
investors. Second, I noticed a growing body of literature, especially in the context of 
the US and New Zealand, which suggested that bank-based financing models have 
some limitations in meeting the capital needs of farming industry and off-farm equity 
capital can be one of the best alternatives for family farm businesses. Off-farm equity 
capital provides farm businesses a larger amount of capital to finance the projects with 
longer-term duration, and it escalates the scale of farm businesses at no additional 
financial risk (Mondelli, 2011, Barry, Ellinger, Hopkin & Baker, 2000).  
Third, despite ample benefits of off-farm equity to both family farms and off-
farm investors (Mondelli, 2012, 2011; Wang, Leatham, & Chaisantikulawat, 2002; 
Barry & Robinson,2001), another body of evidence suggested that family farms and 
off-farm investors often find it difficult to engage in off-farm equity arrangements due 
to an absence of  any common institutional ground and arrangements to minimise the  
informational asymmetries and moral hazard problems among farms and off-farm 
investors (Wang, Leatham, & Chaisantikulawat, 2002; Barry & Robinson,2001; 
Dodson,1994). Fourth, I also found various categories of investment models and 
institutional arrangements under which external equity capital in farm businesses are 
used. Notable invest models include: own-operate model; own-lease, and lease 
operating model (Sippel, Larder, & Lawrence, 2017; Magnan,2015, Burch & 
Lawrence, 2013); while institutional arrangements include agricultural trust fund and 
investor-oriented corporate structure model (Chaddad, Senesi, Vilella & Palau, 2009); 
direct ownership, partnership, and direct ownership under corporation (Barry 
&Robinson,2001; Dodson,1994). Fifth, much less empirical academic evidence and 
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growing body of anecdotal research are known in Australian approach off-farm equity 
capital. However, a growing body of anecdotal research, such as, Heath & Tomlinson 
(2016); Cotter, Rochecouste, & Mohsin, (2016); Alexander, (2015); Agrifood Skills 
Australia, (2015); KPMG, (2015); Tomilson, (2014); ANZ, (2014); Commonwealth 
of Australia, (2014); PPB, (2014); and Clark et al., (2014) showed the emergence of 
off-farm equity partnership. 
These anecdotal evidences imply that  off-farm equity usages in Australian 
family farming is gradually moving forward but off-farm investors are less  motivated 
for investing equity capital due to farms’ poor investability, vogue management style, 
poor information infrastructure, immature financial governance and concentrated 
ownership structure, poor level of farms’ reporting, cultural disparity, goal ambiguity 
, lack of off-farm equity market liquidity, lack of asset managers and lack of suitable 
products.  Nevertheless, the much empirical evidence is needed in the contexts of off-
farm equity capital in the family farm business. The academic understanding of how 
family farms can successfully shift their traditional financing strategies towards off-
farm equity is still very limited. To better understand the institutional mechanisms that 
are necessary to make this shift, my thesis uses a set of institutional theoretical 
perspectives: institutional logics, institutional path dependence, and path creation, as 
well as the theory institutionalization process. 
Findings and theoretical linkages of the present research suggest at least five 
important aspects of my thesis. First, it facilitates understanding and knowing the 
views of each partner, family farms and off-farm investors, in an off-farm equity 
partnership, that may be regarded as one of the key pillars in laying down the 
foundation of off-farm equity arrangement. Second, this thesis presents an off-farm 
equity process, as outlined in Paper 2, that family farms may adapt to shift their 
traditional path of financing towards off-farm equity. Third, family farms would be in 
a better position in institutionalising their naïve governance structures and reporting 
practices, as demonstrated in Paper 3, to attract off-farm investors in off-farm equity 
investment. Fourth, this research is equally significant to Australian and another 
country context of the family farm business, because family farms around the globe 
need to access long-term capital to intensify and to expand their growth trajectories 
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(Hazell, Poulton, Wiggins, & Dorward 2010). In Australia, as at 2013, more than 95% 
of all farms were under family farm model (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013) and 
thy are at currently at crossroads with their 100 years old bank-based model to meet 
their long-term and working capital shortages. Family farms have a bearing on the 
global economy as around 90 % of total farms are family dominant around the world 
(FAO, 2014).  Fifth, the empirical evidence and theoretical explanation presented in 
this research will help academicians and policymakers to use the implications and 
practical application of the issues unpacked in this thesis relating to off-farm equity.   
2. Research questions  
Off-farm equity capital is a relatively less accessed means of financing in the 
context of family farms, all over the world, except in some advanced economies such 
as the US, Canada, and New Zealand. The institutional arrangements facilitating the 
access to this capital has also not been inclusive and less explored. On the other hand, 
off-farm equity-financing in farm businesses is not a new idea. Scholars in farm 
financing and agriculture, acknowledge off-farm equity as more efficient and 
innovative than traditional financing models based on debt and internal equity. Off-
farm equity capital can be effective in minimising the weaknesses of traditional mixes 
of financing and in scaling up family farms’ size and growth. Ironically, this form of 
financing has not been used in the Australian family farming industry, the empirical 
setting of this thesis, to its full potential. Despite the recent trends of off-farm equity 
capital in Australian family farming industry, the questions remain unanswered in the 
academic literature as to why off-farm equity has not been used to a more considerable 
extent in Australian family farms. More importantly, extant literature informs us less 
how family farms can shift their traditional financing strategies towards an innovative 
one, off-farm equity capital. Hence, this thesis has attempted to fill this gap. 
 Securing off-farm equity arrangements in family farm contexts is complicated 
as it is complicated to bring two different partners- farms and off-farm investors- in 
equilibrium. The main aim of this thesis was to explore how family farms can shift 
their traditional financing model into an innovative one, off-farm equity, in this case. 
To achieve this main aim, this thesis has attempted to address three main research 
questions: (1) why do family farms and off-farm investors differ in their logics and 
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how can these competing logics be managed?; (2) why and how can family farms break 
their traditional financing path to access off-farm equity, and how can the path creation 
constitute to the farms’ investment readiness process?; and (3) how can family farms 
institutionalise their governance structure to access off-farm equity. To address these 
three central research questions in three empirical papers, this study explores six 
objectives: 
i. examining the competing logics of family farms and off-farm equity investors 
(Paper 1);  
ii. identifying the practices through which these competing logics can be managed 
(Paper 1); 
iii. understanding why family farms access off-farm equity (Paper 2); 
iv. knowing how family farms access to off-farm equity (Paper 2);  
v. investigating the institutionalization process family farms use for accessing 
off-farm equity (Paper 3); and  
vi. exploring the governance and reporting practices for family farms to access 
off-farm equity (Paper 3). 
3. Research summary of empirical chapters (Three papers) 
Chapter 2, (Paper 1), of this thesis, has attempted to answer two questions: (1) 
why family farms and off-farm investors differ in their logics in off-farm equity 
arrangement and (2) how these logics can be managed.  Based on farm advisors’ views, 
this paper found eight dichotomous pairs of logics because of which off-farm equity 
capital suppliers (off-farm investors) and off-farm equity capital users (farms) were 
less likely to build off-farm equity deals. These logics portray two different stances 
from two different actors’ perspectives to off-farm equity capital: family farms and 
off-farm investors. Family farms, on the one hand, are emotional with a protectionist 
view. They tend to stick to generational practices of doing business even though they 
struggle with lower scale and poor financial knowledge. Key motivations for engaging 
off-farm equity from their perspective is to minimise costs and maximise operating 
efficiency diversifying their business portfolio. Investors, on the hand, prefer 
professional management of their capital for a certain period, which will ensure 
expected operating and capital returns. Investors appreciate a commercial approach to 
business that encompasses the businesses case for investment and provides scope for 
scale investment. The focal points of investors’ decisions are maximizing output 
efficiency and capital and divesting investment at the point of exit. 
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While family farms and investors contradict each other, owing to competing 
perspectives, findings suggest two major practices that family farms may take on board 
to minimise competing demands. Two practices that are used to minimise the 
competing demands and increase the likeliness of off-farm capital are farms’ 
investment readiness and equity structuring. Investment readiness process is a 
complicated long-term process. As a part of this process, farms can demonstrate the 
business case for investment, develop an information memorandum and create 
benchmarking data platform. About equity structuration, findings inform us that 
family farms must address two major aspects of farm business: strategies and structural 
dynamics. In settling strategy, farms require to concentrate on the different type of 
strategies including commodity, growth, expansion, and investment strategy. These 
strategies need to be aligned as per partners’ mutual interest. Farms also have to the 
strategic in their planning including financial, decisions domain, and asset allocation. 
With regard to equity structuration, farms can address different structures including 
investment structure, governance structure, ownership, reporting and other 
organizational structure. All of these structures may be either formal or informal.  
Chapter 3 (Paper 2) has answered to the following questions: (1) why family 
farms create new financing path towards off-farm equity, and (2) how family farms 
make a successful off-farm equity journey. We analysed the stories of three farms who 
were engaged in off-farm equity process, using the interpretive narrative analytical 
framework. We interviewed four family farms to find out about the experiences in the 
off-farm equity process; we excluded one farm in our final analysis as this farm were 
not consistent regarding size and industry setting. We observed five narratives in the 
experiences of the off-farm equity process: motivations for change, soul reflecting, 
right partners, professionalization and letting go and taking on narratives. Relating 
these narratives to the path creation process (Garud & Karnøe, 2001), and new path 
creation theory (Simmie, 2012), we developed a four-step model of the off-farm equity 
accessing process. The four stages of this model include: responding to triggers, 
searching alternatives, spotting obstacles, and preparation and transformation. We also 
interpret this four stages as learning opportunities for investment readiness for family 
farms wishing to access off-farm equity.  
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Chapter 4 (Paper 3) has explored the governance structure for family farms 
wishing to access off-farm equity. To achieve this, we relied on the opinions of four 
family farms and thirteen farm advisors and used an interpretive thematic analysis of 
the semi-structured interview data. We found three inductive governance themes: the 
governance culture, the governance alignment, and the governance structure. We 
inductively theorized these three themes under institutional theory and framed an 
institutionalization process for family farms composed of three stages: transformation, 
foundation, and intensification. The findings confirmed us that a unique set of practices 
of governance structures and reporting practices might not suit the needs of both family 
farms and investors to negotiate off-farm equity deals. Thus, we suggest case by case 
governance and reporting practices.  
4. Epistemological, methodological, and methodical Position 
Epistemology refers to the philosophical position or the tools that researchers 
should take about the origin of knowledge prior to the study begins, to justify the 
quality of knowledge being produced ( Carter & Little, 2007; Becker, 1996; Bryman, 
1984). Epistemology thus, has, flow-on-effect on the choice of methodology,  which 
in turn influences the selection of the right methods for research and determines the 
analytical and reporting structure of research (Carter & Little, 2007). Three sets of 
epistemological perspectives– interpretivism, hermeneutics and social constructivism- 
(Schwandt, 2000), are observed in qualitative inquiry. This thesis is commensurate 
mainly with an interpretive approach as the attributes of this approach is evident in this 
thesis. The interpretive approach of epistemology is recommended in the following 
conditions (Gephart, 2004; Schwandt, 2000; Isabella,1990; Hudson & Ozanne, 1988): 
i. the subjective experience of the participants is the focal point of the study; 
ii.  the context in research setting needs to be taken care of; 
iii. the real world of research setting is complex and is interrelated with actors;  
iv.  researcher interprets the elapsed action, as explorer does not know until the 
exploration is finished; and 
v. different participant has different views on the research question.  
These assumptions are also applied in this thesis as this research has been fully 
explorative, relied on the subjective experience of farms and farm advisors, and 
considered the Australian context of family farm financing. By using qualitative 
interpretive epistemology, this thesis has responded to the call of  Nordqvist, Hall, and 
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Melin (2009) who urged researchers to use the interpretive qualitative approach as the 
extant literature around the broader family business arena are dominated by 
quantitative research. This thesis also moves the argument of Michiels and Molly 
(2017) forward in favor of using qualitative research to unveil the non-economic issues 
in family businesses’ financing decision and to sharpen the theoretical shifts in family 
business’ financing decisions.  
The methodology is a loose term and has different meanings for different 
researchers as noted by Carter and Little (2007). From their review (Carter & Little, 
2007), we may define methodology, in qualitative research, as the combination, 
description, and justification of the principles, procedures, and techniques (methods) 
of collecting evidence. Research methods in qualitative research, on the other hand, 
include all iterative actions including “sampling, data collection, data management, 
analysis and reporting” undertaken by “researchers and other participants”(Carter & 
Little, 2007). To make the contribution visible, qualitative investigators need to use a 
clear methodological procedure to give a clear picture of “what was done in the 
research process and to articulate how research practices transformed observation into 
data, results, findings, and insights” (Gephart, 2004). However, this methodological 
procedure in qualitative research, unlike quantitative research, needs to be reported in 
a less formal and more flexible style (Silverman, 2013). This reporting method is 
comparable to the style of writing   “detective story” (Alasuutari, 1995) and a “natural 
story”(Silverman, 2013).  
Following the above views, this thesis designed the methodology section of each 
paper systematically but less formal manner to give audiences a clear justification of 
the actions researchers have taken as a part of the methodology. The interpretive 
epistemological position of this thesis guided us to select suitable methodologies: 
interpretive thematic methodology (for paper one and three) and interpretive narrative 
methodological framework (for paper two), as qualitative scholars rarely suggest any 
single correct methodology (Rynes, Bamberger, & Pratt, 2011). Guided by these 
interpretive methodologies, we selected semi-structured interviews for collecting data. 
Semi-structured interviews are recommended in a context where researchers want to 
access informants’ worlds view and their interpretations about that world (Minichiello, 
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Aroni, & Hays, 2008). In line with our selected epistemological and methodological 
perspective in this thesis, the semi-structured interview seemed to us more justified as 
it gave us the opportunity to hold the position of “symbolic interactionist” (Minichiello 
et al., 2008). Moreover, this “interactionist” approach was necessary for us to explore 
the “why” and “how” questions in family farm financing aspects which would have 
been difficult to do with the quantitative format of the survey ( Reay, 2014). 
Inspired by Reay and Jones, (2016), in paper one, we used qualitative interpretive 
logic capturing methodological framework for family farms to explore competing 
interests, among family farms and off-farm investors, which contribute to interpretive 
logic capturing methodological framework. Most of the literature in institutional logic 
established the methodological fact that logics in an institution can either be measured 
or operationalised, rather than “logic capturing” (Reay & Jones, 2016). One of the 
limitations of logic measurement / logic operationalisation methodological framework 
that these two methods simply compare or contrast the logics in an organization with 
predetermined ideal types of logics, which do not consider the research-context and do 
not explain the emerged logics “through quotes, observation, and thick description” 
(Reay & Jones, 2016; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012; Thornton, Jones, & 
Kury, 2005). As our research has not used any ideal types of logics and has developed 
the logics based on empirical quotes and participants’ insights, it contributes to 
“capturing logics” methodological framework.  
Paper two of this thesis contributes to advancing the field of family business 
research in general, and family farms in particular, through using interpretive narrative 
analysis, as suggested by (Dawson & Hjorth, 2011). Narratives analysis of interview 
data enabled this thesis to provide a thick description of family farms’ complex 
phenomenon to our audiences (Leitch, Hill, & Harrison, 2010; Rynes et al., 2011). 
Paper three contributes, using six steps thematic methodological framework, to get a 
pattern (Braun & Clarke, 2006),  in family farms’ governance process in our raw data, 
shared by family farms and farm advisors. Through using Braun’s thematic 
framework, initially proposed for psychology, in family farm financing contexts, this 
research advances the advocacy of Braun and Clarke (2006) to use their thematic 
analytical framework in another field. 
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Another methodological stance of this thesis is that it has depicted how 
“methodological conservatism” (Tracy, 2010) in the qualitative investigation can be 
overcome by “embracing the diversity of qualitative methods” (Rynes et al., 2011). 
Concerning the diversity, Rynes et al. (2011) argued that diversity should be 
considered in data sources, research questions, and analytical strategies. This “method 
diversity” (Rynes et al., 2011) is also known as “triangulation” and “crystallization”  
among qualitative methodologist, which means using multiple data, investigators,  
analytical, and theoretical perspectives, in the same research (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 
2007; Tracy, 2010). This thesis, thus, demonstrates analytical, investigators and 
theoretical diversity. Investigators’ diversity was evidenced as two investigators (the 
principal investigator and the principal supervisor) collected data while three others (I, 
principal supervisors and the second associate supervisor) constantly checked 
analytical outcomes. Moreover, everyone contributed in designing interpretation. 
Analytical diversity work as we used different interpretive, analytical tools including 
narrative, thematic and content analysis. Analytical diversity was also achieved 
through using both manual data analysis method ( Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994) and software, i.e., NVivo Pro 11 and Leximancer version  4 (Smith 
& Humphreys, 2006). As this thesis inductively used three theoretical frameworks, 
such as institutional logics, path creation theory under institutional lock-in and 
institutionalisation theory, it has also contributed to theoretical diversity. Moreover, 
following the view of Tracy (2010), this thesis also viewed all of the above as 
methodologically creative and significance as we found little or no use of the same 
methods,  theories and concepts in the earlier farm financing and family businesses 
financing literature.     
 
5. Research contribution 
This section discusses the overall contribution of the thesis. The contribution is 
discussed one by one under three different headings: contribution to theory, practice, 
and methodology. 
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5.1.Theoretical contribution  
Reporting the theoretical contribution of a research project lacks proper 
meaning and generic terminologies to express (Corley & Gioia, 2011; Whetten, 
1989). To delineate the contribution of this thesis, we draw on the idea of Corley and 
Gioia (2011) who defines theoretical contribution of research as to “ emphasize [ing 
the] notion of advancing knowledge and moving the field’s thinking forward, 
providing  new connections among previous concepts and exploring the implications 
of these connections among previous concept, and exploring practical implications 
of these connections” (p.15). Theoretical contribution can happen in three possible 
ways (Crane, Henriques, Husted, & Matten, 2016): (1) testing and refining theory,  
(2) theory application, and (3) generating theory. Our contribution relates to the 
application of broader sets of institutional theory as we inductively interpreted our 
empirical outcomes with an existing theory to advance the conceptual connections 
and to explore their implications.  
Paper one explores two specific findings. First, it explores some eight pairs of 
contradictions that might inhibit the flow of equity capital to family farms from off-
farm equity investors. Secondly, it proposes two strategic practices - investment 
readiness strategy and equity structuration process- to address those competing 
interests. Understanding competing logics in off-farm equity collaboration advances 
the institutional logics theory (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012; Thornton, 2004) 
by linking the logics concept to the voluntary equity partnership of two different 
autonomous partners from two different fields. Although institutional logics have been 
applied in different fields of study, as explained in paper one, we have not seen much 
literature in which the logics in farm financing mechanisms are linked. Our study has 
attempted in this respect. The second main findings have enriched the strategic 
response models in the institutional process (Pache & Santos, 2010; Oliver, 1991). The 
investment readiness strategy discussed in paper one put “compliance tactics of 
acquisition strategy” ( Pache & Santos, 2010; Oliver, 1991) forward and showed how 
this theoretical concept works empirically. While “balancing tactics of compromise 
strategy”( Pache & Santos, 2010; Oliver, 1991) is manifested in the equity 
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structuration process of our findings. In addition, we see a new dimension of this 
strategic response is the mediating role of professional farm advisors. 
Paper two is built on a narrative of three family farms’ experiences with off-
farm equity journeys. In this paper, we have visualized family farms, a path dependent 
unit of organization (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009) as family farms have 
historically been stuck to a less optimal financing model which is based on internal 
equity and bank debt. We again found the relevance of path creation process (Garud 
& Karnøe, 2001) and new path creation theory (Simmie, 2012) when we saw family 
farms break their old financing models and started a new journey towards a new 
financing path driven by some internal and external triggers. Following the path 
creation theory, we proposed an off-farm equity path creation process. This process, 
in fact, incorporates the investment readiness journey of family farms. This paper has 
an advanced path creation theory in three ways: first, it has shown how family farms 
break their financing shackles and what systematic stages they may follow to transform 
their traditional financing models; second, this study has added a new dimension in 
organizational path dependence and path creation literature by introducing family farm 
businesses as the unit of analysis. Third, this study has a shaded light on how family 
farms can remove their capital inertia and the negatives of institutional hysteresis.  
The final paper, Paper 3, has provided a governance and reporting framework 
for family farms wishing to access off-farm equity. Within our empirical data, we 
found three governance themes that family farms consider in the family farms 
governance process: governance culture, governance alignment, and governance 
structure. Interpreting these themes with the conceptualization of three-stage 
sequential institutional processes (Tolbert & Zucker, 1999), we proposed three stages 
of family farms governance in accessing off-farm equity capital. Our three-sequential 
stages are transformation, foundation, and intensification. In our third paper, we put 
forward the idea of institutional isomorphism, by treating off-farm investors and 
professional advisors as background institutions, though not empirically tested, who 
put normative pressure on family farms to adopt governance structure. We believe that 
these extensions of institutional theories might serve as a starting point for family 
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farms scholars to empirically test more cases in off-farm equity and it thus advances 
theory on family farms’ institutionalisation in the context of financing.  
5.2.Contribution to practice 
To contribute in a practical sense, we identified four groups as possible practical 
audiences: family farms, off-farm investors, farm advisors, and policymakers. Table 1 
summarises paper specific contribution of this thesis. 
Table 1:  Paper specific contribution of the thesis 
Audience
s 
Paper 1 
 
Paper 2 Paper 3 
Family 
farms 
Can identify off-farm 
investors’ interest and 
can craft response 
strategy based on their 
capacity and desire. 
May learn the process of 
injecting off-farm equity 
and prepare themselves to 
be investment ready. 
Get the lesson on how to 
implement governance 
process and the stages of 
governance and 
reporting aspects for off-
farm equity 
Off-farm 
investors 
Can identify family 
farms’ interest and 
can check if investors’ 
requirement matches 
with family farms 
Understanding of the 
context when family farms 
intend to take a partner 
and understand farms’ 
professionalization 
process for off-farm 
equity 
Understand farms’ 
governance and 
reporting choice based 
on their sizes, cultures, 
and business models. 
Farm 
advisors  
 
 
Can devise better 
strategies both for 
farms and off-farm 
equity investors to 
minimise competing 
arguments. 
Help farms in new 
financing path creation 
and investment ready 
processes through farm 
specific guides. 
The advisor may exert 
indirect pressure on 
family farms to change 
their governance 
structure. 
Policyma
kers 
Can create a platform 
for creating awareness 
and educating both 
farms and off-farm 
investors. 
Can deliver a platform by 
which farms, and investors 
can communicate with 
each other and take the 
initiative for industry-
specific benchmarks 
 
Facilitates voluntary 
governance and 
reporting education and 
training pitches for 
farms. 
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6.   Methodological legitimization 
6.1. Analytical trustworthiness and generalizability  
One may ask about the credibility (Agar, 1986), trustworthiness (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985), validity (Maxwell, 1992) and generalizability (Ruddin, 2006) of our 
qualitative analytical findings. These criticisms may stem from the fact that 
methodologists rarely agree on certain   “boilerplate”, of analysis, “significance level” 
of results and “magic number” of participants in qualitative analysis (Pratt, 2009). This 
problem is also known as the legitimization crisis of qualitative methodology (Denzin, 
2001). Following the view of Merriam (1995), researchers of this study feel an 
obligation to talk about the trustworthiness and generalizability before recommending 
practical implications of the findings explored. In relation to this, qualitative 
researchers have recommended many concepts of trustworthiness, such as credibility, 
dependability, and transferability (Guba & Lincoln, 1981) and rigours, including 
internal validity, reliability, and external validity ( Merriam, 1995; Maxwell, 1992). 
Trustworthiness of qualitative research legitimises the degrees of fitness of the 
research for what it has been conducted for (Merriam, 1995) 
Following the position of Merriam (1995), we ensured the internal validity to 
make sure the consistency of each papers’ findings with reality. In qualitative research, 
reality refers to relative trueness, rather than absolute trueness, of phenomena with 
multiple dimensions (Merriam, 1995). Accordingly, this thesis explores only one 
single possibility based on our most relevant interpretation of data. For example, in 
paper one; we interpreted the data from institutional logics theory and strategic 
response model. In the case of paper two, we tried to depict farms’ journey to off-farm 
equity through path dependent and path creation theory. Institutionalization theory was 
the best theoretical position, to the best interpretive judgment of this study, to explain 
farms equity structuring process including governance and reporting. We, however, 
acknowledge that the selected theoretical explanations reflect merely one good 
explanation out of many possibilities. Other investigators can interpret the same data 
from others philosophical, analytical, and theoretical perspectives. 
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6.2. Internal validity (Reality) 
 Strategies such as triangulation (investigators, methods, and source 
triangulation), checking data with participants, taking advice from peer groups and 
immersing in the data, are recommended to increase the likelihood of internal validity 
of qualitative research (Merriam, 1995). This study has used both investigators and 
method triangulation in each empirical paper. My principal supervisors and I engaged 
in data collection (conducting interviews). During the data analysis, this thesis relied 
on the opinions of all other associate investigators, which thus provided the thesis 
investigator triangulation. With regard to method triangulation, this thesis has used 
different methods such as content analysis, thematic analysis, and narrative analysis. 
This thesis has also used both manual and two different types of text analysis software, 
i.e., N-vivo 11 and Leximancer 4, as part of the triangulation process. During the data 
collection stage, researchers of this study double-checked any comments, which 
seemed to be unclear, made by participants. This worked as a replica of member 
checking in ensuring internal validity. Two of my associate supervisors who were not 
engaged in the data collection process, they challenged the findings of each paper. 
Research questions and findings were also discussed with some qualitative and 
quantitative peer groups before and after the data collection and analysis. Following 
the advice and concerns of peer groups, data was repeatedly checked to address their 
concerns. This step helped this research project refine the research questions and revise 
associated findings. As this thesis has used both naturalistic and constructionist 
research philosophy, researchers were immersed into the data and revisited the data 
back and forth to develop the right interpretation.   
6.3. Reliability (Consistency)   
Reliability of research is achieved if repeated trials of the same set of objective 
measurement by different researchers give the same set of results (Merriam, 1995). 
Replications of the findings by repeated trial are possible only in the context of hard 
science, for example in a quantitative inquiry, with a positivistic approach (Merriam, 
1995). In qualitative settings, like in the context of this thesis, it is unusual to expect 
the same results of the same set of data under different trails by different researchers 
owing to the human touch element on the phenomena being studied. Rather, different 
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trials generate different interpretation. This was also true in this thesis as this thesis 
examined the human experiences and views of farm owners and professional advisors.  
To pass the test of reliability, consistency is another terminology that 
qualitative researchers prefer to use, as noted in (Merriam, 1995; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). The consistency of qualitative research is attained when investigators ensure 
that findings conform with the data collected (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).To reach the 
maximum level of consistency, this research used three strategies: triangulation, peer 
examination and audit trail ( Merriam, 1995). As mentioned regarding internal validity, 
this research followed triangulation and peer examination for consistency of the 
findings. Following the suggestion of other qualitative scholars ( Merriam, 1988; 
Danzig, 1985; Guba & Lincoln, 1981), investigators of this study also demonstrated 
audit trial- details of data collection, analysis, and patterns and categories- in every 
paper. See the data collection and analysis phase of each paper.   
6.4. External validity (Generalizability)  
 Research generalizability indicates the applicability of research findings in one 
research compared setting to other similar settings (Maxwell, 1992), which is also 
known as external validity (Merriam, 1995). In quantitative research, systematic 
generalization is possible with statistical inferences focussing mainly on the 
representativeness of a sample to population (Merriam, 1995; Maxwell, 1992). By 
contrast, inferences about persons, events, and situations facilitate generalization in 
qualitative research, concentrating on the depth of the unit of study (Merriam, 1995; 
Maxwell, 1992). Consistent with A qualitative research approach, researchers use 
different conceptualizations, such as working hypothesis, concrete universal, reader, 
and user generalizability to refer to generalizability ( Ruddin, 2006; Merriam, 1995; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1986;  Stake, 1978).  
Based on the works of Merriam (1995), this study has defined these 
terminologies. A working hypothesis means developing propositions based on the 
research settings which could be used to guide policy and practice. Concrete universal 
refers to applying the lessons learned from one research context to other similar 
experiences. Under the notion of readers’ generalizability, a generalization of research 
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findings mainly depends on how the audiences use the research findings in their 
contexts. Qualitative researchers have very little to show in terms of how finding can 
be applied to other research, which is also known as a naturalistic generalisation (Stake 
& Trumbull, 1982).  
This study has not proposed any working hypothesis or proposition to help 
policy guidelines for Australian farm financing. Following concrete universal and user 
generalisability views, researchers of this study argued that main players of the 
farming industry including family farms, private investors, farm advisors and 
policymakers of other economies, like in the Australian setting, can use the findings 
as a reference point of knowledge. They can apply the lessons learned from this study 
to their settings. For example, family farms, in other settings, wishing to access to off-
farm equity, may think of the areas on which they have their preferences that may not 
in line with off-farm investors. Family farms can also prepare themselves to be 
investment ready the way farms have demonstrated in our case. More, importantly, 
family farms get some practical ideas on how to structure their off-farm paths, 
developing the right governance and reporting structure based on their strengths and 
desire. Off-farm investors around the world are another potential audience for this 
research. The explored logics of off-farm investors in this study may help them 
understand their own logics and be informed about farms’ preferences for building off-
farm equity alliance. Investors may also better understand farms off-farm equity 
accessing process and investment readiness process. Having informed about farms’ 
details, off-farm investors can structure their own identity and may get ready to 
compromise and become more balanced in some areas. Policymakers can design 
efficient off-farm financing products, policies, and guidelines to facilitate the off-farm 
equity market. These policy guidelines may help family farms in solving their 
financing problems.        
Strengthening the rigour of generalizability in qualitative research is relatively 
more complex than in its counterpart, quantitative research. To energise the 
generalizability rigour of qualitative research, Merriam suggested four strategies: 
showing a thick description of the research context, using multi-site designs, model 
comparison, and developing samples within samples. This thesis, in each paper, shows 
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a thick description of the interview process, data collection, coding, categorisation, 
theme selection, and theorisation. Qualitative scholars, however, yet to have any 
unanimous benchmark to measure the thickness of description (Lincoln & Guba, 
1986). This study is also consistent with the multi-site design of generalization as 
findings were based on several types of family farms who have a business network in 
multiple locations in the same region. Farm advisors were also diversified in a sense 
that each of the advisors had experiences dealing with different farms with different 
business models and a diversified investor class with many investment models. 
7.  Limitations and further research opportunities   
 One of the driving motivations behind this thesis was to contribute to extending 
the literature of off-farm financing, off-farm equity in particular, for family farms and 
agriculture. In achieving this aim, we identified the empirical gaps, problematized the 
extent of the theoretical knowledge, and methodological immaturity in the extant 
literature with regard to off-farm equity in family farms, family farms and off-farm 
investors logics, family farms path creation and investment readiness, and family 
farms’ governance processes. At the same time, it is equally important for the readers 
to know that this contains limitations. Knowing these limitations, future researchers 
may find a clear path to further research. Each of empirical papers in this thesis has 
indicated paper-specific limitations and future research opportunities.  
Yet, it is useful to provide a summary of key limitations here, in light of the 
points mentioned in each paper, which also gives an idea of doing potential further 
research. 
i. We have not been able to empirically explore the logics of family farms and off-
farm equity investors in an off-farm equity alliance based on these actors’ 
individual attributes, such as their size, business models, and investment models 
(see paper 1). 
ii. Based on the geography, industry, social and cultural contexts, partners in the off-
farm alliance, family farms and investors, may behave differently. This study did 
not address this (see paper 1). 
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iii.  This study borrowed the terminology of around alliance and institutional 
terminologies based upon alliance and institutional logic literature of traditional 
businesses. Typologies and taxonomies could be established that would 
specifically relate to family farms (see paper 1). 
iv.  Even though this study relied on advisors’ opinion to explore competing views of 
family farms and off-farm investors in off-farm equity alliances, our evidence did 
not speak much about the specific and detailed roles of advisors in matching the 
views of the two main partners (see paper 1).  
v. We were able to reach only one member of family farms for interviews. 
Interviewing only one member of each farm might restrict the details findings of 
the off-farm equity journey (see paper 2).    
vi. All of the sample farms interviewed for paper 2 were in the cattle industry. This 
concentration of data on only one industry may not disclose the off-farm equity 
experiences of all other family farms due to the nature of heterogeneity (see paper 
2). 
vii. In the new path creation of farm financing, off-farm equity in this thesis, 
experiences, and cooperation of all other actors such as investors and advisors 
were believed to be a significant component. Theoretically, these actors’ roles are 
important in new path creation. However, the path creation model we outlined 
does not incorporate the missing component of investors’ experiences (see paper 
2). 
viii. The data did not help the researchers to identify governance and reporting 
practices based on farms’ and investors’ specific needs. Tailoring governance and 
reporting processes and practices is a necessity as our findings suggest that a “One 
size fits all” governance framework may not be suitable for each type of farm and 
investor (paper 3). 
ix.   Two potential sample groups- off-farm investors and farm financing 
policymakers- have not been included in our interview. Inclusions of their views 
might reveal more issues in off-farm equity alliances’ logics, path creation and 
governance process (all papers) 
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x. Generalizability of our findings can be challenged by the cross-country farms and 
research settings. Studies on comparable economies in family farm settings can 
advance our empirical findings.  
xi. Another major limitation for the whole thesis was the small sample size of farm 
and advisor interview participants. We interviewed four farm and 14 farm advisors 
that have not given us adequate information on off-farm equity alliance that may 
satisfy diverse types of farms and investors. Interviews with a larger sample size 
of farms and advisors may reveal more interesting findings the research questions. 
8. Concluding note  
One last point is that, from a country-specific perspective, this research has 
demonstrated the ongoing need for sufficient access to long-term finance, equity 
finance in particular, for Australian family farms. In the midst of continuous crises, 
originating from natural disasters and economic downturns, and structural changes 
(Mann, Freyens, & Dinh, 2017), a sole reliance of family farms on the traditional 
bank-dominant model is now being questioned: in empirical and   anecdotal 
research, by farm finance commentators,  by farm industry stakeholders; and farm 
policy makers in Australia. Despite this, off-farm equity, a proven alternative farm 
financing model in another economic setting, has not been explored extensively in 
Australia, except some recent developments. Through this study, the aim was to 
engage in some intellectual conversation, and research agenda with academics, 
family farms owners, off-farm investors, farm advisors and policymakers. To 
shape the future directions of off-farm equity in the context of Australian family 
farms, this qualitative inquiry informs the audiences only about a tip of the iceberg 
of the whole complex phenomenon off-farm equity alliance in family farming 
industry. Our journey in this qualitative investigation was full of challenges,  as 
qualitative research has no “algorithm” to analyze “the field works and word 
works” to elucidate the evidence (Gephart, 2004). Yet, the best hope for the 
researchers is that this study would attract more intellectual dialogue around farm 
financing issues in general and off-farm equity in particular, both in the Australian 
and global contexts.  
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Appendix 1. Contextual and Historical Background 
1. Off-farm equity capital in farm businesses  
Research investigating efficient sources of financial capital for the US farming 
sector may contribute to understanding the farm financing issue for the rest of the 
world as empirical works beyond the US has been less explored (Featherstone, 
Ibendahl, Randy Winter, & Spaulding, 2005). To address this research gap in other 
jurisdiction, this study, therefore, relied to some extent on the US literature to find a 
historical context of off-farm equity capital in agriculture. 
Farms’ financial failures escalated in the 1900s in the US with dramatic changes 
in the farming environment including financial, economic technological, risks 
dynamics (Guither & Halcrow, 1988). With the emergence of a competitive farm credit 
system, composed of commercial banks, federal sponsored cooperatives, federal 
lenders and banks, government-owned farmers’ home administration, private financial 
institutions, and other individuals, in 1916, lenders in the US adopted a tight policy in 
sanctioning farm credit. Farmers needed to apply for loan fulfilling two eligibility 
criteria (Guither & Halcrow, 1988): (1) farms’ cash flow ability (both on the farm and 
off-farm sources) (Guither & Halcrow, 1988) and (2) appropriate debt to asset (equity) 
ratio. Amid such stricter loan policy, US farms faced more financial difficulties, 
especially, in a situation when: (1) farms’ asset value (equity value) declined, (2) and 
farms’ financing and operating cost soared owing to the fall of commodity prices.  
From 1970 to 1982, the US farming sector was flooded with debt financing driven 
by the appreciation of farms’ internal equity (land value) and a minimal real cost of 
debt (Crane & Leatham, 1995; Guither & Halcrow, 1988). Using this opportunity of a 
boom in the supply farms’ debt capital, US farms escalated loan proceeds by increasing 
fresh loans and refining the non-performing loans. This means the loan disbursed by 
lenders were not qualitatively sound and made the lenders over-reliance on the farms 
and agricultural portfolio (Brake & Boehlje, 1985). As a result, the heyday of debt 
dominated farm financing did not last long, which then caused the financial crisis in 
the early 1980s for the US economy. This emerged from the sudden fall in the internal 
equity value (owners’ land/capital asset), by approximately 25%, which has 
downgraded farms’ repayment capability to lenders (Guither & Halcrow, 1988). With 
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the lowering of farms’ asset values and declining trends in commodity prices, farms in 
the US gradually experienced increased financial risk owing to a mismatch of 
operating revenue and fixed financial obligations (Guither & Halcrow, 1988). 
Therefore, the US farming sector was immersed in a credit crunch and bankruptcies 
which affected all lenders, farms and agribusinesses, and rural communities in the US 
(Crane & Leatham, 1995; Guither & Halcrow, 1988). Even though these two 
problems- borrower and lender problems- are the most common reasons for the US 
farm crisis, there are some other complicated reasons for the farm crisis (Bullock, 
1986) 
The degree of farms debt capital, has, thus, influenced on farms’ internal equity, 
financial performance, financial risks and their survival (Wu, Guan, & Myers, 2014; 
Guither & Halcrow, 1988). Many studies in the context of the US farm financing 
industry have confirmed the limitations of debt capital in agricultural farms. Notable 
works in this setting are: Featherstone et al. (2005); Bierlen, Dixon, Ahrendsen, and 
Barry, (1998); Lowenberg-DeBoer,Featherstone, and Leatham (1989); Collins and 
Bourn (1986); Barry and Robison (1986); Melichar (1984); Gabriel and Baker (1980); 
Sonka, Dixon, and Jones (1980). An aggregation of all the findings of these works 
indicates: farm debts become risky due to emerged financial risks and business risks 
if farms’ credit subsidy/ government funding is declined. Moreover, excessive usage 
debt increases farms total risk, even though the business risk is reduced, which may 
threaten farms’ long-term survival. More importantly, higher proportions of debt are 
more suitable financing mix for solvent farms with higher on-farm income and internal 
equity.     
To get rid of the above financial difficulties, six policy options were suggested 
by the US policymakers as observed by Barry, Ellinger, and Eidman (1987), cited in 
(Guither & Halcrow, 1988): (1) selling farms’ asset under leaseback arrangements; (2) 
selling farms’ asset under no lease –back arrangements ; (3) writing down farms’ debt 
obligations; (4) curtailing interest rates to farms’ loans; (5) offering deferred loan 
repayment options; and (6) injecting off-farm equity to freeze farms’ loan obligations. 
Brake and Boehlje (1985) also mentioned three-policy adjustment at three levels to 
overcome US farm financing crisis: farm level, public policy level, and sectoral level. 
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Like Barry et al. (1987), Brake and Boehlje (1985) also suggested for injecting off-
farm equity capital as a potential solution to a farm crisis, even though off-farm equity 
is sometimes criticized for causing farms’ ownership dilutions (Boehlje, 1995). This 
was the reference point in the global farm business’ history when off-farm equity 
started to attract the attention of academics, policymakers, and commentators in farms 
and agricultural finance. Off-farm equity capital through a public equity platform is, 
however, not new in the US farming sector where mostly European investors invested 
equity in tobacco and ranch production (Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989). The public 
platform of off-farm equity is a relatively impractical option for family farms 
businesses owing to high compliance costs (Barry & Robison, 2001). Alternatively, 
off-farm equity capital denominated from other farms and other off-farm sources is 
recommended as a solution to farms’ financial stress. 
With these voices in favour of injecting off-farm equity capital in US arm 
businesses and production agriculture, a group of scholars (Mondelli, 2011; Barry & 
Robison, 2001; Barry, Bierlen, & Sotomayor, 2000; Crane & Leatham, 1995,1993; 
Dodson, 1994; Fiske, Batte, & Lee, 1986) has become dedicated in unveiling the 
feasibility, motives, market requirements, institutional arrangements, and barriers to 
off-farm equity market in agriculture. As an extension of these works, my thesis 
focuses on the exploration of off-farm equity capital in Australian family farms and 
agriculture.  
For an extensive review of the motives and problems of off-farm equity, we 
refer to the special issues of American Journal of Economics (1986, Vol, 68).  A recent 
study (Ouma, 2016) also revealed a systematic timeline of the evolution of farm 
finance in the context of US farm and agriculture. Ouma (2016) categorized the 
agriculture-finance landscape of the period 1860-2015 in five distinct categories: (1) 
informally served period (1860-1915); (2) government supported period (1916-1967); 
(3) bank dominated period (1968-2007); (4) market- based period I (1987-2007); and 
(5) market-based period II (2008-to date). For attributes of each phase, see Ouma 
(2016). This timeline gives an indication how off-farm equity financing has taken 
place as a market-driven financing mix in the farm and agriculture industry.  
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Since then, this wave of off-farm equity, born in the US, has expanded globally 
including Australia, NZ, Canada (Painter, 2010; Eves, 2005). Empirical frameworks 
for analysing off-farm equity in agricultural farms are yet to get matured (Lowenberg-
DeBoer et al., 1989).  To address such a gap in terms of a proper research framework, 
this research focuses on the exploration of off-farm equity in Australian family farms 
businesses, using a qualitative research approach under the institutional theoretical 
framework. 
2. Australian off-farm equity market 
2.1.Australian farm and agriculture  
There is an old maxim in Australia:   that its economy “rode on the sheep’s’ back” 
(Productivity Commission, 20005). This signifies agricultural contributions to 
Australian economic development both at a national and global front. Nationally, it 
generates 2.7 percent of GDP (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) & Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations ( 
FAO), 2016). Australian farm and agricultural exports are expected increase up to 
almost $49 billion in 2017-2018 from $48 billion in 2016-2017 (Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARES), 2017). During 2015-16, Australia 
has exported 77 percent of the total produced of foods and fiber, which worth $44.8 
billion (National Farmers’ Federation (NFF), 2017). Nearly half a million workforces 
are employed both on the farm and off-farm activities in the Australian agricultural 
sector (NFF,2017; Fuglie & Wang, 2012). This sector uses 60% of Australian land 
resources and consumes 70% of water (Hamblin, 2009). Australian agriculture 
production feeds over 22 million people domestically (Lawrence, Richards, & Lyons, 
2013).  
On the global stage, Australia exports diverse farm and agricultural products such 
as wool, wheat, meat, and sugar, and feeds another 40 million people in other countries 
including the UK, Japan, China, the Middle East and Korea (Lawrence et al., 2013).   
Australia is a net exporter of agricultural commodities. The export value of Australian 
agribusiness products was $38 billion in 2012-2013, compared with imports valued at 
approximately $12 billion (ABARES, 2013). Australia exports represent almost 60% 
of its total production, which is equivalent to 76 % of its gross farming value 
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(Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry (DAFF), 2011). Strategically, 
Australia is located in the Asia Pacific region which is regarded as one of the fastest 
growing markets for food and fiber (Austrade, 2017). This locational advantage gives 
interested investors a sound fundamental for long-term return in the sector (Austrade, 
2017). Currently, 50 percent of Australian food and fiber export destination is Asia 
and the Pacific (Austrade, 2014). The Australian agribusiness sector accounts for 
approximately 3 percent of the global food trade which is three times higher than the 
domestic demand (Austrade, 2014). Australia is ranked 2nd regarding agricultural land 
around the globe with a 9% global share (Lowder, Skoet, & Raney, 2016) and it ranks 
4th as a global exporter of Ag. Commodity (Keogh, 2009). The Australian agricultural 
industry is now being considered as one of the five pillars (Asia Pacific Stock 
Exchange, (APX),2014) of the Australian economy; one of the Fantastic Five next 
high growth wave sectors (Deloitte,2013) and it is an equally competitive sectors as 
other sectors in the Australian economy (Lydon, Dyer, & Bradley, 2014)  
2.2. Declining competitiveness in Australian farm and agriculture 
However, the share of contribution of the Australian agricultural sector to its 
economy has started to fall from the early 1960s (Productivity Commission, 2005). 
For example, during the post-war period, in 1951, the contribution of Australian 
agricultural production accounted for 29% of GDP and the size of export was 
equivalent to 90% of GDP (Stoeckel & Miller, 1982) cited in Botterill (2016). By 
2014, the production value was down to 2% of to GDP and export volume had receded 
to only 15% of GDP (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015a) noted in (Botterill, 2016). 
Even, compared to Australia’s’ global competitors, such as the US and Canada, 
Australian agriculture is lagging with regards to productivity (Rural Industries 
Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC), 2013). Other estimates in 
Australian agricultural productivity (Hughes, Lawson, Davidson, Jackson, & Sheng, 
2011; Nossal, Zhao, Sheng, & Gunasekera, 2009) shows that agricultural productivity 
has become either slower in some commodities or negative in others. For example, the 
productivity of the broadacre industry dropped to negative 2% during 1997/98-
2006/07 from positive 5% during1979/80-1997/98.  
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Factors explaining the reasons of declining productivity and competitiveness of 
Australian agriculture include, but not limited to: agricultural risks and volatility, 
technological shifts, transport, communication and infrastructure, research and 
development, farmer education, regulatory environment, policy changes, access to 
sufficient funding (Heath, 2016; Nossal et al., 2009).  
“Family farms are the cornerstone” of Australian agriculture, and they are “the 
best stewards” of Australian land as they are committed to carrying their business 
legacy to the next generation (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015b). 99 % of almost 
130,000 individual Australian farms are family owned and operated (Heffernan, 
Keogh, & McKew, 2008). However, Australian farms are continuously declining in 
number. One estimate by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in the year 2016 shows a 
decrease in farms by almost 40% between 1994 to 2014: from around 180,000 to 
110,000 (Pratley, 2017). We see many theoretical and empirical themes in the extant 
literature that explains the reasons for this declining pattern of farm numbers and the 
above-mentioned decreasing rate of Australian agricultural productivity. Issues 
mentioned above as a driving force behind declining farms’ productivity and farms’ 
size are known as the effects of structural changes in the literature.  
2.3. Structural changes in Australian farm and agriculture 
Structural changes arise due to changes in environment surrounding agriculture 
including natural factors, business factors, financial factors, economic factors, 
commodity prices, technological and policy dimensions (Mann, Freyens, & Dinh, 
2017; Pratley, 2017; RIRDC,2007;Balmann, Dautzenberg, Happe, & Kellermann, 
2006; Rossier & Wyss, 2006; Horridge, Madden, & Wittwer, 2005; Kingwell & 
Pannell, 2005; Botterill, 2003; Productivity Commission,1998). Using these 
interpretations from this literature, we find three types of structural changes. One form 
of structural change is achieved through the amalgamation and consolidation tendency 
of smaller farms into larger ones (RIRDC, 2007; Productivity Commission, 1998). 
This amalgamation leads farms, though, to the path of an economy of scales (Esposti, 
2014; Dimitri, Effland, & Conklin, 2005), and it has ramification for declining family 
farms size and for shifting family farms’ model towards corporate farming model 
(Pratley, 2017). Another form of structural change is to have a natural adjustment. The 
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natural adjustment process ensures efficient use of factors of production by skilled 
farms driving inefficient farms out of the industry during the resource relocation 
process (Gray, Oss-Emer, & Sheng, 2014). The third type of structural change 
originates from off-farm economic and natural crises including downward economic 
pattern and drought that affects farms’ size, profitability, attrition levels, and wellbeing 
and induces farms’ decision to stay or quit (Mann et al., 2017). 
Research on the effects of structural changes in extremely protected agricultural 
economies with relatively smaller farms (for example, in the case of the US and 
Europe) (Streifeneder, Tappeiner, Ruffini, Tappeiner, & Hoffmann, 2007; Ahearn, 
Yee, & Korb, 2005) are ample. The findings of such research are that farms, impacted 
by structural changes, exit the farming occupation if they fail. Australian literature 
confirms that structural changes are one of the contributing factors in receding farms’ 
numbers, but there is weaker empirical evidence of a total exit from farm occupation 
(Vanclay, 2003). The Australian media, however, establishes the notion of farm exit 
as a repercussion of structural changes (Mann et al., 2017).  
Structural changes in farms and agricultural firms and their associated effect on 
farms’ financing structure can also be better explained through financial models of 
structural changes (Vickers, 1968). According to this explanation, financial capital, 
both debt and equity, are the key components for farms to acquire firms’ capital asset 
and an operating asset to generate sufficient cash flow to keep the business operating 
(Boehlje, 1992). Any constraints to this capital availability may hamper farms’ value 
maximization goal and challenged the farms’ existence. To meet any financial 
shortfall, farms feel pressure to sell their capital asset which paralyses their income 
generating capability in the long run (Boehlje, 1992). Thus, growth in farm size and 
capital assets can be achieved with diverse types of debt, equity capital, and financial 
lease. 
Farms can resist these structural pressures (Vanclay, 2003) using either of three 
options: (1) sticking to the current strategy; (2) changing the current strategy and (3) 
leaving the farming industry. However, the real response depends on the farm-specific 
scenario (Gray & Lawrence, 2001). Every option has its own merits and demerits and 
relates to farm’s financing strategy. Structural changes in agriculture literature suggest 
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different models to explain the insights of structural changes: financial, human capital, 
technological, institutional, and social (Boehlje, 1992). Brinkman (1983) also 
proposed an extensive framework of structural changes in agriculture, which was 
further extended by Goddard, Weersink, Chen, and Turvey (1993). In these 
frameworks, the financial structure of agricultural farms is one of the leading aspects. 
In this thesis, we rely on the financial aspect of structural changes to contextualise the 
off-farm equity in Australian farm businesses.  
2.4. Deregulation and financial capital in Australian farming 
Deregulation of the Australian farm credit system is one of the pivotal factors that 
caused structural changes.  Leaving farms’ or amalgamating of different smaller farms 
by farmers for greater scale has long been an essential feature in Australian farming 
industry, rather than a new phenomenon, as a part of structural adjustment processes 
(Lawrence, 1999). Policy changes- a shift from public finance to private finance- in 
Australian farm financing also contributed to deregulation of family farms. Argent 
(2000) was one of the first authors who discussed how public-sector finance 
contributed to financing the Australian farming sector, and how the Australian farming 
sector was eventually fully commercialized after the public finance schemes were 
abandoned. Argent (2000) identified two eras of public finance in the Australian 
farming sector: the rise of public credit (1952-1983), also known as the highly 
regulated credit era, and the fall of public credit (1983-to date), also known as the 
deregulated era. Table 1 provides the key feature of these two-era including the main 
players in each era; actions taken, and financial institution developed by the Australian 
federal government for farm credit; control on the flow of domestics and foreign 
capital; and the nature of loans provided to the farming sector. Main observation in 
these two eras is the opposite. Public finance has always facilitated a necessary 
platform for private capital flows in Australian farming sector, as private investors feel 
uneasy about investing financial capital in this risky business (Larder, Sippel, & 
Argent, 2017;  Martin & Clapp, 2015).  
In 1972, abolishing the interventionist attitude (Botterill, 2005), Australian 
economy entered in the era of “economic rationalism” (Vanclay, 2003) by accepting 
restructuration and deregulation, as a response to globalization (Gray & Lawrence, 
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2001; Tonts, 2000), as noted in (Vanclay, 2003). Scholars have labeled this transition 
of the Australian economy as the neoliberalism phase (Lawrence & Campbell, 2014;  
Table 1: Finance-agriculture relations in Australian agriculture landscape, 
(1952-2017), design based on Argent (2000)  
Regulated era: Rise of public agricultural 
credit (1952-1983) 
Globalized Era: Fall of public agricultural credit 
/lender of the last resort (1984- till today) 
Main players in agricultural-finance 
relation:  
Sate, the central bank, farm families, financial 
institutions, depositors, shareholders, and 
investors 
Main players in agricultural -finance relation:  
Sate, the central bank, farm families, financial 
institutions, depositors, shareholders, and investors 
Establishment of public financial institutions 
by the Federal government:  
 1952: concessional credit schemes 
 1956: interest rate averaging scheme  
 1959: Common Wealth Development Bank 
(CDB) – for long-term investment in farm 
 1962: Term Loan Fund (TLF) – for long-
term credit to primary producers  
 1966: Development Loan Fund (DLF)- for 
long-term credit to primary producers  
 1978: Primary Industries Banks of Australia 
(PIBA)) - for long-term investment in farm 
Deregulation and privatisation initiatives 
 1983: floating Australian dollar, deregulation of 
the financial system 
 After 1985: 16 foreign banks were established 
 1994: CDB was partly privatized 
 1996: CDB was fully privatized  
 Since1980: fully commercial credit to farms 
Domestic and global capital: domestic capital 
was preferred; the global capital was fully 
controlled  
Domestic and global capital: global capital is not 
controlled and open and is in full competition with 
domestic capital 
Nature of farm loan: fully concessional, a 
lower rate of interest, directed by states, state 
support to farms  
Nature of farm loan: fully commercial, the market 
rate of interest, less state directed loan, state support 
to all another sector 
Dibden, Potter, & Cocklin, 2009;  Tonts & Jones, 1997). Others (Botterill, 2016; 
Vanclay, 2003; Lawrence, 1999; Tonts & Jones, 1997; Argent, 1997) have studied the 
nature of deregulation and restructuring in terms of broader aspects of the socio-
economic-cultural context of Australian agricultural farms as Australian agriculture is 
a composite of social, cultural, political, historical, and economic construct (Vanclay, 
Lockie, Charles Sturt University, 2000). Finance capital is one of the leading themes 
in these works. Financial implications of the post-deregulation phase in Australian 
agriculture were mixed as discussed by many scholars: (Vanclay, 2003; Gray & 
Lawrence, 2001; Argent, 2000; Lawrence, 1999; Miller, 1996). In summary, this 
transition protected Ag. Industry from policy distortion; it provided family farm 
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realised benefits through cross-border expansion; it caused a decline in the state 
financial support for farms; it commercialised the banks’ farm credit policy- once a 
privileged option for farms, farms’ financial dependency on off-farm partners was 
increased and farm financial crisis and stress evolved. 
In a highly regulated era, the federal government expanded and extended 
Australian farm and agriculture through directives to financial institutions for longer-
term loan to farms at concessional terms and lower interest rates, establishing financial 
institutions, such as Commonwealth Development Bank (CDB), and Primary 
Industries Banks of Australia (PIBA), and instruments, such as, Term Loan Fund 
(TLF) and Development Loan Fund (DLF. At that time, the foreign flow of capital to 
enter in the farming sector was fully controlled. Since 1983, things have started to 
change because of expansion to the global arena. CDB and PIBA were fully privatised, 
and these institutions are lending to farms at commercial terms. Capital flow in the 
farming sector has been freed from state control. 
2.5.Post-deregulation stage in Australian farm and agriculture sector  
The above post-deregulation pressures put Australian farms in a trap of “global 
misfortune” (Gray & Lawrence, 2001). Alternatively, since the late 1990s, Australian 
family farms and agricultural farms built a new financing tie with Managed Investment 
Schemes (MIS), a pool of funds developed by corporate sectors.  The Australian 
Securities Exchange Commission, (ASIC, 2009) reports that in July 2009, there were 
371 licensed agribusiness schemes of which 198 were forestry (plantations) and the 
remainder primarily horticultural. Approximately $8 billion had been raised from 
75,000 investors since the introduction of the Managed Investments Act in 1998. 
Ironically, this new financing mix of Australian farm financing with MIS did not last 
long. Four major MIS schemes including Timber Crop, Great Southern Crop Willmont 
and Gunns were collapsed due to high transaction costs, poor management, and weak 
business structure (Larder et al., 2017). 
The necessity for an off-farm equity market for Australian family farms emerged 
after the post-deregulation stage. In the early 2000s, access to sufficient external equity 
was identified as a limiting factor to Australian farms’ expansion, profitability and 
even for accessing bank debt (Dwyer, Lim & Murphy 2004).  Australian farmers, being 
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located in regional areas, have always been relied on banks debt without sufficient 
supply of off-farm equity capital which has caused farms’ negative growth (Dwyer, 
Lim & Murphy 2004).  
These risks and uncertainties may inhibit the farms’ cash generating capacity and 
can create default risk if farms cannot service the bank loan as per loan covenant. 
Banks may then force farms’ liquidation for the recovery of their principal and interest. 
This unexpected event may drive farmers out from their farms, which are their home 
as well as the site of their occupation (Kolstrup et al., 2013; Sartore, Kelly, Stain, 
Albrecht, & Higginbotham, 2008). Australian media reports how naively Australian 
banks handled banks’ debt to farms and contributed to silent farm financial crisis, 
farms’ foreclosure, and farmers’ suicide (Mailler, 2015; Chenery, 2015; McCarthy, 
2014; Francis, 2014; Huges, 2014; Jones, 2013). Other reports criticised Australian 
banks for being harsh or unfair and for not understanding farm business and raised 
concern for a public inquiry for unconscionable farms’ banking practices (Bettles, 
2017; Locke, 2016; Marshall, 2014).   
Moreover, from a financial ecosystem perspective, over-reliance on debt is a threat 
to the balance of the whole financial system (Rolet, 2012). More alarming is that the 
largest share of bank debt coverage, 70% of total farm loans, is mainly held by the top 
25% of Australian farm business (Heath, 2016). This means smaller units of farms 
either cannot access debt loans owing to insufficient security, or banks do not consider 
them as attractive due to their scale. Since the post-global financial crisis in 2008, this 
type of finance has become tougher for family farms due to banks stricter loan policies 
(Thiele, 2017). This trend is also evidenced in the Australian farming sector as the 
relative value of bank loan has declined to 120 % of annual agricultural production 
from 160%, even though the total volume of debt capital has not declined (Heath & 
Tomlinson, 2016). 
The value of internal equity (land in this case) and farms’ obligation arising from 
bank debt are interconnected and any fluctuation in lands value can on impact farms’ 
financial conditions, especially in capital-intensive farms, cattle industry in particular 
(Mclean, Holmes & Counsell, 2014; Martin, Phillips, Leith, & Caboche, 2013; 
Gleeson, Martin, & Mifsud, 2012; ACILTasman, 2012). Land value is a determining 
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factor of farms internal equity as land assets are almost equal to 75% of farms internal 
equity. Some estimates suggest that cattle farms need to sustain a safety level of 85% 
of the internal equity, in the long run, to service the bank loan properly (Mclean et al. 
2014). Any fall in the value of internal equity below this safety level may cannibalise 
farms’ working capital and push farms to a likely default of losing internal equity 
(Mclean et al. 2014). Internal equity is by itself a finite source of capital and cannot 
help family farms to grow and increase scale (KPMG, 2015).  
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Appendix 2: Off-farm Equity Market Requirements: A Review  
 
1. Demand and supply side of off-farm equity 
1.1. Demand side of off-farm equity 
Family farms who want to access off-farm capital are the ultimate seekers of 
equity on the demand side. Family farms’ sizes, preferences, and behaviours influence 
demands for equity. With regard to the demand to the side of off-farm equity, Collins 
and Bourn (1986), based on Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), agreed that farms 
with high debt-asset ratios could access much higher off-farm equity. In the same vein, 
Collins, Lowenberg-DeBoer, Featherstone, and Leatham (1989), also found that farms 
with higher debt volumes can consume more off-farm equity. Their study also showed 
that even a new farm with lower debt could reap the benefits of economies of scale by 
injecting off-farm equity, but it a takes a relatively long time. Farms’ demands for off-
farm equity capital also derives from their tendency to diversify their investment 
portfolios as farms can invest their equity in other farming sectors if they have a surplus 
of internal equity. This has been evidenced in other research (McKinzie, Baker, & 
Tyner, 1987; Penson,1977). Others stated that demands for off-farm capital are 
sometimes driven by subjective attitudes of farms as they argue that a judicial mix of 
debt and off-farm equity is necessary to keep the farm’ cost of capital under control. 
Empirical models, such as, maximization of expected present value over 
consummation, maximization of expected wealth in a dynamic environment with 
uncertain real estate, and maximization of expected wealth in a dynamic and risky 
environment, are also discussed in the literature (Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989) that 
such models estimate the demands for equity capital, at least in aggregate equity 
(without any difference between of farm or off-farm equity sources). 
Even though these demand determinations are based on US literature and 
aggregate analysis of farm and external equity, in the absence of empirical works in 
other settings, we believe that these have implications for understanding the family 
dominant farms’ demand dynamics for off-farm equity in other economic settings 
Australia in our case. Furthermore, regarding capital needs to escalate farms’ sizes and 
productivity, anecdotal research in Australian farming industry (ANZ, 2016; AgriFood 
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Skills, Australia, 2015) classifies demand of off-farm equity (family farms) into four 
groups: small, medium size, large commercial and corporate farms.  Table 1 depicts 
some basic features of Australian family farms who have a demand for off-farm equity 
finance. One interesting observation of these features is that not all the farms have a 
desire and real strength to use off-farm equity. Commercial and corporate farms are in 
a better position to use off-farm equity while medium-size farms also have the 
potential for off-farm equity. Small farms are not viable for off-farm equity.   
Table 1:  Different types of Australian family farms, (ANZ, 2016; 
AgriFood.2015) 
1.2. Supply side of off-farm equity 
As another significant actor in the off-farm equity market, investors have also 
attracted much attention in the farm and agricultural finance literature as suppliers of 
off-farm equity. Regarding the importance of addressing investors’ attractiveness, one 
scholar (Raup, 1986) raised the question: “why would outside investors want to 
assume some of the risks of contemporary farming?” Investors’ tendency to explore 
off-farm equity options is influenced by searching cost, farms’ risk-return features, and 
 Small size Medium Size Commercial Corporate 
  
  
K
ey
 f
ea
tu
re
s 
 
- Lifestyle 
farming 
- Scalability 
neither 
desired not 
realistic 
- family farms 
with 
enormous 
potential 
- The desire to 
grow and 
extend the 
size 
- Already large-
scale and 
sophisticated 
- Yet, family-
controlled 
- large scale family owned 
farm under a corporate 
structure 
- want to have geographic 
and commodity 
diversification 
Proportio
n  
50% 30% 18% 2% 
Average 
Turnover 
Less than 
$150,000 
$150,000-
$500,000 
$500,000-$1.2M greater than $1.2M 
Financing 
Strategy  
internal 
financing and 
off-farm income 
Combination of 
debt and internal 
fund 
debt, off-take 
agreement, getting 
ready for external 
capital partners 
Use of debt and already using 
external equity partners  
Asset 
class  
Beef 
/sheep/cropping 
Beef/sheep/cropp
ing/ 
dairy/horticulture
/forestry 
Beef/sheep/cropping/ 
dairy/horticulture/for
estry 
Beef/sheep/cropping/ 
dairy/horticulture/forestry/m
ixed farming 
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available institutional arrangements. Some literature emphasizes investors’ 
requirements for off-farm equity (Mishra & Lence, 2005; Dodson, 1994 ; Lowenberg-
DeBoer et al., 1989; Collins, 1988; Moss, Featherstone, & Baker, 1987; Boyette & 
White, 1987; Gertel & Lewis, 1980; Kost, 1968). In these works, authors opined that 
agricultural assets have many features, such as minimal systematic risk, the 
uncorrelated rate of return and risk with market portfolio, and consistent and 
comparable long-term returns, to motivate investors. This evidence is however based 
on the data of publicly traded agricultural asset using capital asset pricing techniques 
such as capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and arbitrage pricing techniques (APT). 
No stream of literature was identified in the family farming domain where the supply 
side of equity was counted using such a sophisticated tool.  
2. Asset class and rate of return in off-farm equity capital market 
Many scholars (Larder, 2015;  Larder, Sippel, & Lawrence, 2015; Magnan, 2015; 
Isakson, 2014; Burch & Lawrence, 2009) in agricultural farms have addressed the 
emergence of financialization in primary agriculture and agribusiness value chain.  
These studies identified the active role  of finance, financial actors, financial markets, 
and financial institutions in every aspect of agricultural value chains worldwide: food 
retailing (Burch and Lawrence  2009, 2013);  food processing (Rossma 2009), grain 
trading (Murphy, Burch, & Clapp, 2012); determination of food prices and the 
distribution of agricultural risk (Martin and Clapp 2015; Bush, 2012; Clapp, 2014; 
Ghosh, Heintz, & Pollin, 2012); provisioning of agricultural inputs (Ross 2008); and 
the ownership and control of farmland (Fairbairn 2013, Highquest US, 2010, Cotula 
2012). Table 2 summarises some potential Ag asset class which are available for 
investors across the global food and Ag value chain. 
In the Australian context, the potential Ag. Investment class can be grouped into 
two types of assets class based on their current export contribution in Australian 
economy (Industry Super Australia, 2017; BDO, 2015). This two-asset class is 
processed and non-processes items. Unprocessed items include wheat, wool, cotton, 
oilseeds, barley, live animals, fruits, and nuts. Processed items include meat, 
beverages, milk, and sugar products. 
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Table 2: Agricultural asset across the Ag and food value chain, Valoral advisor 
(2017). 
 
2.1.Farm Land: Emerging agricultural asset class 
Farmland is one of the hot agricultural assets around the world for institutional 
investors such as pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds, as well as non-
institutional investors (Luyt, Santos & Carita, 2013; Daniel, 2012; Grain, 2011; 
Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, & Keeley, 2009). Metaphorically, farmland is compared 
with gold and now is known as “black gold” or “gold with yield” or “gold with 
coupon” (Fairbairn, 2014b). Farmland is categorically divided into two: arable land 
and permanent crops (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations, 2012). Lands that are ploughed for relatively shorter periods, i.e., less than 
five years, and that is mainly used for: agricultural crops, posture, mowing, market or 
kitchen gardens, are known as arable land (FAO, 2012). Permanent crops are on those 
lands that are used for the long-term cultivation of crops, and for planting trees, other 
than forest trees (FAO, 2012). Estimates show that the global universe of investible 
farmland value is $8.4 trillion of which only $1 trillion sizes of farmland has been 
Upstream Midstream Downstream 
Farmers and growers 
 Farmland, crop production 
 Livestock, fisheries, and 
aquaculture 
 Forestry, urban farming, 
and organic farming 
 storage 
Input companies 
 Seeds, crop protection 
 Fertilizer 
 Precision agriculture and 
irrigation system  
 Animal health, genetics, 
and feeds 
 Energy 
Processing and trading 
 Commodity sourcing and 
handling 
 Animal protein (beef 
dairy, poultry 
 Biofuels, wood, and 
papers 
 Grains, wood, and 
wineries 
Food companies 
 Food ingredients, 
processing, and packaging 
 Bakery, snacks, and 
beverage 
 Vegetable protein, dairy 
processing, and meat 
packing 
 
Distributing and retailing 
 Cold storage, bulk products 
 Supermarkets and groceries  
 Import/export 
 Private food/branded food 
Consumers 
 Urban and rural 
 Farm to consumer 
 Food labeling 
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tapped by farms owners and investors (Macquarie Agricultural Fund Management 
(MAFM), 2012). Of this explored investment volume, $30-40 billion is owned by 
institutional investors while $70-$100 billion is held by non-institutional investors 
(MAFM, 2012). Institutional investors are the key players in farmland investment as 
their long-term sources of financing (liability structure in other words) well fits well 
with financing demands of agriculture. 
The Australian rural land market is estimated at about 400 million hectares as 
at June 2015 (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2017), and the lion percentage of 
this land is privately held. In the Australian literature, farmland has been considered 
as one of the rising Ag asset class in which institutional, corporate financial investors 
are investing a lot (Larder, Sippel, & Argent, 2017; Larder et al., 2015; Magnan, 2015; 
Sippel, 2015). The Australian farmland market has five features that can attract global 
investors (Larder et al., 2017): political stability, technological aristocracy in farming, 
strategic geographic fitness, open and export-oriented agricultural policy, and 
significant land value appreciation. Foreign investors are currently holding a great 
portion of farm ownership in Australian farmland. The UK, the US, the Netherlands, 
Singapore, China, the Philippines, Switzerland, Jersey, Indonesia, Japan are the top 
ten foreign investors (Industry Super Australia, 2017).    
2.2. Investment rates of return for Australian agricultural assets 
 The average long-term rate of return in Australian agricultural asset are very 
competitive and are attractive for the potential investors in these sectors. Table 3 
portrays the trend of long-term rate of return, 1980-2016, income component and 
capital appreciation component, in Australian agriculture (Industry Super Australia, 
2017).  The beef and wheat sector are the two most attractive choice for investors as 
each of the sectors generating annualized growth rate of 10.5% while the dairy sector 
shows an annualized return of 9.9% (Industry Super Australia, 2017).  
3.  Investors class in off-farm equity capital  
3.1. Institutional investors 
Traditional banks fall short of fulfilling the long-term financing needs of 
growth-oriented firms in different sectors in the economy due to two major distinct 
limitations of banking model: (1) an instantaneous commitment to depositors, and 
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(2) a changed role in the intermediation process after the neoliberalism era (Croce & 
Yermo, 2013). Thus, long-term lending financing has become more stringent for 
commercial banks due to stricter banking regulation stemming from Basel III after 
the financial crisis (Croce & Yermo, 2013). Like other sectors, huge long-term capital 
gaps emerged in the agricultural sectors due to this maturity mismatch. Institutional 
investors have emerged as an alternative financing vehicle to provide three types long 
term (at least for five years) capital: “productive, patient, and engaged” capital ( 
Croce & Yermo, 2013). Çelik and Isaksson (2014) defined intuitional investors as an 
independent legal entity or a subsidiary or conglomerate of another bigger company 
that manages investors’ money. Çelik and Isaksson (2014) have divided intuitional 
investors into three categories: traditional (pension funds, investment funds, 
insurance companies), alternative (hedge funds, private equity sovereign funds), 
asset managers.   
Table 3: Rate on long-term investment in Australian agricultural assets class 
(Industry Super Australia, 2017) 
Years Return Component 
Wheat and 
Other Crops 
Dairy Beef 
All 
Industries 
1980-
1989 
Yield 
Yield with Capital gain 
7.1% 
11.9% 
5.7% 
19.3% 
4.3% 
19.3% 
5.5% 
14.6% 
1990-
19999 
Yield 
Yield with Capital gain 
10.2% 
11.9% 
4.6% 
8.8% 
7.8% 
8.0% 
7.6% 
8.0% 
2000-
2009 
Yield 
Yield with Capital gain 
6.1% 
10.% 
4.5% 
9.0% 
4.4% 
0.3% 
4.8% 
9.9% 
20101-
2016 
Yield 
Yield with Capital gain 
3.8% 
4.2% 
3.0% 
3.1% 
2.2% 
1.9% 
3.2% 
3.6% 
1980-
2016 
Yield 
Yield with Capital gain 
7.3% 
10.5% 
4.8% 
9.9% 
.0% 
10.5% 
5.7% 
9.7% 
 
The global size of these institutional investors is estimated at USD 73.4 trillion 
(traditional), USD 11.3 trillion (alternative) and USD 31.5 trillion (asset managers) 
(Çelik & Isaksson, 2014). Dominant OECD countries regarding institutional 
investors are: Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark, UK, and Australia whereas 
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Hungary, the Czech Republic, Mexico, the Slovak Republic, Greece, and Turkey are 
in less dominant brackets. Of these, 38% of traditional institutional investment and 
40% of alternative intentional investment are held by public equity. This thesis is 
more interested to unveil the private segment of institutional investment in farm and 
agriculture.    
In the global farms and agricultural domain, the emergence of institutional 
investors including private equity funds, pension’s funds, private investment 
companies, farmland investment management organizations (FIMOS) larger 
agribusiness firms and high net worth individual investors have been accounted for 
in a range of studies (Knott & Neis, 2017; Ouma, 2016; Magnan, 2015; Isakson, 
2014; Fairbairn, 2014b; Luyt et al., 2013; Bergdolt & Mittal, 2012; HighQuest 
Partners, US, 2010). A recent report (Preqin, 2016) on agricultural fund investing 
pattern over 2000 investors identified nine types of institutional investors in 
agriculture/ farmland: pension funds are the largest investors with a share of 32% 
(20% public pension fund, and 12% private pension fund). Others included: 
endowment plans (14%), foundations (12%), family offices (6%), government 
agencies (6%), asset managers (5%), investment Company (5%), and other (20%). 
Another study on 58 funds (HighQuest Partners, US, 2010) also shows the same kind 
of institutional investors who are active in the agriculture and food value chain.   
3.1.1. Private Equity (PE) fund 
 Private equity is clearly understood as an opposed to public equity. It refers to 
any equity capital provided by private investors to other private companies with a 
view a to earn normal and capital gain from that investment (Gilligan & Wright, 
2014). Privet equity funds are a mechanism by which principal investors, also known 
as limited partners (LP), and individual find managers, also known as general 
partners (GP), develop a partnership for a limited time (Gilligan & Wright, 2014). 
Private firms injecting private equity improve their operational, financial, and 
strategic performance (European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA),2009). Different institutional investors including private pension funds, 
public pension funds, foundations, insurance companies, investment banks, asset 
managers, family offices, government agencies, corporate investors, private equity 
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firm, sovereign wealth funds, and superannuation schemes and wealth managers are 
active as limited partners in private equity funds (Gilligan & Wright, 2014).  
PE firms can be a useful source of long-term finance to farms and 
agribusinesses in given conditions where farms want to beef up the scales but struggle 
to get sufficient access to finance and liquidity (Aulisi et al., 2015). The farm and 
agribusiness financing discuss the emerging role of private equity funds in farms and 
agribusiness under the notion of food regimes because of neoliberalism, capital 
restructuring and financialization (Klimek & Bjørkhaug, 2017; Knott & Neis, 2017; 
Ouma, 2016; Burch & Lawrence, 2009).  One review (Luyt et al., 2013) of equity 
funds in primary agriculture found almost 57 active cases of equity funding valued 
at USD22-24 billion invested in selected countries of two regions: Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth independent states (CIS), over the period 
2006-2013. For details, we refer to the review titled” Emerging investment trends in 
primary agriculture” (Luyt et al., 2013).  The main focus of this investment was: 
agricultural land (0.2%) and arable land (0.4%).  
Private equity funds are held by the investing firms from 3 to 10 years and are 
sold at profits to realise their invested capital (Gilligan & Wright, 2014; Gospel, 
Pendleton, Vitols, & Wilke, 2011). Global private equity under asset management 
stood at $2.49 trillion in 2016 (Preqin, 2017). The business model of PEF is, as 
explained in (Makhene, 2009) as follows: (1) making a pool of targeted capital from 
interested limited partners (LPs) for a certain period, (2) LPs do have limited liability 
and no role in management, and (3) GPs have unlimited liability and management 
authority and contribute capital (1-5%) to funds for a specific period. After maturity 
LPs will return the capital back to investors. Though there is no unique form of private 
equity (PE) management, a study (EVCA,2007)  shows that there are three types of 
PE equity: (1) independent PE - is  the most commonly found PEF in which capital 
are collected mainly from third parties, and no specific individual/organizational 
shareholder holds the majority stake- ; (2) Captive PE – is one in which one parent 
organization provides the total capital from its sources, and (3) semi-captive PE- is 
that form in which the largest amount of capital is collected from one particular parent 
organization and the other parts of capital are collected from third parties. 
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From the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum Venture Xpert data set, Mondelli 
and Klein (2014) reported a pattern of external equity injection in some selected 
economic settings around the world over the period, 1990-2010. Table 4 summarizes 
that during this period 163 agri-food companies from North America, 106 companies 
from the European Union, and 24 from Australia and New Zeeland accepted private 
equity. In addition, Daniel (2012) has identified 16-private equity deals in African 
farmland investment scape. In the Australian literature, Burch and Lawrence (2013) 
are some of few authors who academically studied private equity with the food chain. 
In this work, Burch and Lawrence raised the questions about the ethical business 
practices of private equity models. Thornton’s private equity report (Grant Thornton, 
2014) recorded 113 private equity deals during the 2011-2014 period in Australian 
agri-food chain. Of these deals, 22 originated from overseas, and 94 deals were from 
domestic sources. 
PE investment in Australian agribusinesses is still under-represented due to the 
following factors: the conservative attitude of ownership retention of agribusiness 
farms by the family (Smyrnios & Dania, 2006); the ‘keep it in the family’ tradition of 
equity governance (Barbera, 2012); and the aptitude of unusual cash return 
expectations, usually three times that of PE investment multiples, of the PE investors 
(Deloitte, 2013). 
Table 4: Private Equity flow in Ag asset class around the Globe (source Thomson 
Financial SDC Platinum Venture Xpert, adapted from Mondelli and Klein (2014) 
Sector 
North 
America 
European 
Union 
Australia-New 
Zealand 
Total 
Agricultural Inputs 35 31 1 67 
Agricultural 
production 
52 36 11 99 
Agri.  food 
processing 
35 19 03 57 
Wholesale 09 03 02 14 
Service to 
agricultural 
production 
32 17 07 56 
Total 163 106 24 293 
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3.1.2.  Pension funds 
Pension funds are a public or private beneficial institutional mechanism, where 
employers and employees contribute, on the basis of employment contracts, to 
developing a pool of funds for the employees (Clark & Monk, 2014; Franzen, 2010; 
Bodie, Marcus, & Merton, 1988). All contribution are accumulated in a single fund 
which is then invested in capital markets and then participants are rewarded from the 
pension funds (Franzen, 2010). Two types of pension funds are observed: defined 
contribution (DC) pension funds and defined benefit (DB) pension funds (Franzen, 
2010; Bodie et al., 1988). DC is a relatively simple pension fund where both 
employers and employees make a regular contribution for a specified period and 
claimants have their benefits accumulated in the account from total contribution and 
investment returns (Bodie et al., 1988). DB is a fund that is created form employees’ 
deferred tax, which is placed under a trust and benefits are calculated based on 
claimants’ social security, levels of salary and lifetime of service (Franzen, 2010). 
Global accumulated assets under pension funds increased to USD 39.3 trillion 
in 2015 from USD21.3 trillion in 2004 (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), 2016). 
Bond and equities have been the traditional choice of investment which has started 
to change in recent decades (PwC, 2016). The global financial crisis of 2008 
profoundly affected pension fund portfolio creating $5.4 trillion losses mostly in 
OECD countries, as pension fund portfolio concentrated in equity securities were 
exposed to equity securities (MAFM, 2009). Due to the uncorrelated character of 
agricultural assets with other assets pension finds diversified their portfolio to farm 
and agribusinesses (Grain, 2012). Currently, the pension fund is the largest 
institutional investors in the agricultural sector of industrialized economies (Cotula, 
2012). The total size of the global pension fund is US$32 trillion and US$5-15 billion 
is now invested in farmland (Garner, .2011). Table 5 outlines some pension fund 
investments in different parts of the world with different agricultural assets and 
farmland. 
Introduced in 1993, the compulsory occupational pension system in Australia is 
known as the Superannuation system which currently holds a $2.2 of funds under 
management, covering pension contributions of almost 71% of the Australian 
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workforce (Nales, 2017; Inderst, 2014). The Australian Superannuation system 
consists of 481, 57 funds: 122 are corporate finds, 56 industry funds, and 39 public 
sector funds while funds for the retail sector is 135 and there are 481,538 funds with 
less than five members. The top 10 largest Australian superannuation funds are: 
Future Fund, Australian super, Q Super, First State Superannuation Scheme, State 
Super, UniSuper, Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme, Retail Employees Super 
Annulation Trust, Hesta Super Fund, and Sun super (Inderst, 2014). Ironically, this 
strong fund base contributes an investment of less than 0.5% to the $64 billion 
Australian farm and agricultural sector (Nales, 2017).  
 Contrary to Australian Super annotations, anecdotal and empirical works have 
recorded that some sizable foreign pension funds have invested in Australian farms 
and agribusiness including in farmland, crops, cattle, and the fish industry. Besides 
the deals mentioned in Table 5, over the period 2011-2103, Australian agricultural 
land attracted $1.5 billion of investment backed by US, Danish and Swiss pension 
funds (Craston, 2013). Besides these, the Australian almond production has received 
$115 million investment from Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board, Canada.  In 
2016, the Public-Sector Pension (PSP) fund, one of the largest Canadian pension fund 
committed to investing $500 million in Australian cattle and fish farms under joint 
venture partnership (Cranston, 2016).  
The much empirical evidence is yet to confirm the reasons why Australian super 
funds are feeling less attractive towards Australian farms and agricultural investors. 
A survey done by BDO, Australia (2015) revealed some reasons for lower investment 
by Australian Funds in farms and agriculture: lower expected average return, less 
diverse Ag.  The investable product, high searching cost, illiquid environment for Ag 
products, information gaps, lack of asset managers with agricultural knowledge, and 
higher management expenses in agricultural asset portfolios. However, criticism of 
poor returns in the farm and agricultural sector is challenged by the long-term return 
trend as depicted in Table 3. Another evidence by the Teachers Insurance and 
Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) farmland 
research also confirmed the annualized return of 10.27% on agricultural farmland, 
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which outperformed all other types of the asset class in the US over a long-term 
period, 1970-2016 (Goodreds, Ourso, & Park, 2017).   
Table 5: Pension funds investment picture in global farms land and production (Grain, 
2012) 
Pension fund 
Fund 
Origin 
Asset under 
management 
Invested 
amount  
Ag. Asset class  
Alecta pension Fund Sweden 
US$72.3 
billion 
Not revealed 
Meat, dairy, sugar, 
beef: Russia 
AP2 Second Swedish National 
Pension Fund 
Sweden 
Us$34.6 
billion  
US$500 
million (1.4%) 
Grain farmlands:   US 
and Brazil 
AP3: Second Swedish National 
Pension Fund 
Sweden US$28.8 
US$ 
38million 
(0.1%) 
Farmland and grain 
production: Russia 
and Ukraine 
APG: Netherlands 
Netherlan
ds 
EU4240 
billion 
EUR 1billion 
(0.5%) 
Latin America, New 
Zealand, Australia, 
Ascension Health USA US$15 billion 
$1.1 billion 
(7.5%) 
farmland 
Australian superfund Australia 
US$1.27 
trillion 
US$490 
million 
(0.04%) 
Farmland: Australia 
AVWL Germany 
US$11.5 
billion 
US$100 
million (0.9%) 
Farmland: Australia, 
Brazil, and the USA 
CalPERS (California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System) 
USA 
US$231.4 
billion 
US$ 50 
million 
Farmland and crops: 
USA 
Dow Chemicals USA Not revealed Not revealed Farmland: USA 
Insight Management UK 
US$235 
billion 
US$1.6 billion  
IPERS (Iowa public retiree 
system) 
USA US$20billion 
US$100 
million (0.5%) 
Farmland: North 
America 
New Zealand Superannuation 
Fund 
New 
Zealand 
US$ 14.2 
billion 
US$ 407 
million (3%) 
Farmland: NZ and 
overseas 
One US “state teachers fund” - 
CALSTRS? 
USA  
US$ 500 
million - US$ 
1 billion 
farmland 
PFZW Pension Fund for Care 
and Well-Being, formerly 
PGGM 
Netherlan
ds 
EUR 90 
billion 
(0.3%) farmland 
PKA Pensionskassernes 
Administration 
Denmark 
US$ 25 
billion 
US$370 
(1.5%) 
Farmland reals, 
soybeans, fruits, 
vegetables, sugar,  
TIAA- CREF Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity 
Association-College Retirement 
Equities Fund 
USA 
US$ 426 
billion 
 
 
US$3.1 
billion 
(0.7%) 
 
Farmland: Australia, 
US, Brazil and Poland 
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Much empirical evidence is yet to confirm the reasons why Australian super 
funds are feel less attractive towards Australian farms and agricultural investors. A 
survey done by BDO, Australia (2015) revealed some reasons for lower investment 
by Australian Funds in farms and agriculture: lower expected and average return, less 
diverse Ag.  Investable product, high searching cost, illiquid environment for Ag 
products, information gaps, lack of asset managers with agricultural knowledge, and 
higher management expenses in agricultural asset portfolios. However, criticism of 
poor returns in the farm and agricultural sector is challenged by the long-term return 
trend as depicted in table3. Another evidence by the Teachers Insurance and 
Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) farmland 
research also confirmed the annualized return of 10.27% on agricultural farmland, 
which outperformed all other types of the asset class in the US over a long-term 
period, 1970-2016 (Goodreds, Ourso, & Park, 2017).   
3.2.High Net Worth Individual (HNWI) investors  
Initial public offerings (IPOs) and institutional investors, in a strategic partnership, 
may not incentivize family business owners to seek capital from these sources as this 
financing option may limit or reduce the control of family business whereas keeping 
the majority of control in the hands of family owners is a strong desire (KPMG, 2014).  
In this context, the HNWI can be an exciting alternative by giving them sufficient 
capital as well as to retain the family ownership. Researchers (Mason and Harrison, 
1996; Landstrom, 1993; Riding 1993; Harr, Starr, & MacMillan 1988; Wetzel 1987; 
Gaston and Bell, 1986) conducted on private individual investors in the context of the 
US, the UK, Sweden, and Canada found the following features of private individual 
investors: That private individual investors are/have:  
i. well-educated;  
ii. experienced in the new ventures; 
iii. a preference to invest in a syndicate formed with other investors; 
iv.  Investment holding period of 5-8 years. 
Individual investors, especially, HNWI, appoint family office to take investment 
and wealth management services (Earnest Young (EY), 2012). A family office can be 
two types: a single-family office- the family which is created by single family and is 
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obligated to serve that family – and multi-family office- the family office which is 
created for advising a number of families (EY, 2012). Assets under management of 
single family office (3000 single family offices) in the US is estimated at $1.2 trillion 
while multi-family’s (150 multi-family) assets are nearly $450 billion (EY, 2012).  In 
Australia, there are 250 single family offices and some multi-family offices who are 
being used by wealthy individuals to professionalize their financial management 
(Family Office Connect (FOC), Australia, 2012). The Top 20 multi-family offices in 
Australian market have $177.48 billion of assets under management as at December 
2012 (FOC, Australia, 2012). According to a Wealth insight estimate (O’Dowd, 2013), 
investment portfolios of Australian single-family offices are divided as follows: 21% 
in real estate 11% in retail and fashion, and 10% in basic materials. We, however, did 
not find any specific name of an agribusiness asset class in which family offices had 
invested. Yet, given the asset size of the family offices in the Australian and global 
contexts, it can be said that family offices are one of the potential candidates for off-
farm equity investment. 
    HNWI investors, who take the advice of family offices, both with regards to 
domestic and international sources, have also given serious attention to the Australian 
farm and agribusiness asset class. Domestic HNWI investors, for example, who 
switched their investment to Australian farmland and agriculture include Kerry Stokes 
(Media Mogul), Brett Blundy and Gerry Harvey (retail kings), Gina Rinehart (mining 
magnates), and Andrew Forest (McCauley, 2015). Reports by McCauley (2015), based 
on Australian Financial Review, suggest that these HNWI investors focus mainly on 
Australian cattle and land covering $4.7 million in cattle, $80 million in dairy, $500 
million in baby formula production, and $1.09 billion in retail and real estate. Based 
on international sources, reports in Australian media uncover the interest of foreign 
HNWI investors in Australian farms and agriculture. It is reported that Liu Yongaho, 
one of the richest man in China, prepares to invest $1billion in Australian agriculture 
from 2017 to 2020 (Courtney, 2017). AUK billionaire, Joe Lewis, (owner of football 
team Tottenham Hotspur) recently raised his shares in the Australian Agricultural 
Company (AACo) up to 37 % which is worth $350 million (Cranston, 2016). It is also 
rumoured in the media that another Chinese investor, Joel Chang, the founder of 
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Genius Link Asset Management (GLAM) is interested in investing $1 billion in 
Australian agribusinesses over the next three years (Corrs Chambers Westgarth 
Lawyers, 2016).    
4. Alternative institutional forms in off-farm funding  
 Dodson (1994) is one of the first few authors in agricultural farm financing 
who raised the issue of institutional arrangements for the smooth flow of off-farm 
capital to family farms. Dodson mentioned three elements of better institutional 
arrangements: (1) willingness to access off-farm equity- an adequate number of 
farmers with positive attitudes towards off-farm equity participation; (2) ability to 
access off-farm equity- sufficient number of farm businesses with the required size 
and return to attract investors; and (3) intuitional arrangements – a platform that 
equilibrates farmers and off-farm investors at lower transaction costs.   Other scholars 
(Collins & Bourn, 1986), contemporaries of Dodson, mentioned professional 
financial intermediator as another component of this institutional framework. Collins 
and Bourn (1986) also proposed a theoretical model arguing for financial 
intermediator to consider four issues regardless of an institutional framework to be 
considered for off-farm equity. These four issues are: 
i. addressing principal-agent problem between family farms and investors; 
ii. facilitating such off-farm equity instrument that will ensure liquidity to both 
farms and investors; 
iii.  investors protection in the events of farms’ default or foreclosure; and  
iv. fixing the taxation structure of off-farm equity arrangement. 
 
Literature, of almost 15 years ago, on off-farm equity capital in farm business 
(Barry & Robison, 2001; Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989), identified three categories 
of institutional arrangements in off-farm equity capital: (1) direct personal ownership 
of farm assets, (2) partnerships, and (3) direct ownership of firm assets by a 
corporation. Based on the conceptualization of Dodson (1994), some basic 
qualitative features of these intuitional arrangements are discussed in brief in the 
following section. 
4.1.Direct ownership 
    Direct ownership, a commonly used method in the US, is deployed by off-
farm investors to have outright purchase of agricultural assets: farmland and non-
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land assets. The acquired farms are operated by hired farmers but are managed by 
the non-farm investors or any other professional farm management firms on the 
investors’ behalf.  On some occasions, purchased farms are leased back to farm 
owners. The searching cost of a suitable farm for the urban investors is relatively 
high. Diversifying investors’ portfolios might be difficult as they might not have 
sufficient finance to purchase while parties to a transaction under this arrangement 
could struggle with liquidity owing to the absence of a ready market for the trading 
of farm assets.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
4.2. Partnerships: Unlimited, limited, and corporate  
Under this method, off-farm investors provide some forms of land and non-land 
capital including live stocks, equipment, and specialized management. Dodson 
(1994) mentioned three possible types of partnership: unlimited, limited and 
indirect limited partnership held by the incorporation of another partnership. Under 
unlimited (direct) partnership, off-farm investors, through intermediaries, bring 
management expertise into family farms and participate in farms’ management with 
a commitment to share farms’ losses in higher proportion relative to their 
contribution. In a limited partnership, by contrast, off-farm partners’ investment is 
mainly in cattle feeding, citrus groves, and other farms, and the share of profit and 
loss is proportionate to their capital invested (Dodson, 1994). Corporate partnership 
family farms go public but take the risk of double taxation: at the individual level 
and the corporate level. Searching costs for all types of partnership are high as the 
negotiation process is complex due to the diversity of partners. Owing to the 
engagement of brokers in the middle and standardization issues, assets under direct 
partnership are less liquid than those limited partnerships. Regarding units of assets 
under, limited partnership, they are easily diversifiable because of the units of assets 
being smaller.  While for the greater unit of assets, under the direct partnership, is 
less diversifiable. 
4.3.Equity partnership  
In a publicly listed setting, Collins and Bourn (1986) proposed three types of 
equity partnerships in US agriculture. First, a limited partnership between a 
commercial farm and an entity which is publicly traded. Under this mechanism, 
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farmers of commercial farms are general partners while the publicly traded entity 
is the limited partner. Limited partners select the general partners on the historical 
profitability and contribute proportionate capital of common entity’s internal 
equity/ or asset. In exchange, limited partners, namely farmers, are due to pay part 
of the capital gain and the operational gain. Second, a limited partnership between 
a publicly traded real estate investments trusts (REIT) and farmers. REIT, as a 
limited partner, attempts to issue common equity for a pool of farmers. Finally, a 
quasi-equity partnership between farms and a publicly traded entity. The latter 
acquires farmland and leases it back to farmers.  
Equity partnership through the public equity platform or quasi-public equity 
platform, even though, have been successful in some instances of US production 
agriculture (Atherton, 1972). Public domain of off-farm equity has steadily 
remained untapped by family farmers because of farmers’ high floatation costs in 
the middle (Barry, Bierlen, & Sotomayor, 2000; Penson Jr & Duncan, 1981). 
Alternative modes of private off-farm equity capital, financing through land 
leasing, especially by large farmers, emerged in the US (Mondelli, 2011; 
Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989). Currently, almost 50% of family farmers in the 
US and Canada access off-farm equity through leasing land (Mondelli, 2011). 
Nearly 50 % of US farmland and 40% of the UK’s farms land are now under formal 
and informal lease agreements in which capital and land are transferred from one 
enabled partner to other needed partners (Ashby & Ashby, 2011). 
In New Zealand, since, since the late 1970s, equity partnerships have been part 
of production agriculture until today. ANZ (2014) has counted almost 1000 equity 
partnership in different agricultural sectors including dairy, sheep, beef, cropping, 
and viticulture. In its featured article “Equity partnership: A look under the bonnet” 
ANZ (2014) outlines the basic features, benefits, critical success factors, modus 
operandi and challenges to off-farm equity partnerships. In its document, equity 
partnerships are loosely defined as a joint venture that develops pool resources, 
financial capital, expertise and other resources, from different individuals with 
different orientations. Equity partnership generates benefits both for farms and 
investors. Farmers’ benefits include: increase in scales and efficiencies, ensuring 
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better performance, mastering farm management skills, expanding the current 
business without losing the outright ownership and diversification of agricultural 
risks 
5.  Off-farm investment models in practice  
Recent developments around off-farm investors in production agriculture, food 
and agribusiness and farmland investment have shown several types of new 
institutional mechanisms. In the same line with that scholarly works, some 
contemporary empirical evidences (Sippel, Larder, & Lawrence, 2017; Magnan, 
2015; Fairbairn, 2014b; Li, 2015; Luyt et al., 2013; Burch & Lawrence, 2013; Daniel, 
2012; De Lapérouse, 2012; McMichael, 2012; Woodhouse, 2012; De Schutter, 2011; 
Burch &Lawrence,2009), off-farm investments in family farms - primary agriculture, 
food and agribusinesses value chain. These scholarly works show six models that 
have been used by off-farm investors globally while investing. Three common 
models are: (1) own –operate, (2) own lease-out, (3) lease operate. Three other less 
common models are: Operating Company (OPCO) and Property Company 
(PROPCO), active, and passive.  
There are two fundamental differences between these two spatial kinds of the 
literature of institutional arrangements in off-farm equity financing, mentioned 
above: First, while previous literature mainly concentrated on US farm and 
agriculture, the recent literature off-farm equity has now spread all over the world- 
developed and developing economies. Second, the latest stream of literature depicts 
the flows of off-farm capital from four different domains as observed in Cotula et al. 
(2009) and Daniel (2012):  
i. dominance of sovereign wealth funds, direct and indirect investment, in 
farms agriculture through equity participation;  
ii. the emergence of foreign investment in farms and agribusiness by state-
owned enterprises; 
iii. evolving farms and agribusiness capital deals at the government to 
government levels, and  
iv. origination of a mass private institutional investors group including agri. 
food companies, mutual funds, banks, pension funds, hedge funds, and 
private equity funds.   
 
 
 
  
  
 
   290 
 
5.1. Own-operate model 
Like direct ownership, the owner-operated model is a model through which off-
farm investors (usually institutional) invest in agricultural land and production. 
Farms cannot hold ownership anymore. Investors are interested in purchasing 
motivated by financial perspectives as observed in (Fairbairn, 2014b):  a long-term 
perceived growth potential stemming from higher population growth and associated 
food scarcity, and the value investing philosophy of investors, as investors apparently 
see much better long-term fundamental than those of financial assets. Investors 
expect higher returns of 20 percent (in combination with an increase in commodity 
prices and land values), but at the same time, they take the likelihood of higher risk 
stemming from higher price volatility (Fairbairn, 2014b Davies, 2011). Investors 
wishing to invest financial capital both in land and for production continuation use 
this model (Fairbairn, 2014b). 
 Return from this model may be a composite of productive and speculative 
component (Fairbairn, 2014b).   In an empirical study, Magnan (2015) accounted for 
five different large-scale fund investments under the own-operate model from both 
domestic and foreign sources in the Australian agro-food sector. These five funds 
and their associated sizes are:  
i. Macquarie Agricultural funds based in Australia with $AU1 billion,  
ii. Sustainable Agricultural funds headquartered in Australia with $AU145 
million,  
iii. MH Premium which originated in the UK with $AU142 billion,  
iv. First Australian Farm Land Fund which is situated in Sweden with $AU 
100 million and 
v.  Rural Fund Management based in Australia with $AU300 million.  
 
Sippel et al. (2017) also recorded two more deal under this mechanism: Hasad 
Australia, and Macuire Pastoral Fund. 
5.2. Own- lease model    
 Under this model, investors acquire the targeted agricultural assets, mainly 
farmland and then rent it back to farmers (Fairbairn, 2014b). Investors generally take 
the advice of external asset managers to fix the share of rental income and income 
from capital appreciation (Fairbairn, 2014b). Producers struck by financial 
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difficulties and prior debt servicing obligations may opt for this kind of financing 
option (Isakson, 2014). On the other hand, investors sometimes want to gain from 
price increases of the land, rather than agricultural production; and they sometimes 
look to cultivate flex crops to diversify their portfolios (Borras Jr, Kay, Gómez, & 
Wilkinson, 2012; McMichael, 2012) cited in Isakson (2014). With these intentions 
in mind and driven by long-term return strengths of farmland, investors use this 
model (Fairbairn, 2014b).  This conservative strategy used by investors is the true 
reflector of their financial assets, motives of farms land (Fairbairn, 2014b). Sippel et 
al. (2017) and (Magnan, 2015) have empirically explained how this investment 
model has been applied in the Australian farming sectors by Laguna Bay Pastoral 
and Westchester Agricultural Asset Management respectively for deals worth A$250 
million, and $US 2billion.    
5.3. Lease -operate  
This is a mechanism under which investors first take lease the farmland from 
farmers and then finance the leased land for production (Sommerville & Magnan, 
2015; Fairbairn, 2014a). This arrangement is considered to be more productive for the 
farming sector in the sense that investors actively engage in the production process, 
rather than just grabbing ownership (Sommerville & Magnan, 2015). Owing to the 
investors’ direct and active engagement, this model is one of the riskiest approaches 
as it entails both production risks and commodity price risks (Sommerville & Magnan, 
2015). Investors also find it as problematic in the case of mega investment projects 
where it is difficult to coordinate labour across different orientations and different 
geographies (Sommerville & Magnan, 2015; Magnan, 2012). Investors wishing to 
have access to only agricultural production, rather than ownership of land, may 
become more interest in using this model (Fairbairn, 2014b). In terms of risk versus 
return for investors, this is ranked the top model (Fairbairn, 2014b). This strategy is 
mainly based on the investors’ speculative tendency around farms’ crops values, rather 
than farms’ land values (Isakson, 2014). 
5.4. OPCO - PROPCO model 
 This is a mechanism through which agricultural assets are repackaged, and a 
separate new entity is created for facilitating investors and farms (Isakson, 2014; Burch 
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& Lawrence, 2013). Property company (PROPCO) is created to own the land (or any 
other assets) being sold and to work as a lessor of the capital asset while operating 
company (OPCO) is created to continue the production. Burch and Lawrence (2013) 
and Isakson (2014) have explained how a private equity consortium took over the UK 
based Somerfield supermarket using OPCO-PROCO. To their works, PROPCO can 
help both investee farms/firms and investors. Investees can avail themselves of 
additional loans from other sources thereby keeping the asset as mortgage, while 
investors can assess the market value of the assets. The OPCO-PROPCO model also 
facilitates separating the use and market value of the farmland (Fairbairn, 2014b). 
5.5. Passive investment model 
The passive investment mechanism is one of the highest recommended models 
to minimize investors’ concerns for farms’ production and management risk 
(AuxVenture, 2014). Agricultural investment underpins production risks originating 
from climatic and economic variability and the risks of managing the farm businesses. 
Investors also cannot fully rely on the advice of their advisors. Driven by these forces, 
investors remain concerned about losing their invested capital, and they feel less 
secured to invest in this sector (AuxVenture, 2014). Passive investment model works 
under the following conditions: investors invest their capital with a commitment from 
farms that investors will be given a fixed rate of return on farm production and 
additional capital appreciation benefits. Investors may also exit from the investment 
after a certain period. On the other hand, farms remain with farm business as producing 
and managing agent of farms’ production as they have ample experience in farm 
businesses. This model makes both farms and investors happy.  
6. Off-farm equity models in practice in Australia 
In Austrian farms and agriculture, off-farm equity is currently deployed in a 
range of structures, see Table 6. All of the structures mentioned, leasing is the most 
common and is commonly understood by stakeholders (KPMG, 2015). Other 
structures are still at an immature stage (KPMG, 2015). Table 6 implies some relevant 
facts and barriers to the off-farm equity structures mentioned.  
However, the bottom line is that no unique types of equity structure can satisfy 
all of the farms’ and investors’ expectations. Rather, a combination of different options 
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of equity models might serve the ultimate purpose of off-farm equity users and 
suppliers.     
Table 6: Different off-farm equity models used in Australian agriculture   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structure  Overview Trend  Source of Conflict 
Leasing  
Involves terms of 3 to 5 years with 
a set annual fee (approximately 3% 
to 5% of the underlying land value) 
Common  
The conflict between the 
land and operating entities 
regarding land care and 
improvement 
Share 
Farming 
Involves sharing farm profits 
between the landowner and farm 
manager. 
Common  
The conflict between the 
land and operating entities 
regarding land care and 
improvement 
Joint 
Ventures 
(Equity 
Partnership 
and co- 
Investment) 
involve a combination of off-farm 
equity, manager equity, and debt 
finance through a partnership, trust 
or company structure that owns and 
operates the business and share 
profits  
Limited  
ensure alignment between 
off-farm investors and 
managers 
Asset 
management 
Asset management involves the 
provision of off-farm equity that is 
under the control of a ‘manager.’  
Increasingly 
common 
The conflict between the 
off-farm equity investors 
and the manager through 
aligned remuneration 
models 
Public 
ownership 
Involves off-farm equity sourced 
through a company listed on a 
publicly traded share exchange 
from retail and institutional 
investors 
Limited Use 
Strong alignment between 
land and operating assets 
Managed 
investment 
schemes 
(MIS)  
 
A variety of structures based on 
collective investment in a common 
enterprise.  
 
Decreasing in 
popularity 
Good governance  
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Appendix 3: Comparative picture of institutionalism  
Prepared from the extant literature on institutionalism 
 
 
Institutionalism Key feature/ main 
focus 
Institutional 
elements  
Basis for 
decision  
Theory 
linkage 
Realist 
institutionalism 
Ensures basic 
principle before 
starting operation 
Trust and  
Agreement of 
actors 
(institutions) 
 
Relations and 
networks of 
actors 
 
Realist theory 
(Modern) 
Sociological 
institutionalism 
Societal, cultural and 
ideation issues, such 
as supra-societal, 
supra-state, or supra-
societal issues 
determines the norms 
of institutions or 
actors. 
 
Cognitive and 
normative 
scripts, moral 
temples, and 
symbol system 
of actors exert 
influence 
Heuristic 
actions of 
actors 
(organisation/  
country) 
 
Organisational 
theory, such as 
institutional 
logic theory 
Historical 
institutionalism 
Big question and 
issues of wide interest 
within specific place, 
time and context 
determine the norms of 
institution or actors. 
 
Conjunction of 
context, events, 
and  processes in  
one or different 
society or 
country   
Self-
reproducing 
sequences 
sets path or 
trajectory. 
Institutional 
Path 
dependence/ 
institutional 
lock-in theory 
Political/ 
economic 
institutionalism 
Answers to the nature 
of powers and focus on 
casual role of political 
institution (actors) on 
political out come and 
process.  
 
process/system/ 
structure of actor 
Rule/ system 
constructed 
by actors 
State centred 
theory  
Organisational 
intuitionalism 
Explores the 
perspectives of 
institutionalists 
regarding the 
behaviour of 
organisation/ 
institutional and 
institutional processes 
Rules , norms, 
and ideologies of 
wider society  
Regulatory, 
social and 
cultural 
forces 
Plethora of 
theories: 
Institutional 
isomorphism, 
institutional 
logics, 
institutional 
lock-in, and 
institutionalisat
ion theory. 
  
  
 
   306 
 
 
Appendix 4: Representative quotes for board and reporting formalization and in 
formalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: with the big institutional they’re always going to want that board (formal) structure. 
Panel A: Now it's (a successful farm who already collected equity) the largest private cotton grower in 
Australia, what it has done is it has a formal Board with independent directors with the accounts audited, 
it's got a CEO, a CFO.  So it's very investable. 
Panel A: we often see the board type creation where you have institutional or large sophisticated 
investment participants 
Panel A: it (the board) will be somewhere independent; it will be run by an external facilitator; 
B
o
ar
d
 
F
o
rm
al
iz
at
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n
 
Panel A: in the smaller co-investment opportunities, so in the mid-range and the midrange is sort of 
about 10 million to 50 million bracket, I don’t know that a board is necessary, what I think is quite 
effective is that external advisory board”.  
Panel B: my preferences are to not have independent or external board members, because you know, I 
guess we would prefer to be running our operations ourselves  
Panel A: With private investors and family offices and stuff you don’t actually see the board structure.  
It’s pretty rare. 
Panel A: you do not need necessarily have the full time board that is really expensive. You can have 
non-executive directors 
Panel A: we argue that it doesn’t have to be a formal paid structured board it could be an advisory 
committee and they provide confirmation of the budget, the planning and the strategic planning process 
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Panel A: thee institutional investors and even some of the corporates want to have look consolidated financial 
records of 3-5 years   
Panel A: It is not a simple reporting; it is understanding and forecasting what the business can offer within next 
10 years 
Panel A: I think that the transparent real time data reporting will become a straight forward requirement of 
wholesale institutional investment in any agriculture.   
Panel A: In big cases, they might be reported quarterly and certainly the reporting is usually around the 
productivity driver 
Panel A: I don’t see quarterly reporting in the investment structures unless you’re in the institutional end and 
you’ve got a board structure and a more corporatized structure 
Panel A: I have not seen any farm from medium to large, especially in beef, that they do have financial reporting 
that are sophisticated enough to attract the private equity farms. 
Panel A: business plans sort of things and the financial history documents it should be on the table to 
attract the investors 
Panel A: there might be a P and L, the balance sheets wouldn’t be reported in smaller scale, middle low 
tier investment more than once a year.  
Panel A: just providing half yearly or annual management figures and then the accountancy sort of 
reports for the annual tax.  That would be more common 
Panel A: outside of the formal structure of reporting there is informal communication between investors 
and farms  
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Appendix 5: Representative quotes for governance practices- control and exit 
strategy 
Governance 
Components 
         Statement by Panel A Statement by Panel B 
Ownership and  
Control   
 
 
 
 
 Corporate investors want 50 -50 ownership,  
Control tolerance depends on the level of 
return, and each investor is different 
 Day to day control should be at farm level, 
and strategic control should be at board level 
 Some farms want to sell the ownership while 
some other want to keep it, every farm are 
different, it depends on deal and case by case 
 Ownership structure may be tweaked by 
farm advisor by consulting with all  
 Control should be commercially pragmatic: 
more equity, less control 
 The compromising attitude in control: 
majority right to investors in the board and 
majority rights to investors in decision 
making(large farms) 
 No interference of investors in the decision 
making 
 Do not want to lose control more than 50 
percent  over operations for too much 
equity ( small farm) 
 Want to sacrifice up to 90 % control for 
right investors, like a pension fund,  in 
exchange for keeping  control on strategic 
and management issues 
 Not worried about control ( Small farm)  
Exit Strategy  Board charter will reflect, exit strategy to be 
fixed  at the upfront,  
 the capital exit strategy will be fixed in later 
in pure long-term equity ( more than ten 
years)  
 flexibility in exit option is required as the 
commodity / price/exchange risk emerge, 
 the contingent event that causes exit must 
address in the shareholder agreement,  
 the exit must reflect both parties interest    
 exit option should be locked for at least five 
years in external equity plan 
 developing a contingency plan  for exit 
option in three ways:  selling a part of the 
business, borrowing to pay investors and 
doing some capital replacement 
 locking exit for some certain period ( up to 
10 years) ( large farm) 
 dealing with right and culturally aligned 
investors to avoid exit, for example, PE 
investors has a quick exit strategy, but 
institutional investors wait for 20 years 
 exit between 5 -10 years ( small farms) 
 maintaining a standard methodology ( small 
farm) 
 case by case  
Equity 
arrangements 
and investor 
types  
 Equity Model: Joint Venture Model, Co-
Investment Model, Passive Equity Model 
 Investors Types: Institutional Corporate, 
Private Equity, High net worth individuals 
 Investors source: Asian (Chinese), North 
American, European, Canadian 
 Equity Size:  Large, Medium, and small  
 Investors Sophistication: based on origin 
 Investor Approach: Direct Vs. Indirect 
 Risk and Return: yield and capital return 
 Equity Time horizon: longer period, 20—
50 years 
 Cultural affinity: same cultural settings 
  
 
 Equity Model: 50-50 JV, 50 -0 equity 
partnership, offtake and passive equity 
 Equity Partners: Institutional, private 
individual investors 
 Expected size: Larger size 
 Strategic choice: access to capital, global 
distribution network, export, processing, 
and supply chain network, risk sharing, 
skills, machinery and technology 
 Equity duration: 10 years plus, 5-10 
years and deal by deal 
 Equity origins: domestic, foreign, deal by 
deal  
 Cultural affinity: same cultural settings 
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Appendix 6: 
Semi-Structured (in-depth) interview guide for family farms  
Project Title: External Equity Capital in Financing Australian Farming and Other 
Agribusinesses: Governance and Disclosure Issues 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Question 1:  Please tell me about bank-based and internal equity finance in meeting 
your farm’s and agribusiness financing needs. (Benefits/limitations) 
Question 2: Other than the above two types of financing, what other types of capital 
arrangements are you using or looking for? Why? (Investment partner/risk and return 
choices/ management and ownership preference) 
Question 3: Please, give some details about the business plan of your farm. (Before 
and after external equity) 
Question 4: Please tell us about the key business and financial information of your 
farm or agribusiness that you deliver to your investment partner before and after taking 
the external capital. (Contents/channels/frequency/ target groups) 
Questions 5: Please tell me about the management and ownership structure of your 
farm and agribusiness. (Before equity injection and after equity injection) 
Question 6: How do you control and take regular and strategic business decisions 
about your farm and agribusiness? (Before and after equity) 
Question 7: What mutual commitment, responsibilities, and obligations, of both you 
and your investment partners, are necessary for making external equity investment 
happen? 
Question 8: Could you please tell me some other elements of professional 
management and governance of your farm that has boosted your reputation in the 
market. 
Question 9: Is your farm facing any barriers/ problems in the current form of 
ownership/management in attracting capital from external investors? Please give the 
details. 
Questions 10: Please share with me your experience of using external equity capital 
investment in your capital structure. (Benefits/ challenges/ some names of investors) 
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Appendix 7: 
Semi-structured (in-depth) interview guide for farm advisors 
Project Title: External Equity Capital in Financing Australian Farming and Other 
Agribusinesses: Governance and Disclosure Issues 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Question 1: Please, tell me your current understanding regarding external equity 
capital environment for Australian farms and other agribusinesses?  
Question 2: What are the key sets of information (business and financial) the external 
equity investors want from the Australian farms and agribusinesses before and after 
making external equity investment decisions? (For decision making for investors) 
Question 3: How do the farms and agribusinesses transmit (report) their key financial 
and business information to the investors at the time of, and after, the external equity 
investment? 
Question 4: What business planning attributes are required to ensure the investment 
readiness of the farms and agribusiness?  
Questions 5: Please tell me about the ownership structure of Australian farms and 
agribusinesses and how it influences the external equity investors’ decisions?  
Question 6: How do the Australian farms and agribusiness make the decision to seek 
external equity investment? (Transparency/accountability issues regarding the 
decision) 
Question 7: What are governance practices/management framework for Australian 
farms and agribusinesses that secure external equity? 
Question 8: What are the retail and institutional investors (domestic and foreign) 
expecting from farms and agribusinesses for their capital investment? (E.g. 
expectations relating to return risk and management) 
Question 9: Please share some examples/names of farms and investors involved in or 
seeking external equity capital arrangements in Australian farms agribusiness. 
(Domestic and Foreign- individual and institutional) 
Question 10: As an industry advisor, what can you do/suggest to improve the 
governance and disclosure capability of farms and agribusiness? 
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Appendix 8: Ethics approval 
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Human Research Ethics Committee 
PHONE +61 7 4631 2690| FAX +61 7 4631 5555 
EMAIL ethics@usq.edu.au 
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Mr. Mohd. Mohsin 
 2/166 Drayton Rd 
Toowoomba QLD 4350 
 
Dear Mohd. 
 
The USQ Human Research Ethics Committee has recently reviewed your 
responses to the conditions placed upon the ethical approval for the project 
outlined below. Your proposal is now deemed to meet the requirements of the 
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) and full 
ethical approval has been granted. 
Approval No. H15REA180 
Project Title External equity capital in financing Australian farming and 
other Agribusinesses: Governance and disclosure issues 
Approval date 24 August 2015 
Expiry date 24 August 2018 
HREC Decision Approved 
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The standard conditions of this approval are: 
(a)  conduct the project strictly in accordance with the proposal 
submitted and granted ethics approval, including any amendments 
made to the proposal required by the HREC 
(b) advise (email: ethics@usq.edu.au) immediately of any 
complaints or other issues in relation to the project which may 
warrant review of the ethical approval of the project 
(c) make a submission for approval of amendments to the 
approved project before implementing such changes 
(d) provide a ‘progress report’ for every year of approval 
(e) provide a ‘final report’ when the project is complete 
(f) advise in writing if the project has been discontinued. 
 
For (c) to (e) forms are available on the USQ ethics website: 
          http://www.usq.edu.au/research/ethicsbio/human 
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Appendix 9: Information sheet 
Project Details  
 
Title of Project:    
External Equity Capital in Financing Australian Farming and 
Other Agribusinesses: Governance and Disclosure Issues 
 
Human Research 
Ethics Approval 
Number: H15REA180 
 
 
Research Team Contact Details 
 
Principal Investigator Details Supervisor Details 
Mr. Mohd. Mohsin 
Email:  Mohd.Mohsin@usq.edu.au 
Telephone:  (07)  4631 5362 
Mobile:  0450073575 
Professor Julie Cotter 
Email:  julie.cotter@usq.edu.au 
Telephone:  (07)  4631 2916 
Mobile:  0488 555 349 
 
Description 
 
This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD Project. The purpose of this project 
is to explore and address the governance and disclosure best practices for Australian 
farming and other agribusinesses seeking the external equity capital. 
 
The scope of the Project: In unlisted settings, the most commonly used farm 
business structures in Australia are: sole traders, subsidiary, companies, joint 
ventures, partnership, cooperatives and managed investment schemes. In this study, 
these categories are referred to as unlisted farming and agribusiness companies. The 
  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S o u t h e r n  Q u e e n s l a n d  
 
Participant Information for USQ Research 
Project Interview 
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unit of study of this thesis will be the Australian agribusiness farms that are involved 
in the beef value chain from cattle production to distribution. Queensland beef 
industry, especially based in Northern NSW and Southern Queensland of Australia, 
would be prioritized in the study.  
 
Project Importance: The traditional debt dominated Australian farm financing model 
has gradually been getting inefficient in providing adequate finance for the expansion 
and innovation of this sector.External equity is emerging as an alternative source of 
finance. Large-scale external equity investment in this sector is still extremely limited. 
This research addresses the exploration of adopting appropriate governance and 
disclosure standards with a view to promoting the external equity capital for this 
industry.  
The research team requests your assistance because you are engaged in Australian 
farming or other agribusinesses and your valuable opinions will assist the project to 
be successful.  
 
Participation 
 
Your participation will involve contributing your thoughts and ideas in the interview 
will take approximately 60 minutes of your time. The interview will take place at a 
time and venue that is convenient for you. 
 
Questions will include: What problems are Australian farms and other 
agribusinesses facing traditional financing? What could be the alternative choice of 
financing? What are the main barriers to external capital? What are the investors are 
looking for from farms? How can the market intermediaries help in farm financing 
and investing?    
 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do not wish to take part, 
you are not obliged to. If you decide to take part and later change your mind, you are 
free to withdraw from the project at any stage.  You will be able to withdraw data 
collected about yourself after you have participated in the interview.  If you wish to 
withdraw from the project, please contact the Research Team (contact details at the 
top of this form). 
 
Your decision whether you take part, do not take part, or to take part and then 
withdraw, will in no way impact your current or future relationship with the 
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University of Southern Queensland or your farm. You have the opportunity to know 
about the outcome of the research. In this connection, a summary report will be sent 
to your email. The report will also be available on the website: 
http://eprints.usq.edu.au/view/type/thesis.html, of USQ as e print version, once it will 
finally approve by the research office of the university. 
 
Expected Benefits 
 
It is expected that this project may directly benefit all participants by bringing 
together the knowledge and experiences of all key parties involved in external equity 
financing of Australian farms and other agribusinesses. The outcomes of this 
research will be shared with the participants. It may help in forming the basis of 
guidance on governance and disclosure for farms and other agribusinesses seeking 
external equity finance. It may also provide some policy decisions.    
 
Risks 
 
There are no anticipated risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your 
participation in this project. 
 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially unless required by law. 
 
 After the interview, you will receive a copy of the transcribed interview and 
you will have the opportunity to verify your comments and responses prior to 
final inclusion. 
 The audio recording will be stored in a secure data storage at USQ. 
 The research team (investigator and his supervisors) will have access to the 
recording. Also professional transcribers from Pacific Transcription Institute 
may be involved in the transcribing of the recording. Pacific Transcription 
adheres to the Australian Privacy Principles and conforms to university 
contractor agreements. To protect your privacy and ensure confidentiality, 
interview audio and transcriptions will not be made available to others at any 
time. 
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 If you wish to participate in the study without voice recording, please advise 
the investigator. In this case,  the interview may take longer as the researcher 
will need more time to take notes during the interview. 
 The data would be used for more expensive research. The data will also be 
shared with other research for a collaborative research. The identity, opinions, 
and the names of the participants will be kept in strict confidence.   
 
Any data collected as a part of this project will be stored securely as per University 
of Southern Queensland’s Research Data Management policy.  
 
Consent to Participate 
 
We would like to ask you to sign a written consent form (enclosed) to confirm your 
agreement to participate in this project.  Please return your signed consent form to a 
member of the Research Team prior to participating in your focus group. 
 
Questions or Further Information about the Project 
 
Please refer to the Research Team Contact Details at the top of the form to have any 
questions answered or to request further information about this project.  
 
Concerns or Complaints Regarding the Conduct of the Project 
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you 
may contact the University of Southern Queensland Ethics Coordinator on (07) 4631 
2690 or email ethics@usq.edu.au.  The Ethics Coordinator is not connected with the 
research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an unbiased 
manner.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to help with this research project. Please keep 
this sheet for your information.  
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Appendix 10: Consent form 
   
Project Details  
 
Title of Project:  
 
External Equity Capital in Financing Australian Farming 
and Other Agribusinesses: Governance and Disclosure 
Issues 
 
Human Research Ethics 
Approval Number:  
H15REA180 
 
Research Team Contact Details 
 
Principal Investigator Details Supervisor Details 
Mr. Mohd. Mohsin 
Email:  Mohd.Mohsin@usq.edu.au 
Telephone:  (07)  4631 5362 
Mobile:  0450073575 
Professor Julie Cotter 
Email:  julie.cotter@usq.edu.au 
Telephone:  (07)  4631 2916 
Mobile:  0488 555 349 
 
Statement of Consent  
 
By signing below, you are indicating that you:  
 
 Have read and understood the information document regarding this project. 
 
 Have had any questions answered to your satisfaction. 
 
 Understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the research team. 
  
 
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S o u t h e r n  
Q u e e n s l a n d  
Consent Form for USQ Research Project  
Interview 
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 Understand that you are free to withdraw at any time, without comment or penalty. 
 
 Understand that you can contact the University of Southern Queensland Ethics 
Coordinator on (07) 4631 2690 or email ethics@usq.edu.au if you do have any concern 
or complaint about the ethical conduct of this project. 
 
 Are over 18 years of age. 
 
 Agree to participate in the project. 
 
Participant Name  
  
Participant 
Signature 
 
  
Date  
Please return this sheet to a Research Team member prior to undertaking the 
interview. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
